Lawyerly

GR No. 207355

2016-02-03

JENNIFER A. AGUSTIN-SE v. OFFICE OF PRESIDENT

CARPIO, J.

Petitioners, in essence, are arguing that the Court of Appeals should have applied the doctrine of stare decisis, which enjoins adherence to judicial precedence, such that lower courts are bound to follow the rule established in a decision of the Supreme Court,[51] or the doctrine of res judicata, which provides that a final judgment or decree on the merits rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction is conclusive of the rights of the parties or their privies in all later suits and on all points and matters determined in the previous suit.[52]

GR No. 179408

2014-03-05

PHILIPPINE LONG DISTANCE TELEP COMPANY v. ABIGAIL R. RAZON ALVAREZ

BRION, J.

In the field of adjudication, a case cannot yet acquire the status of a "decided" case that is "deemed settled and closed to further argument" if the Court's decision is still the subject of a motion for reconsideration seasonably filed by the moving party. Under the Rules of Court, a party is expressly allowed to file a motion for reconsideration of the Court's decision within 15 days from notice.[61] Since the doctrine of stare decisis is founded on the necessity of securing certainty and stability in law, then these attributes will spring only once the Court's ruling has lapsed to finality in accordance with law. In Ting v. Velez-Ting,[62] we ruled that:The principle of stare decisis enjoins adherence by lower courts to doctrinal rules established by this Court in its final decisions. It is based on the principle that once a question of law has been examined and decided, it should be deemed settled and closed to further argument.

GR No. 208566

2013-11-19

GRECO ANTONIOUS BEDA B. BELGICA v. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO N. OCHOA

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.

It was in the year 2000[46] that the "Priority Development Assistance Fund" (PDAF) appeared in the GAA. The requirement of "prior consultation with the respective Representative of the District" before PDAF funds were directly released to the implementing agency concerned was explicitly stated in the 2000 PDAF Article. Moreover, realignment of funds to any expense category was expressly allowed, with the sole condition that no amount shall be used to fund personal services and other personnel benefits.[47] The succeeding PDAF provisions remained the same in view of the re-enactment[48] of the 2000 GAA for the year 2001.

GR No. 180882

2013-02-27

BAGUIO REGREENING MOVEMENT v. ATTY. BRAIN MASWENG

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.

In the case at bar, petitioners and private respondents present the very same arguments and counter-arguments with respect to the writ of injunction against the fencing of the Busol Watershed Reservation. The same legal issues are thus being litigated in G.R. No. 180206 and in the case at bar, except that different writs of injunction are being assailed. In both cases, petitioners claim (1) that Atty. Masweng is prohibited from issuing temporary restraining orders and writs of preliminary injunction against government infrastructure projects; (2) that Baguio City is beyond the ambit of the IPRA; and (3) that private respondents have not shown a clear right to be protected. Private respondents, on the other hand, presented the same allegations in their Petition for Injunction, particularly the alleged recognition made under Proclamation No. 15 in favor of their ancestors. While res judicata does not apply on account of the different subject matters of the case at bar and G.R. No. 180206 (they assail different writs of injunction, albeit issued by the same hearing officer), we are constrained by the principle of stare decisis to grant the instant petition. The Court explained the principle of stare decisis[25] in Ting v. Velez-Ting[26]: The principle of stare decisis enjoins adherence by lower courts to doctrinal rules established by this Court in its final decisions. It is based on the principle that once a question of law has been examined and decided, it should be deemed settled and closed to further argument. Basically, it is a bar to any attempt to relitigate the same issues, necessary for two simple reasons: economy and stability. In our jurisdiction, the principle is entrenched in Article 8 of the Civil Code. (Citations omitted.)

GR No. 157649

2012-11-12

ARABELLE J. MENDOZA v. REPUBLIC

BERSAMIN, J.

Apparent from the aforecited pronouncements is that it was not the absence of the medical expert's testimony alone that was crucial but rather petitioners' failure to satisfactorily discharge the burden of showing the existence of psychological incapacity at the inception of the marriage. In other words, the totality of the evidence proving such incapacity at and prior to the time of the marriage was the crucial consideration, as the Court has reminded in Ting v. Velez-Ting:[21]

GR No. 177190

2011-02-23

LAND BANK OF PHILIPPINES v. ERNESTO P. PAGAYATAN

VELASCO JR., J.

We cannot apply the principle of stare decisis to the instant case, too. The Court explained the principle in Ting v. Velez-Ting:[17]

GR No. 184063

2011-01-24

CYNTHIA E. YAMBAO v. REPUBLIC

NACHURA, J.

While the Court has not abandoned the standard set in Molina,[44] the Court has reiterated the tenet that the factual milieu of each case must be treated as distinct and, as such, each case must be decided based on its own set of facts.

GR No. 184063

2011-01-24

CYNTHIA E. YAMBAO v. REPUBLIC

NACHURA, J.

