This case has been cited 5 times or more.
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2015-10-14 |
VILLARAMA, JR., J. |
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| We agree with the CA that there was sufficient basis to initiate deportation proceedings under Section 37(a)(9) in relation to Section 45 of the PIA of 1940. We find no cogent reason to overturn the CA's findings the question of whether substantial evidence being a question of fact which is beyond this Court's power of review for it is not a trier of facts.[26] | |||||
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2014-11-24 |
VELASCO JR., J. |
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| It is axiomatic that laws should be given a reasonable interpretation which does not defeat the very purpose for which they were passed.[17] Courts should not follow the letter of a statute when to do so would depart from the true intent of the legislature or would otherwise yield conclusions inconsistent with the purpose of the act.[18] This Court has, in many cases involving the construction of statutes, cautioned against narrowly interpreting a statute as to defeat the purpose of the legislator, and rejected the literal interpretation of statutes if to do so would lead to unjust or absurd results.[19] | |||||
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2012-12-10 |
PERALTA, J. |
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| In construing words and phrases used in a statute, the general rule is that, in the absence of legislative intent to the contrary, they should be given their plain, ordinary and common usage meaning.[28] The words should be read and considered in their natural, ordinary, commonly-accepted and most obvious signification, according to good and approved usage and without resorting to forced or subtle construction.[29] Words are presumed to have been employed by the lawmaker in their ordinary and common use and acceptation.[30] Thus, petitioners should not give a special or technical interpretation to a word which is otherwise construed in its ordinary sense by the law. In the instant case, respondent was able to prove that the subject owner's duplicate copy of the TCT is not lost and is in fact existing and in her possession. Moreover, petitioners admit that they entrusted the subject TCT to respondent. There is, thus, no dispute that the TCT in the possession of respondent is the genuine owner's duplicate copy of the TCT covering the subject property. The fact remains, then, that the owner's duplicate copy of the certificate of title has not been lost but is in fact in the possession of respondent, with the knowledge of petitioners. | |||||
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2012-10-09 |
MENDOZA, J. |
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| The Court is not unaware of the use of the words "private citizen" in the subject provision and the plain meaning rule of statutory construction which requires that when the law is clear and unambiguous, it must be taken to mean exactly what it says. The Court, however, finds that a simplistic interpretation is not in keeping with the intention of the statute and prevailing jurisprudence. It is a well-established rule that laws should be given a reasonable interpretation so as not to defeat the very purpose for which they were passed. As such, "a literal interpretation is to be rejected if it would be unjust or lead to absurd results."[20] In Secretary of Justice v. Koruga,[21] the Court emphasized this principle and cautioned us on the overzealous application of the plain meaning rule: The general rule in construing words and phrases used in a statute is that in the absence of legislative intent to the contrary, they should be given their plain, ordinary, and common usage meaning. However, a literal interpretation of a statute is to be rejected if it will operate unjustly, lead to absurd results, or contract the evident meaning of the statute taken as a whole. After all, statutes should receive a sensible construction, such as will give effect to the legislative intention and so as to avoid an unjust or an absurd conclusion. Indeed, courts are not to give words meanings that would lead to absurd or unreasonable consequences.[22] | |||||
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2010-01-21 |
BRION, J. |
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| The cancellation of Scheer's passport resulted in the loss of his privilege to stay in the country and for which reason, the BID ordered his deportation. The subsequent issuance of a new passport to Scheer, however, remedied his undocumented status and authorized his continued stay; thus, we declared the SDO against him moot and academic. On the other hand, Park was ordered deported because his cancelled passport denied him of the privilege to re-enter the country. The subsequent issuance of a new passport to Park, as we said, did not erase the fact that he was not lawfully admitted into the country in the first place, as he returned without a valid passport. When an alien has already physically gained entry in the country, but such entry is later found unlawful or devoid of legal basis, the alien can be excluded anytime after it is found that he was not lawfully admissible at the time of his entry.[26] | |||||