This case has been cited 7 times or more.
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2015-01-21 |
LEONEN, J. |
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| Compelling governmental interest would include constitutionally declared principles. We have held, for example, that "the welfare of children and the State's mandate to protect and care for them, as parens patriae,[254] constitute a substantial and compelling government interest in regulating . . . utterances in TV broadcast."[255] | |||||
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2014-02-18 |
ABAD, J. |
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| Petitioners point out that the provision of ACPA that makes it unlawful for any person to "produce, direct, manufacture or create any form of child pornography"[33] clearly relates to the prosecution of persons who aid and abet the core offenses that ACPA seeks to punish.[34] Petitioners are wary that a person who merely doodles on paper and imagines a sexual abuse of a 16-year-old is not criminally liable for producing child pornography but one who formulates the idea on his laptop would be. Further, if the author bounces off his ideas on Twitter, anyone who replies to the tweet could be considered aiding and abetting a cybercrime. | |||||
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2014-02-18 |
ABAD, J. |
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| The guidelines in Miller were adopted in Pita v. Court of Appeals[232] and Fernando v. Court of Appeals.[233] It was also cited in the 2009 case of Soriano v. Laguardia[234] wherein we stated:Following the contextual lessons of the cited case of Miller v. California a patently offensive utterance would come within the pale of the term obscenity should it appeal to the prurient interest of an average listener applying contemporary standards.[235] | |||||
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2012-09-24 |
BRION, J. |
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| The BSP is not simply a corporate entity but qualifies as an administrative agency created, pursuant to constitutional mandate,[100] to carry out a particular governmental function.[101] To be able to perform its role as central monetary authority, the Constitution granted it fiscal and administrative autonomy. In general, administrative agencies exercise powers and/or functions which may be characterized as administrative, investigatory, regulatory, quasi-legislative, or quasi-judicial, or a mix of these five, as may be conferred by the Constitution or by statute.[102] | |||||
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2012-01-24 |
VELASCO JR., J. |
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| P.D. No. 755 involves an invalid delegation of legislative power, a concept discussed in Soriano v. Laguardia,[141] citing the following excerpts from Edu v. Ericta: It is a fundamental ... that Congress may not delegate its legislative power.... What cannot be delegated is the authority ... to make laws and to alter and repeal them; the test is the completeness of the statute in all its term and provisions when it leaves the hands of the legislature. To determine whether or not there is an undue delegation of legislative power, the inquiry must be directed to the scope and definiteness of the measure enacted. The legislature does not abdicate its functions when it describes what job must be done, who is to do it, and what is the scope of his authority.... | |||||
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2011-07-05 |
VELASCO JR., J. |
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| General jurisdiction over agrarian disputes over stock distribution agreements necessarily implies a specific authority to monitor and enforce implementation of the same. As distinguished from express powers, implied powers are those that can be inferred or are implicit in the wordings or conferred by necessary or fair implication of the enabling act. [185] Public respondents correctly identified the explanation of Chavez v. National Housing Authority, [186] on the doctrine of necessary implication in administrative law, in this wise: Basic in administrative law is the doctrine that a government agency or office has express and implied powers based on its charter and other pertinent statutes. Express powers are those powers granted, allocated, and delegated to a government agency or office by express provisions of law. On the other hand, implied powers are those that can be inferred or are implicit in the wordings of the law or conferred by necessary or fair implication in the enabling act. In Angara v. Electoral Commission, the Court clarified and stressed that when a general grant of power is conferred or duty enjoined, every particular power necessary for the exercise of the one or the performance of the other is also conferred by necessary implication. It was also explicated that when the statute does not specify the particular method to be followed or used by a government agency in the exercise of the power vested in it by law, said agency has the authority to adopt any reasonable method to carry out its functions. (Emphasis supplied) | |||||