This case has been cited 9 times or more.
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2015-09-02 |
PEREZ, J. |
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| Under Section 4 of Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure,[6] certiorari should be instituted within a period of 60 days from notice of the judgment, order, or resolution sought to be assailed.[7] The 60-day period is inextendible to avoid any unreasonable delay that would violate the constitutional rights of parties to a speedy disposition of their case.[8] Rules of procedure must be faithfully complied with and should not be discarded with the mere expediency of claiming substantial merit.[9] As a corollary, rules prescribing the time for doing specific acts or for taking certain proceedings are considered absolutely indispensable to prevent needless delays and to orderly and promptly discharge judicial business. By their very nature, these rules are regarded as mandatory.[10] | |||||
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2014-02-03 |
DEL CASTILLO, J. |
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| Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration with Prayer to Dismiss,[14] strongly opposing private respondent's Motion for Extension to File Petition for Certiorari for being an absolutely prohibited pleading. Citing Laguna Metts Corporation v. Court of Appeals,[15] petitioners argued that A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC[16] effectively rendered the 60-day period for filing a petition for certiorari non-extendible after it deleted portions of Rule 65 pertaining to extension of time to file petition. Thus, as the rule now stands, petitions for certiorari must be filed strictly within 60 days from notice of judgment or from the order denying a motion for reconsideration.[17] | |||||
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2012-08-22 |
REYES, J. |
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| On October 30, 2009, the CA rendered the assailed resolution dismissing the Republic's petition for certiorari on the ground that the petition was filed out of time inasmuch as extensions of time are now disallowed by A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC[18] and as applied in Laguna Metts Corporation v. Court of Appeals.[19] | |||||
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2012-07-16 |
DEL CASTILLO, J. |
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| It is settled jurisprudence that heavy pressure of work is not considered compelling reason to justify a request for an extension of time to file a petition for certiorari. "Heavy workload is relative and often self-serving. Standing alone, it is not a sufficient reason to deviate from the 60-day rule."[40] In Yutingco v. Court of Appeals,[41] therein petitioners' counsel cited heavy workload in seeking the court's leniency. However, the same was rebuffed by the Court ratiocinating that such "circumstance alone does not provide the court sufficient reason to merit allowance of an extension of the 60-day period to file the petition for certiorari. Heavy workload x x x ought to be coupled with more compelling reasons such as illness of counsel or other emergencies that could be substantiated by affidavits of merit."[42] | |||||
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2012-02-29 |
SERENO, J. |
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| In Laguna Metts Corporation v. Court of Appeals,[19] we explained that the reason behind the amendments under A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC was to prevent the use or abuse of the remedy of petition for certiorari in order to delay a case or even defeat the ends of justice. We thus deleted the clause that allowed an extension of the period to file a Rule 65 petition for compelling reasons. Instead, we deemed the 60-day period to file as reasonable and sufficient time for a party to mull over the case and to prepare a petition that asserts grave abuse of discretion by a lower court. The period was specifically set and limited in order to avoid any unreasonable delay in the dispensation of justice, a delay that could violate the constitutional right of the parties to a speedy disposition of their case. Consequently, we pronounced that when the CA granted the motion for extension, it in effect disregarded and modified, if not outrightly reversed, the Supreme Court En Banc Resolution in A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC. We then said that in so doing, the appellate court arrogated unto itself "a power it did not possess, a power that only this Court may exercise."[20] Consequently, we ruled that petitions for certiorari must now be filed strictly within 60 days from notice of judgment or from the order denying a motion for reconsideration.[21] | |||||
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2010-11-15 |
BRION, J. |
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| Under Section 4 of Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure,[13] certiorari should be instituted within a period of 60 days from notice of the judgment, order, or resolution sought to be assailed.[14] The 60-day period is inextendible to avoid any unreasonable delay that would violate the constitutional rights of parties to a speedy disposition of their case.[15] | |||||
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2010-10-20 |
MENDOZA, J. |
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| There is no basis for petitioner's assertion either that the tenets of substantial justice, the novelty and importance of the issue and the meritorious nature of this case warrant a relaxation of the Rules in her favor. Time and again the Court has stressed that the rules of procedure must be faithfully complied with and should not be discarded with the mere expediency of claiming substantial merit.[11] As a corollary, rules prescribing the time for doing specific acts or for taking certain proceedings are considered absolutely indispensable to prevent needless delays and to orderly and promptly discharge judicial business. By their very nature, these rules are regarded as mandatory.[12] | |||||
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2010-09-08 |
PEREZ, J. |
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| The record shows that, having been granted the 15-day extension sought in its first motion, petitioner filed a second motion for extension praying for an additional 10 days from 17 April 2006 within which to file its petition for review, on the ground that pressures of work and the demands posed by equally important cases prevented its counsel from finalizing the same. As correctly ruled by the CA, however, heavy workload cannot be considered as a valid justification to sidestep the reglementary period[45] since to do so would only serve to encourage needless delays and interminable litigations. Indeed, rules prescribing the time for doing specific acts or for taking certain proceedings are considered absolutely indispensable to prevent needless delays and to orderly and promptly discharge judicial business.[46] Corollary to the principle that the allowance or denial of a motion for extension of time is addressed to the sound discretion of the court,[47] moreover, lawyers cannot expect that their motions for extension or postponement will be granted[48] as a matter of course. | |||||
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2010-02-17 |
CORONA, J. |
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| As a rule, an amendment by the deletion of certain words or phrases indicates an intention to change its meaning.[26] It is presumed that the deletion would not have been made had there been no intention to effect a change in the meaning of the law or rule.[27] The word, phrase or sentence excised should accordingly be considered inoperative.[28] | |||||