This case has been cited 8 times or more.
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2014-04-08 |
MENDOZA, J. |
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| Nothing has polarized the nation more in recent years than the issues of population growth control, abortion and contraception. As in every democratic society, diametrically opposed views on the subjects and their perceived consequences freely circulate in various media. From television debates[2] to sticker campaigns,[3] from rallies by socio-political activists to mass gatherings organized by members of the clergy[4] the clash between the seemingly antithetical ideologies of the religious conservatives and progressive liberals has caused a deep division in every level of the society. Despite calls to withhold support thereto, however, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 10354, otherwise known as the Responsible Parenthood and Reproductive Health Act of 2012 (RH Law), was enacted by Congress on December 21, 2012. | |||||
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2014-02-18 |
ABAD, J. |
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| The usual identifying information regarding a person includes his name, his citizenship, his residence address, his contact number, his place and date of birth, the name of his spouse if any, his occupation, and similar data.[19] The law punishes those who acquire or use such identifying information without right, implicitly to cause damage. Petitioners simply fail to show how government effort to curb computer-related identity theft violates the right to privacy and correspondence as well as the right to due process of law. | |||||
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2014-02-18 |
ABAD, J. |
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| Petitioners claim that Section 4(a)(6) or cyber-squatting violates the equal protection clause[12] in that, not being narrowly tailored, it will cause a user using his real name to suffer the same fate as those who use aliases or take the name of another in satire, parody, or any other literary device. For example, supposing there exists a well known billionaire-philanthropist named "Julio Gandolfo," the law would punish for cyber-squatting both the person who registers such name because he claims it to be his pseudo-name and another who registers the name because it happens to be his real name. Petitioners claim that, considering the substantial distinction between the two, the law should recognize the difference. | |||||
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2012-02-28 |
BRION, J. |
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| CONSISTENT WITH THE DECISION OF THE SUPREME COURT IN PIMENTEL V. AGUIRRE CASE, EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 7 IS ONLY DIRECTORY AND NOT MANDATORY.[12] The Case for the Respondents | |||||
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2011-02-15 |
CARPIO MORALES, J. |
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| of ripeness.[24] The question of ripeness is especially relevant in light of the direct, adverse effect on an individual by the challenged conduct.[25] In the present petition, there is no doubt that questions on, inter alia, the validity of the simultaneous referral of the two complaints and on the need to publish as a mode of promulgating the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings of the House (Impeachment Rules) present constitutional vagaries which call for immediate interpretation. | |||||
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2011-02-15 |
CARPIO MORALES, J. |
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| On August 10, 2010, House Majority Leader Neptali Gonzales II, as chairperson of the Committee on Rules,[9] instructed Atty. Artemio Adasa, Jr., Deputy Secretary General for Operations, through Atty. Cesar Pareja, Executive Director of the Plenary Affairs Department, to include the two complaints in the Order of Business,[10] which was complied with by their inclusion in the Order of Business for the following day, August 11, 2010. | |||||
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2009-06-30 |
BRION, J. |
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| The petitioner's unusual approaches and use of Rule 65 of the Rules of Court do not appear to us to be the result of any error in reading Rule 65, given the way the petition was crafted. Rather, it was a backdoor approach to achieve what the petitioner could not directly do in his individual capacity under Rule 65. It was, at the very least, an attempted bypass of other available, albeit lengthier, modes of review that the Rules of Court provide. While we stop short of concluding that the petitioner's approaches constitute an abuse of process through a manipulative reading and application of the Rules of Court, we nevertheless resolve that the petition should be dismissed for its blatant violation of the Rules. The transgressions alleged in a petition, however weighty they may sound, cannot be justifications for blatantly disregarding the rules of procedure, particularly when remedial measures were available under these same rules to achieve the petitioner's objectives. For our part, we cannot and should not - in the name of liberality and the "transcendental importance" doctrine - entertain these types of petitions. As we held in the very recent case of Lozano, et al. vs. Nograles,[20] albeit from a different perspective, our liberal approach has its limits and should not be abused. | |||||