This case has been cited 5 times or more.
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2013-06-03 |
BERSAMIN, J. |
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| Pursuant to Article 100 of the Labor Code, petitioner as the employer could not reduce, diminish, discontinue or eliminate any benefit and supplement being enjoyed by or granted to its employees. This prohibition against the diminution of benefits is founded on the constitutional mandate to protect the rights of workers and to promote their welfare and to afford labor full protection.[29] The application of the prohibition against the diminution of benefits presupposes that a company practice, policy or tradition favorable to the employees has been clearly established; and that the payments made by the employer pursuant to the practice, policy, or tradition have ripened into benefits enjoyed by them.[30] To be considered as a practice, policy or tradition, however, the giving of the benefits should have been done over a long period of time, and must be shown to have been consistent and deliberate.[31] It is relevant to mention that we have not yet settled on the specific minimum number of years as the length of time sufficient to ripen the practice, policy or tradition into a benefit that the employer cannot unilaterally withdraw.[32] | |||||
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2013-01-21 |
PERLAS-BERNABE, J. |
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| Neither was it proven that there exists an established company policy of giving early retirement packages to the Bank's aging employees. In the case of Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company v. National Labor Relations Commission, it has been pronounced that to be considered a company practice, the giving of the benefits should have been done over a long period of time, and must be shown to have been consistent and deliberate.[34] In this relation, petitioners' bare allegation of the solitary case of Lusan cannot assuming such fact to be true sufficiently establish that the Bank's grant of an early retirement package to her (Lusan) evolved into an established company practice precisely because of the palpable lack of the element of consistency. As such, petitioners' reliance on the Lusan incident cannot bolster their claim. | |||||
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2010-06-29 |
NACHURA, J. |
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| It is a time-honored rule that in controversies between a laborer and his employer, doubts reasonably arising from the evidence or from the interpretation of agreements and writings should be resolved in the former's favor in consonance with the avowed policy of the State to give maximum aid and protection to labor.[32] This principle gives us even greater reason to affirm the findings of the CA which aptly and judiciously held: It was established on record that before the late Lutero Remo signed his last contract with private respondents as Cook-Steward of the vessel "M/T Captain Mitsos L," he was required to undergo a series of medical examinations. Yet, he was declared "fit to work" by private respondents' company designated-physician. On April 19, 1999, Remo was discharged from his vessel after he was hospitalized in Fujairah for atrial fibrillation and congestive heart failure. His death on August 28, 2000, even if it occurred months after his repatriation, due to hypertensive cardio-vascular disease, could clearly have been work related. Declared as "fit to work" at the time of hiring, and hospitalized while on service on account of "atrial fibrillation and congestive heart failure," his eventual death due to "hypertensive cardio-vascular disease" could only be work related. The death due to "hypertensive cardio-vascular disease" could in fact be traced to Lutero Remo's being the "Cook-Steward." As Cook-Steward of an ocean going vessel, Remo had no choice but to prepare and eat hypertension inducing food, a kind of food that eventually caused his "hypertensive cardio-vascular disease," a disease which in turn admittedly caused his death. | |||||
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2003-11-11 |
PUNO, J. |
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| On April 29, 1998, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision[11] in favor of Chin and Mallari. It annulled the decision of the trial court upon finding that the gross and reckless negligence of their former counsel which caused them to be declared in default and which later led to the dismissal of their appeal and finality of the judgment amounted to extrinsic fraud. Further, the appellate court reversed the order of the trial court canceling TCT No. 52928 and TCT No. 52929 and reinstating TCT No. 36048 registered in the name of the Paels. It also rejected Maria Destura's claim over the property. It instead upheld the validity of the sale of 70% of the property by a certain Luis and Leony Menor and 30% thereof by the Paels to Chin and Mallari. The dispositive portion of the decision reads: | |||||
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2003-11-11 |
PUNO, J. |
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| The Heirs of Pael and Destura filed separate motions for reconsideration. During their pendency, the University of the Philippines (UP) filed a motion for intervention,[15] alleging that the properties covered by TCT Nos. 52928 and 52929 in the names of Chin and Mallari form part of its Diliman Campus, registered in the name of UP under TCT No. 9462. | |||||