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SPS. ERNESTO F. CURATA AND LOURDES M. CURATA v. PHILIPPINE PORTS AUTHORITY

This case has been cited 6 times or more.

	GR No. 164682 2011-09-14	JOEL GALZOTE Y SORIAGA v. JONATHAN BRIONES BRION, J.
Thus, a direct resort to a special civil action for certiorari is an exception rather than the general rule, and is a recourse that must be firmly grounded on compelling reasons. In past cases, we have cited the interest of a "more enlightened and substantial justice";[12] the promotion of public welfare and public policy;[13] cases that "have attracted nationwide attention, making it essential to proceed with dispatch in the consideration thereof";[14][ ]or judgments on order attended by grave abuse of discretion, as compelling reasons to justify a petition for certiorari.[15][ ]
	GR No. 190529 2011-03-22	PHILIPPINE GUARDIANS BROTHERHOOD v. COMELEC BRION, J.
At this juncture, we take judicial notice of Comelec Chairperson Jose A.R. Melo's resignation effective January 15, 2011[31] and Commissioners Nicodemo T. Ferrer and Gregorio Y. Larrazabal's retirement on February 2, 2011.[32] We hasten to clarify that their departure from government service, however, do not render moot and academic their liability for indirect contempt, since "contempt of court applies to all persons, whether in or out of government." Thus, in Curata v. Philippine Ports Authority,[33] we held: Contempt of court applies to all persons, whether in or out of government.Thus, it covers government officials or employees who retired during the pendency of the petition for contempt.Otherwise, a civil servant may strategize to avail himself of an early retirement to escape the sanctions from a contempt citation, if he perceives that he would be made responsible for a contumacious act.The higher interest of effective and efficient administration of justice dictates that a petition for contempt must proceed to its final conclusion despite the retirement of the government official or employee, more so if it involves a former member of the bench.
	GR No. 182431 2010-11-17	LAND BANK OF PHILIPPINES v. ESTHER ANSON RIVERA PEREZ, J.
We similarly upheld Republic's 12% per annum interest rate on the unpaid expropriation compensation in the following cases: Reyes v. National Housing Authority,[21] Land Bank of the Philippines v. Wycoco,[22] Republic v. Court of Appeals,[23] Land Bank of the Philippines v. Imperial,[24] Philippine Ports Authority v. Rosales-Bondoc,[25] Nepomuceno v. City of Surigao,[26] and Curata v. Philippine Ports Authority.[27]
	GR No. 164195 2010-10-12	APO FRUITS CORPORATION v. LAND BANK OF PHILIPPINES BRION, J.
We subsequently upheld Republic's 12% per annum interest rate on the unpaid expropriation compensation in the following cases: Reyes v. National Housing Authority,[19] Land Bank of the Philippines v. Wycoco,[20] Republic v. Court of Appeals,[21] Land Bank of the Philippines v. Imperial,[22] Philippine Ports Authority v. Rosales-Bondoc,[23] and Curata v. Philippine Ports Authority.[24]
	GR No. 170685 2010-09-22	LAND BANK OF PHILIPPINES v. ENRIQUE LIVIOCO DEL CASTILLO, J.
In expropriation cases (including cases involving lands for agrarian reform), the property's character refers to its actual use at the time of taking,[69] not its potential uses.[70] Respondent himself admitted that his property was agricultural at the time he offered it for sale to DAR in 1988. In his letter to the DAR in 1988, respondent manifested that his land is agricultural and suitable for agricultural purposes, although it stood adjacent to residential properties.[71] Moreover, it has been conclusively decided by final judgment in the earlier cases[72] filed by respondent that his property was validly acquired under RA 6657 and validly distributed to agrarian reform beneficiaries. Since the coverage of RA 6657 only extends to agricultural lands, respondent's property should be conclusively treated as an agricultural land and valued as such.
	GR No. 181556 2009-12-14	IN RE: PETITION FOR ASSISTANCE IN LIQUIDATION OF INTERCITY SAVINGS v. STOCKHOLDERS OF INTERCITY SAVINGS CARPIO MORALES, J.
Statutes are prospective and not retroactive in their operation, they being the formulation of rules for the future, not the past. Hence, the legal maxim lex de futuro, judex de praeterito the law provides for the future, the judge for the past, which is articulated in Article 4 of the Civil Code: "Laws shall have no retroactive effect, unless the contrary is provided." The reason for the rule is the tendency of retroactive legislation to be unjust and oppressive on account of its liability to unsettle vested rights or disturb the legal effect of prior transactions.[15]