This case has been cited 6 times or more.
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2014-11-12 |
REYES, J. |
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| "Ejectment proceedings are summary proceedings intended to provide an expeditious means of protecting actual possession or right to possession of property. Title is not involved. The sole issue to be resolved is who is entitled to the physical or material possession of the premises or possession de factor."[20] "Issues as to the right of possession or ownership are not involved in the action; evidence thereon is not admissible, except only for the purpose of determining the issue of possession."[21] | |||||
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2013-01-30 |
BRION, J. |
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| We agree that ownership carries the right of possession, but the possession contemplated by the concept of ownership is not exactly the same as the possession in issue in a forcible entry case. Possession in forcible entry suits refers only to possession de facto, or actual or material possession, and not possession flowing out of ownership; these are different legal concepts[36] for which the law provides different remedies for recovery of possession.[37] As we explained in Pajuyo v. Court of Appeals,[38] and again in the more recent cases of Gonzaga v. Court of Appeals,[39] De Grano v. Lacaba,[40] and Lagazo v. Soriano,[41] the word "possession" in forcible entry suits refers to nothing more than prior physical possession or possession de facto, not possession de jure[42] or legal possession in the sense contemplated in civil law.[43] Title is not the issue,[44] and the absence of it "is not a ground for the courts to withhold relief from the parties in an ejectment case."[45] | |||||
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2012-12-03 |
DEL CASTILLO, J. |
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| For a court to restore possession, two things must be proven in a forcible entry case: prior physical possession of the property and deprivation of the property by means of force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth.[38] "Possession de facto, [i.e., the physical possession of a property,] and not possession de jure is the only issue in a forcible entry case. This rule holds true regardless of the character of a party's possession, provided that he has in his favor priority in time. x x x"[39] As used in forcible entry and unlawful detainer cases, 'possession' refers to "physical possession, not legal possession in the sense contemplated in civil law."[40] | |||||
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2011-04-11 |
ABAD, J. |
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| It is of course not enough that the allegations of the complaint make out a case for forcible entry. The plaintiff must also be able to prove his allegations. He has to prove that he had prior physical possession[31] for this gives him the security that entitles him to remain in the property until a person with a better right lawfully ejects him.[32] | |||||
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2010-02-16 |
PERALTA, J. |
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| Moreover, in De Grano v. Lacaba,[10] it was explained that: x x x the word "possession," as used in forcible entry and unlawful detainer cases, means nothing more than physical possession, not legal possession in the sense contemplated in civil law. When the law speaks of possession, the reference is to prior physical possession or possession de facto, as contra-distinguished from possession de jure. Only prior physical possession, not title, is the issue. Issues as to the right of possession or ownership are not involved in the action; evidence thereon is not admissible, except only for the purpose of determining the issue of possession.[11] (Emphasis supplied.) | |||||
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2010-02-05 |
DEL CASTILLO, J. |
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| A close scrutiny of Section 6, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court,[27] which grants discretionary authority to the CA in ordering parties to file responsive and other pleadings in petitions for certiorari filed before it, will reveal that such rule is merely directory in nature. This is so because the word "may" employed by the rule shows that it is not mandatory but discretionary on the part of the CA to require the filing of pleadings which it deems necessary to assist it in resolving the controversies.[28] In the same way, the admission of any responsive pleading filed by party-litigants is a matter that rests largely on the sound discretion of the court. At any rate, rules of procedure may be relaxed in the interest of substantial justice and in order to afford litigants maximum opportunity for the proper and just determination of their causes.[29] Strict adherence to technical adjective rules should never be unexceptionally required because a contrary precept would result in a failure to decide cases on their merits.[30] The CA could not have erred in admitting the comment, albeit filed late, when it viewed that the interest of justice would be better served by the policy of liberality. | |||||