This case has been cited 2 times or more.
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2012-10-10 |
BRION, J. |
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| We see no merit in this argument as the petitioners apparently hew to an erroneous view of administrative due process. Jurisprudence has clarified that administrative due process cannot be fully equated with due process in the strict judicial sense.[60] The very nature of due process negates any concept of inflexible procedures universally applicable to every imaginable situation.[61] Thus, we are hard pressed to believe that Kim's denial of his fraternity membership before formal notice was given worked against his interest in the disciplinary case. What matters for due process purpose is notice of what is to be explained, not the form in which the notice is given. | |||||
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2012-10-10 |
BRION, J. |
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| The raison d'etre of the written notice rule is to inform the student of the disciplinary charge against him and to enable him to suitably prepare a defense. The records show that as early as November 23, 2001, it was already made plain to the petitioners that the subject matter of the case against Kim was his alleged fraternity membership. Thus, by the time Mr. Rosarda spoke to Kim and asked for his written explanation in December 2001, Kim has had enough time to prepare his response to this plain charge. We also note that the information in the notice the respondents subsequently sent is no different from the information that they had earlier conveyed, albeit orally, to the petitioners: the simple unadorned statement that Kim stood accused of fraternity membership. Given these circumstances, we are not convinced that Kim's right to explain his side as exercised in his written denial had been violated or diminished. The essence of due process, it bears repeating, is simply the opportunity to be heard.[62] | |||||