This case has been cited 7 times or more.
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2015-04-22 |
DEL CASTILLO, J. |
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| From the above factual scenario, the Court is not convinced that Sanchez abandoned his work. To constitute abandonment, it is essential that an employee failed to report for work without any valid and justifiable reason and that he had a clear intention to sever the employment relationship by some overt act.[29] Mere failure to report for work after notice to return does not constitute abandonment.[30] As mentioned, Sanchez reported back to Ong-Sitco several times to ask about his employment status but was not entertained. Oddly, while Ong-Sitco did not deny this, he never bothered to explain why during these instances, he did not warn Sanchez about his continued absence or ask him to return to work, if only to bolster the claim that he was not dismissed. Instead, Ong-Sitco just ignored him and this, under the circumstances, only shows his intention not to retain him. This is further bolstered by the fact, as shown by the records, that the two memorandum-letters were sent to Sanchez after he filed a complaint against petitioners. Clearly, Sanchez cannot be said to have unjustifiably refused to return to work. He cannot be faulted from reasonably concluding that the memorandum-letters were merely made in order to give semblance of validity to his termination. In addition and as aptly observed by the CA, Sanchez's immediate filing of the complaint is proof of his desire to return to work. It has been held that the filing of a complaint negates any intention of abandoning foregoing employment.[31] | |||||
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2014-04-02 |
REYES, J. |
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| This doctrine of strained relations, however, should not be used recklessly or applied loosely[43] nor be based on impression alone. "It bears to stress that reinstatement is the rule and, for the exception of strained relations to apply, it should be proved that it is likely that if reinstated, an atmosphere of antipathy and antagonism would be generated as to adversely affect the efficiency and productivity of the employee concerned."[44] | |||||
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2013-07-08 |
PEREZ, J. |
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| On the theory that the same is proof enough of the desire to return to work,[28] the immediate filing of a complaint for illegal dismissal more so when it includes a prayer for reinstatement has been held to be totally inconsistent with a charge of abandonment.[29] While it is true that Escudero's complaint prayed for separation pay in lieu of reinstatement, Tan Brothers loses sight of the fact, however, that it had the burden of proving its own allegation that Escudero had abandoned her employment in July 2003. As allegation is not evidence, the rule has always been to the effect that a party alleging a critical fact must support his allegation with substantial evidence[30] which has been construed to mean such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind will accept as adequate to support a conclusion.[31] Confronted with Escudero's assertion that she reported for work despite irregular payment of her salaries and was forced to stop doing so after her wages were not paid in May 2004, the record shows that Tan Brothers proffered nothing beyond bare allegations to prove that Escudero had abandoned her employment in July 2003. | |||||
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2012-06-13 |
SERENO, J. |
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| Furthermore, the fact that respondent made a compromise offer to petitioner SMC cannot be considered as an admission of liability. In Pentagon Steel Corporation v. Court of Appeals,[26] we examined the reasons why compromise offers must not be considered as evidence against the offeror: First, since the law favors the settlement of controversies out of court, a person is entitled to "buy his or her peace" without danger of being prejudiced in case his or her efforts fail; hence, any communication made toward that end will be regarded as privileged. Indeed, if every offer to buy peace could be used as evidence against a person who presents it, many settlements would be prevented and unnecessary litigation would result, since no prudent person would dare offer or entertain a compromise if his or her compromise position could be exploited as a confession of weakness. | |||||
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2011-11-16 |
PEREZ, J. |
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| Viewed in the light of the foregoing principles, we find that the CA correctly ruled out FI's position that Granfil had abandoned his employment. Aside from the fact that Bautista, Tenorio, Ballesteros and Dizon did not even execute sworn statements to refute the overt acts of dismissal imputed against them, the record is wholly bereft of any showing that FI required Granfil to report to its main office or, for that matter, to explain his supposed unauthorized absences. Absence must be accompanied by overt acts unerringly pointing to the fact that the employee simply does not want to work anymore.[33] Even then, FI's theory of abandonment was likewise negated by Granfil's filing the complaint for illegal dismissal[34] which evinced his desire to return to work. In vigorously pursuing his action against FI before the Labor Arbiter, the NLRC and the CA, Granfil clearly manifested that he has no intention of relinquishing his employment. In any case, the fact that Granfil prayed for his reinstatement speaks against any intent to sever the employer-employee relationship[35] with FI. | |||||
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2009-12-23 |
BRION, J. |
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| refusal by the employee to resume his employment without any intention of returning.[12] | |||||
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2009-10-02 |
PERALTA, J. |
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| It is a basic principle that in illegal dismissal cases, the burden of proof rests upon the employer to show that the dismissal of the employee is for a just cause and failure to do so would necessarily mean that the dismissal is not justified.[16] In addition, in claims of abandonment by an employee, the settled rule is that the employer bears the burden of showing a deliberate and unjustified refusal by the employee to resume his employment without any intention of returning.[17] Moreover, in evaluating a charge of abandonment, the jurisprudential rule is that abandonment is a matter of intention that cannot be lightly presumed from equivocal acts.[18] To constitute abandonment, two elements must concur: (1) the failure to report for work or absence without valid or justifiable reason, and (2) a clear intent, manifested through overt acts, to sever the employer-employee relationship.[19] | |||||