This case has been cited 3 times or more.
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2014-04-07 |
SERENO, C.J. |
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| First, we have held in Stronghold Insurance Co. Inc. v. Tokyu Construction Co. Ltd.,[38] that "[the] acceptance [of a surety agreement], however, does not change in any material way the creditor's relationship with the principal debtor nor does it make the surety an active party to the principal creditor-debtor relationship. In other words, the acceptance does not give the surety the right to intervene in the principal contract. The surety's role arises only upon the debtor's default, at which time, it can be directly held liable by the creditor for payment as a solidary obligor." Hence, the surety remains a stranger to the Purchase Agreement. We agree with petitioner that respondent cannot invoke in its favor the arbitration clause in the Purchase Agreement, because it is not a party to that contract.[39] An arbitration agreement being contractual in nature,[40] it is binding only on the parties thereto, as well as their assigns and heirs.[41] | |||||
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2012-04-18 |
MENDOZA, J. |
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| A contract of suretyship is an agreement whereby a party, called the surety, guarantees the performance by another party, called the principal or obligor, of an obligation or undertaking in favor of another party, called the obligee.[40] Although the contract of a surety is secondary only to a valid principal obligation, the surety becomes liable for the debt or duty of another although it possesses no direct or personal interest over the obligations nor does it receive any benefit therefrom.[41] This was explained in the case of Stronghold Insurance Company, Inc. v. Republic-Asahi Glass Corporation,[42] where it was written: The surety's obligation is not an original and direct one for the performance of his own act, but merely accessory or collateral to the obligation contracted by the principal. Nevertheless, although the contract of a surety is in essence secondary only to a valid principal obligation, his liability to the creditor or promisee of the principal is said to be direct, primary and absolute; in other words, he is directly and equally bound with the principal. | |||||
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2009-11-25 |
NACHURA, J. |
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| Finally, as correctly observed by respondent, petitioner's claim that the MOA is a contract of adhesion was never raised by petitioner before the lower courts. Settled is the rule that points of law, theories, issues, and arguments not adequately brought to the attention of the trial court need not be, and ordinarily will not be, considered by a reviewing court. They cannot be raised for the first time on appeal. To allow this would be offensive to the basic rules of fair play, justice and due process.[27] | |||||