This case has been cited 4 times or more.
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2016-01-25 |
PERALTA, J. |
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| As a general rule, petitions for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Civil Procedure filed before this Court may only raise questions of law.[8] However, jurisprudence has recognized several exceptions to this rule. In Spouses Almendrala v. Spouses Ngo,[9] we have enumerated several instances when this Court may review findings of fact of the Court of Appeals on appeal by certiorari, to wit: (1) when the findings are grounded entirely on speculation, surmises or conjectures; (2) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3) when there is grave abuse of discretion; (4) when the judgment is based on misapprehension of facts; (5) when the findings of fact are conflicting; (6) when in making its findings the Court of Appeals went beyond the issues of the case, or its findings are contrary to the admissions of both the appellant and the appellee; (7) when the findings are contrary to that of the trial court; (8) when the findings are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (9) when the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner's main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondent; (10) when the findings of fact are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record; or (11) when the Court of Appeals manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties, which, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion.[10] In the present case, the RTC and the CA have conflicting findings of feet. Hence, the need to rule on the matter. | |||||
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2010-08-25 |
CARPIO, J. |
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| As a general rule, only questions of law may be raised in petitions for certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. Section 1 of Rule 45 states that, "The petition shall raise only questions of law." In Triumph International (Phils.), Inc. v. Apostol,[25] the Court enumerated exceptions to the rule. Among the exceptions are when the findings of fact are conflicting and when the findings are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based.[26] | |||||
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2010-06-16 |
PERALTA, J. |
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| It must be noted, however, that in a plethora of cases, this Court has distinguished the treatment of managerial employees from that of rank-and-file personnel, insofar as the application of the doctrine of loss of trust and confidence is concerned.[28] Thus, with respect to rank-and-file personnel, loss of trust and confidence, as ground for valid dismissal, requires proof of involvement in the alleged events in question, and that mere uncorroborated assertions and accusations by the employer will not be sufficient.[29] But as regards a managerial employee, the mere existence of a basis for believing that such employee has breached the trust of his employer would suffice for his dismissal.[30] Hence, in the case of managerial employees, proof beyond reasonable doubt is not required, it being sufficient that there is some basis for such loss of confidence, such as when the employer has reasonable ground to believe that the employee concerned is responsible for the purported misconduct, and the nature of his participation therein renders him unworthy of the trust and confidence demanded of his position.[31] | |||||
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2009-08-24 |
CARPIO, J. |
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| The Court is unimpressed. Labor officials commit grave abuse of discretion when their factual findings are arrived at arbitrarily or in disregard of the evidence.[20] In the present case, the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC acted with grave abuse of discretion because their factual findings were arrived at in disregard of the evidence. | |||||