This case has been cited 4 times or more.
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2014-04-07 |
REYES, J. |
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| The Court remains steadfast on its stand that the determination of the continuing necessity of a particular officer or position in a business corporation is a management prerogative, and the courts will not interfere unless arbitrary or malicious action on the part of management is shown. Indeed, an employer has no legal obligation to keep more employees than are necessary for the operation of its business.[1] In the instant case however, we find our intrusion indispensable, to look into matters which we would otherwise consider as an exercise of management prerogative. "Management prerogative" are not magic words uttered by an employer to bring him to a realm where our labor laws cannot reach. | |||||
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2011-08-03 |
PEREZ, J. |
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| Having been validly terminated on the ground of redundancy, Leynes is entitled to separation pay equivalent to one month salary for every year of service but not to the backwages adjudicated in her favor by the Labor Arbiter.[53] Hired by NHPI on 26 March 2001 and terminated effective 22 August 2002, Leynes is entitled to a separation pay in the sum of P40,000.00, in addition to her last pay which, taking into consideration her proportionate 13th month pay, tax refund and SILP, was computed by NHPI at P28,188.16.[54] For lack of showing of bad faith, malice or arbitrariness on the part of NHPI, there is, however, no justifiable ground for an award of moral and exemplary damages.[55] For lack of factual or legal bases, we find no cause to award attorney's fees in favor of Leynes. In the absence of the same showing insofar as NHPI's corporate officers are concerned, neither is there cause to hold them jointly and severally liable for the above-discussed monetary awards. | |||||
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2010-09-22 |
CARPIO, J. |
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| In Lowe, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,[17] the Court did not hold the officers personally liable for corporate obligations because the second requisite was lacking, thus: It is settled that in the absence of malice, bad faith, or specific provision of law, a director or an officer of a corporation cannot be made personally liable for corporate liabilities. | |||||
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2010-09-01 |
NACHURA, J. |
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| As to respondent Camus' liability as LMCEC president, it is settled that in the absence of malice, bad faith, or specific provision of law, a director or officer of a corporation cannot be made personally liable for corporate liabilities.[53] | |||||