This case has been cited 9 times or more.
|
2014-06-02 |
BRION, J. |
||||
| The essence of voluntary surrender is spontaneity and the intent of the accused to submit himself to the authorities either because he acknowledged his guilt or he wished to save the authorities the trouble and expense that may be incurred for his search and capture.[30] | |||||
|
2013-12-11 |
PER CURIAM |
||||
| Grave abuse of discretion is defined as capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion and hostility.[16] Here, the subject resolutions of the CTA have been issued in accordance with the rules on evidence and existing jurisprudence. | |||||
|
2013-09-11 |
PERLAS-BERNABE, J. |
||||
| Corollary thereto, Unicapital, et al.'s contention[77] that the case should be dismissed on the ground that it failed to set out the actual libelous statements complained about cannot be given credence. These incidents, as well as the specific circumstances surrounding the manner in which Unicapital and PBI, et al. pursued their claims against Consing, Jr. may be better ventilated during trial. It is a standing rule that issues that require the contravention of the allegations of the complaint, as well as the full ventilation, in effect, of the main merits of the case, should not be within the province of a mere motion to dismiss,[78] as in this case. Hence, as what is only required is that the allegations furnish adequate basis by which the complaint can be maintained, the Court in view of the above-stated reasons finds that the RTC-Pasig City's denial of Unicapital, et al.'s motion to dismiss on the ground of failure to state a cause of action was not tainted with grave abuse of discretion which would necessitate the reversal of the CA's ruling. Verily, for grave abuse of discretion to exist, the abuse of discretion must be patent and gross so as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law.[79] This the Court does not perceive in the case at bar. | |||||
|
2013-09-11 |
PER CURIAM |
||||
| A public prosecutor's determination of probable cause that is, one made for the purpose of filing an information in court is essentially an executive function and, therefore, generally lies beyond the pale of judicial scrutiny. The exception to this rule is when such determination is tainted with grave abuse of discretion and perforce becomes correctible through the extraordinary writ of certiorari. It is fundamental that the concept of grave abuse of discretion transcends mere judgmental error as it properly pertains to a jurisdictional aberration. While defying precise definition, grave abuse of discretion generally refers to a "capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction." Corollary, the abuse of discretion must be patent and gross so as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law.[31] To note, the underlying principle behind the courts' power to review a public prosecutor's determination of probable cause is to ensure that the latter acts within the permissible bounds of his authority or does not gravely abuse the same. This manner of judicial review is a constitutionally-enshrined form of check and balance which underpins the very core of our system of government. As aptly edified in the recent case of Alberto v. CA:[32] | |||||
|
2013-03-06 |
SERENO, C.J. |
||||
| It has long been settled that the grant of a demurrer is tantamount to an acquittal. An acquitted defendant is entitled to the right of repose as a direct consequence of the finality of his acquittal.[15] This rule, however, is not without exception. The rule on double jeopardy is subject to the exercise of judicial review by way of the extraordinary writ of certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. The Supreme Court is endowed with the power to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the government.[16] Here, the party asking for the review must show the presence of a whimsical or capricious exercise of judgment equivalent to lack of jurisdiction; a patent and gross abuse of discretion amounting to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform a duty imposed by law or to act in contemplation of law; an exercise of power in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion and hostility; or a blatant abuse of authority to a point so grave and so severe as to deprive the court of its very power to dispense justice.[17] In such an event, the accused cannot be considered to be at risk of double jeopardy.[18] | |||||
|
2012-11-14 |
PERALTA, J. |
||||
| As to the claim of petitioners that they are entitled to the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender, the same does not deserve merit. For voluntary surrender to be appreciated, the following requisites should be present: (1) the offender has not been actually arrested; (2) the offender surrendered himself to a person in authority or the latter's agent; and (3) the surrender was voluntary.[29] The essence of voluntary surrender is spontaneity and the intent of the accused to give himself up and submit himself to the authorities either because he acknowledges his guilt or he wishes to save the authorities the trouble and expense that may be incurred for his search and capture.[30] Without these elements, and where the clear reasons for the supposed surrender are the inevitability of arrest and the need to ensure his safety, the surrender is not spontaneous and, therefore, cannot be characterized as "voluntary surrender" to serve as a mitigating circumstance.[31] In the present case, when the petitioners reported the incident and allegedly surrendered the bladed weapon used in the stabbing, such cannot be considered as voluntary surrender within the contemplation of the law. Besides, there was no spontaneity, because they only surrendered after a warrant of their arrest had already been issued. | |||||
|
2012-10-09 |
VILLARAMA, JR., J. |
||||
| Moreover, we have held that if the petition is anchored on the people's right to information on matters of public concern, any citizen can be the real party in interest. The requirement of personal interest is satisfied by the mere fact that the petitioner is a citizen, and therefore, part of the general public which possesses the right. There is no need to show any special interest in the result. It is sufficient that petitioners are citizens and, as such, are interested in the faithful execution of the laws.[27] | |||||
|
2012-06-18 |
BERSAMIN, J. |
||||
| We cannot agree with petitioner. As already stated, there was sufficient evidence that petitioner and Travel and Tours Advisers, Inc. were one and the same entity. Moreover, we remind that a petition for the writ of certiorari neither deals with errors of judgment nor extends to a mistake in the appreciation of the contending parties' evidence or in the evaluation of their relative weight.[52] It is timely to remind that the petitioner in a special civil action for certiorari commenced against a trial court that has jurisdiction over the proceedings bears the burden to demonstrate not merely reversible error, but grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the respondent trial court in issuing the impugned order.[53] The term grave abuse of discretion is defined as a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner because of passion or hostility.[54] Mere abuse of discretion is not enough; it must be grave.[55] Yet, here, petitioner did not discharge its burden because it failed to demonstrate that the CA erred in holding that the RTC had not committed grave abuse of discretion. A review of the records shows, indeed, that the RTC correctly rejected petitioner's third-party claim. Hence, the rejection did not come within the domain of the writ of certiorari's limiting requirement of excess or lack of jurisdiction.[56] | |||||
|
2011-06-01 |
VILLARAMA, JR., J. |
||||
| Grave abuse of discretion is defined as capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion and hostility.[18] The subject Resolutions having been issued in accordance with law and existing jurisprudence, no grave abuse of discretion could be ascribed to the appellate court. | |||||