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CONG. GLENN A. CHONG v. PHILIP L. DELA CRUZ

This case has been cited 9 times or more.

	GR No. 205728 2015-01-21	DIOCESE OF BACOLOD v. COMELEC LEONEN, J.
Eighth, the petition includes questions that are "dictated by public welfare and the advancement of public policy, or demanded by the broader interest of justice, or the orders complained of were found to be patent nullities, or the appeal was considered as clearly an inappropriate remedy."[82] In the past, questions similar to these which this court ruled on immediately despite the doctrine of hierarchy of courts included citizens' right to bear arms,[83] government contracts involving modernization of voters' registration lists,[84] and the status and existence of a public office.[85]
	GR Nos. 197942-43 2014-03-26	PHILIPPINE AMUSEMENT v. THUNDERBIRD PILIPINAS HOTELS REYES, J.
While the question of whether to give due course to the petitions is addressed to the discretion of the Court,[63] it behooves PAGCOR to observe the applicable rules and keep in mind that the Court will not take lightly any non-observance of our settled rules as if they are mere technicalities.[64] A motion for reconsideration is a condition sine qua non for the special civil action of certiorari. As we discussed in Republic of the Philippines v. Abdulwahab A. Bayao, et al.:[65]
	GR No. 184536 2013-08-14	MASAYUKI HASEGAWA v. LEILA F. GIRON PEREZ, J.
The elementary rule is that the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to review the resolution issued by the DOJ through a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court on the ground that the Secretary of Justice committed grave abuse of his discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction.[17]
	GR No. 188767 2013-07-24	SPS. ARGOVAN AND FLORIDA GADITANO v. SAN MIGUEL CORPORATION PEREZ, J.
The Court of Appeals is clothed with jurisdiction to review the resolution issued by the Secretary of the DOJ through a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court albeit solely on the ground that the Secretary of Justice committed grave abuse of his discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction.[6]
	GR No. 192986 2013-01-15	ADVOCATES FOR TRUTH IN LENDING v. BANGKO SENTRAL MONETARY BOARD REYES, J.
The decision on whether or not to accept a petition for certiorari, as well as to grant due course thereto, is addressed to the sound discretion of the court.[15] A petition for certiorari being an extraordinary remedy, the party seeking to avail of the same must strictly observe the procedural rules laid down by law, and non-observance thereof may not be brushed aside as mere technicality.[16]
	GR No. 196063 2011-12-14	ORLANDO A. RAYOS v. CITY OF MANILA CARPIO, J.
Indeed, this Court, the Court of Appeals and the Regional Trial Courts exercise concurrent jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus and injunction.[14] However, such concurrence in jurisdiction does not give petitioners unbridled freedom of choice of court forum.[15] In [Heirs of Bertuldo Hinog v. Melicor],[16] citing People v. Cuaresma,[17] the Court held: This Court's original jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari is not exclusive. It is shared by this Court with Regional Trial Courts and with the Court of Appeals. This concurrence of jurisdiction is not, however, to be taken as according to parties seeking any of the writs an absolute, unrestrained freedom of choice of the court to which application therefor will be directed. There is after all a hierarchy of courts. That hierarchy is determinative of the venue of appeals, and also serves as a general determinant of the appropriate forum for petitions for the extraordinary writs. A becoming regard for that judicial hierarchy most certainly indicates that petitions for the issuance of extraordinary writs against first level ("inferior") courts should be filed with the Regional Trial Court, and those against the latter, with the Court of Appeals. A direct invocation of the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction to issue these writs should be allowed only when there are special and important reasons therefor, clearly and specifically set out in the petition. This is [an] established policy. It is a policy necessary to prevent inordinate demands upon the Court's time and attention which are better devoted to those matters within its exclusive jurisdiction, and to prevent further over-crowding of the Court's docket. (Emphasis supplied.)
	GR No. 190795 2011-07-06	NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF ELECTRICITY CONSUMERS v. ENERGY REGULATORY COMMISSION (ERC) SERENO, J.
True, we had, on certain occasions, entertained direct recourse to this Court as an exception to the rule on hierarchy of courts. In those exceptional cases, however, we recognized an exception because it was dictated by public welfare and the advancement of public policy, or demanded by the broader interest of justice, or the orders complained of were found to be patent nullities, or the appeal was considered as clearly an inappropriate remedy. [35]
	GR No. 176579 2011-06-28	WILSON P. GAMBOA v. FINANCE SECRETARY MARGARITO B. TEVES CARPIO, J.
Petitioner submits that the 40 percent foreign equity limitation in domestic public utilities refers only to common shares because such shares are entitled to vote and it is through voting that control over a corporation is exercised. Petitioner posits that the term "capital" in Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution refers to "the ownership of common capital stock subscribed and outstanding, which class of shares alone, under the corporate set-up of PLDT, can vote and elect members of the board of directors." It is undisputed that PLDT's non-voting preferred shares are held mostly by Filipino citizens.[30] This arose from Presidential Decree No. 217,[31] issued on 16 June 1973 by then President Ferdinand Marcos, requiring every applicant of a PLDT telephone line to subscribe to non-voting preferred shares to pay for the investment cost of installing the telephone line.[32]
	GR No. 187972 2010-06-29	PHILIPPINE AMUSEMENT v. FONTANA DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION VELASCO JR., J.
The Supreme Court is a court of last resort, and must so remain if it is to satisfactorily perform the functions assigned to it by the fundamental charter and immemorial tradition. A direct invocation of this Court's original jurisdiction to issue said writs should be allowed only when there are special and important reasons therefor, clearly and specifically set out in the petition. This is established policy--a policy that is necessary to prevent inordinate demands upon the Court's time and attention which are better devoted to those matters within its exclusive jurisdiction, and to prevent further over-crowding of the Court's docket.[9]