This case has been cited 5 times or more.
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2013-01-09 |
SERENO, J. |
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| In Philippine Commercial International Bank v. Spouses Dy,[36] we had occasion to state: Preliminarily, jurisdiction over the defendant in a civil case is acquired either by the coercive power of legal processes exerted over his person, or his voluntary appearance in court. As a general proposition, one who seeks an affirmative relief is deemed to have submitted to the jurisdiction of the court. It is by reason of this rule that we have had occasion to declare that the filing of motions to admit answer, for additional time to file answer, for reconsideration of a default judgment, and to lift order of default with motion for reconsideration, is considered voluntary submission to the court's jurisdiction. This, however, is tempered by the concept of conditional appearance, such that a party who makes a special appearance to challenge, among others, the court's jurisdiction over his person cannot be considered to have submitted to its authority. | |||||
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2012-09-18 |
PERALTA, J. |
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| A peripheral issue which nonetheless deserves our attention is the question about the credibility of the Comelec brought about by the alleged professional relationship between Comelec Chairman Brillantes on one hand and the complainant Senator Pimentel and Fernando Poe, Jr. (FPJ), GMA's rival in the 2004 elections, on the other hand; and by the other Commissioners'[147] reasons for their partial inhibition. To be sure, Chairman Brillantes' relationship with FPJ and Senator Pimentel is not one of the grounds for the mandatory disqualification of a Commissioner. At its most expansive, it may be considered a ground for voluntary inhibition which is indeed discretionary as the same was primarily a matter of conscience and sound discretion on the part of the Commissioner judge based on his or her rational and logical assessment of the case.[148] Bare allegations of bias and prejudice are not enough in the absence of clear and convincing evidence to overcome the presumption that a judge will undertake his noble role to dispense justice according to law and evidence without fear or favor.[149] It being discretionary and since Commissioner Brillantes was in the best position to determine whether or not there was a need to inhibit from the case, his decision to participate in the proceedings, in view of higher interest of justice, equity and public interest, should be respected. While a party has the right to seek the inhibition or disqualification of a judge (or prosecutor or Commissioner) who does not appear to be wholly free, disinterested, impartial, and independent in handling the case, this right must be weighed with his duty to decide cases without fear of repression.[150] | |||||
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2011-11-28 |
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J. |
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| Thus, while mindful of our ruling in La Naval and the new Section 20, Rule 20, this Court, in several cases, ruled that seeking affirmative relief in a court is tantamount to voluntary appearance therein.[45] Thus, in Philippine Commercial International Bank v. Dy Hong Pi,[46] wherein defendants filed a "Motion for Inhibition without submitting themselves to the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court" subsequent to their filing of a "Motion to Dismiss (for Lack of Jurisdiction)," we held: Besides, any lingering doubts on the issue of voluntary appearance dissipate when the respondents' motion for inhibition is considered. This motion seeks a sole relief: inhibition of Judge Napoleon Inoturan from further hearing the case. Evidently, by seeking affirmative relief other than dismissal of the case, respondents manifested their voluntary submission to the court's jurisdiction. It is well-settled that the active participation of a party in the proceedings is tantamount to an invocation of the court's jurisdiction and a willingness to abide by the resolution of the case, and will bar said party from later on impugning the court's jurisdiction.[47] (Emphasis supplied.) | |||||
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2010-09-20 |
VILLARAMA, JR., J. |
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| We find the above explanation well-taken and thus uphold the assailed Resolution upon the grounds so stated. We have ruled in Philippine Commercial International Bank v. Dy Hong Pi,[12] that the mere imputation of bias or partiality is not enough ground for inhibition, especially when the charge is without basis. Extrinsic evidence must further be presented to establish bias, bad faith, malice, or corrupt purpose, in addition to palpable error which may be inferred from the decision or order itself. This Court has to be shown acts or conduct of the judge clearly indicative of arbitrariness or prejudice before the latter can be branded the stigma of being biased or partial. | |||||
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2010-02-11 |
CARPIO MORALES, J. |
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| (3) Failure to do so constitutes voluntary submission to the jurisdiction of the court, especially in instances where a pleading or motion seeking affirmative relief is filed and submitted to the court for resolution.[7] (italics and underscoring supplied) | |||||