This case has been cited 3 times or more.
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2015-08-05 |
JARDELEZA, J. |
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| It is basic in law that a compromise agreement, as a contract, is binding only upon the parties to the compromise, and not upon non-parties. This is the doctrine of relativity of contracts. Consistent with this principle, a judgment based entirely on a compromise agreement is binding only on the parties to the compromise the court approved, and not upon the parties who did not take part in the compromise agreement and in the proceedings leading to its submission and approval by the court. Otherwise stated, a court judgment made solely on the basis of a compromise agreement binds only the parties to the compromise, and cannot bind a party litigant who did not take part in the compromise agreement.[50] | |||||
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2015-02-11 |
VILLARAMA, JR., J. |
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| It is basic in law that a compromise agreement, as a contract, is binding only upon the parties to the compromise, and not upon non-parties. This is the doctrine of relativity of contracts.[32] The rule is based on Article 1311 (1) of the Civil Code which provides that "contracts take effect only between the parties, their assigns and heirs x x x."[33] The sound reason for the exclusion of non-parties to an agreement is the absence of a vinculum or juridical tie which is the efficient cause for the establishment of an obligation.[34] Consistent with this principle, a judgment based entirely on a compromise agreement is binding only on the parties to the compromise the court approved, and not upon the parties who did not take part in the compromise agreement and in the proceedings leading to its submission and approval by the court. Otherwise stated, a court judgment made solely on the basis of a compromise agreement binds only the parties to the compromise, and cannot bind a party litigant who did not take part in the compromise agreement.[35] | |||||
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2014-07-30 |
PERLAS-BERNABE, J. |
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| The Court, however, finds no need to conduct a remand of the case for the purpose of re-computing the loan obligation inclusive of interests, penalties and other charges due against Sps. Mantala[65] for the reason that the said loan is the principal obligation to which the subject real estate mortgage is merely an accessory to. In Philippine National Bank v. Banatao,[66] it was enunciated that: [A] mortgage is merely an accessory agreement and does not affect the principal contract of loan. The mortgages, while void, [however,] can still be considered as instruments evidencing the indebtedness x x x.[67] | |||||