The intendment of the law has been to confine the application of Article 36 to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage.[48] Thus, for a marriage to be annulled under Article 36 of the Family Code, the psychologically incapacitated spouse must be shown to suffer no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes him or her to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants.[49] It is a malady so grave and so permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is about to assume.[50]

GR No. 173138

2010-12-01

NOEL B. BACCAY v. MARIBEL C. BACCAY

VILLARAMA, JR., J.

Surprisingly enough, Ngo-Te backtracked on its criticism of Molina a month later by saying in the case of Ting v. Velez-Ting[31] that Ngo-Te did not abandon Molina. Far from abandoning Molina, Ting explains the Ngo-Te simply suggested a relaxation of the stringent requirements set forth in Molina.[32]

GR No. 173138

2010-12-01

NOEL B. BACCAY v. MARIBEL C. BACCAY

VILLARAMA, JR., J.

SO ORDERED.[11]

GR No. 164493

2010-03-10

JOCELYN M. SUAZO v. ANGELITO SUAZO

BRION, J.

As a final note though, Te expressly stated that it is not suggesting the abandonment of Molina, but that, following Antonio v. Reyes, it merely looked at other perspectives that should also govern the disposition of petitions for declaration of nullity under Article 36. The subsequent Ting v. Velez-Ting[20] follows Te's lead when it reiterated that Te did not abandon Molina; far from abandoning Molina, it simply suggested the relaxation of its stringent requirements, cognizant of the explanation given by the Committee on the Revision of the Rules on the rationale of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages:[21]

GR No. 162336

2010-02-01

HILARIO P. SORIANO v. PEOPLE

DEL CASTILLO, J.

To be sure, the BSP letters involved in Soriano v. Hon. Casanova[39] are not the same as the BSP letter involved in the instant case. However, the BSP letters in Soriano v. Hon. Casanova and the BSP letter subject of this case are similar in the sense that they are all signed by the OSI officers of the BSP, they were not sworn to by the said officers, they all contained summaries of their attached affidavits, and they all requested the conduct of a preliminary investigation and the filing of corresponding criminal charges against petitioner Soriano. Thus, the principle of stare decisis dictates that the ruling in Soriano v. Hon. Casanova be applied in the instant case - once a question of law has been examined and decided, it should be deemed settled and closed to further argument.[40]

GR No. 166738

2009-08-14

ROWENA PADILLA-RUMBAUA v. EDWARD RUMBAUA

BRION, J.

These Guidelines incorporate the basic requirements we established in Santos. To reiterate, psychological incapacity must be characterized by: (a) gravity; (b) juridical antecedence; and (c) incurability.[31] These requisites must be strictly complied with, as the grant of a petition for nullity of marriage based on psychological incapacity must be confined only to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. Furthermore, since the Family Code does not define "psychological incapacity," fleshing out its terms is left to us to do so on a case-to-case basis through jurisprudence.[32] We emphasized this approach in the recent case of Ting v. Velez-Ting[33] when we explained: It was for this reason that we found it necessary to emphasize in Ngo Te that each case involving the application of Article 36 must be treated distinctly and judged not on the basis of a priori assumptions, predilections or generalizations but according to its own attendant facts. Courts should interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis, guided by experience, the findings of experts and researchers in psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals.

	GR No. 207355 2016-02-03	JENNIFER A. AGUSTIN-SE v. OFFICE OF PRESIDENT CARPIO, J.
Petitioners, in essence, are arguing that the Court of Appeals should have applied the doctrine of stare decisis, which enjoins adherence to judicial precedence, such that lower courts are bound to follow the rule established in a decision of the Supreme Court,[51] or the doctrine of res judicata, which provides that a final judgment or decree on the merits rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction is conclusive of the rights of the parties or their privies in all later suits and on all points and matters determined in the previous suit.[52]
	GR No. 179408 2014-03-05	PHILIPPINE LONG DISTANCE TELEP COMPANY v. ABIGAIL R. RAZON ALVAREZ BRION, J.
In the field of adjudication, a case cannot yet acquire the status of a "decided" case that is "deemed settled and closed to further argument" if the Court's decision is still the subject of a motion for reconsideration seasonably filed by the moving party. Under the Rules of Court, a party is expressly allowed to file a motion for reconsideration of the Court's decision within 15 days from notice.[61] Since the doctrine of stare decisis is founded on the necessity of securing certainty and stability in law, then these attributes will spring only once the Court's ruling has lapsed to finality in accordance with law. In Ting v. Velez-Ting,[62] we ruled that:The principle of stare decisis enjoins adherence by lower courts to doctrinal rules established by this Court in its final decisions. It is based on the principle that once a question of law has been examined and decided, it should be deemed settled and closed to further argument.
	GR No. 208566 2013-11-19	GRECO ANTONIOUS BEDA B. BELGICA v. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO N. OCHOA PERLAS-BERNABE, J.
It was in the year 2000[46] that the "Priority Development Assistance Fund" (PDAF) appeared in the GAA. The requirement of "prior consultation with the respective Representative of the District" before PDAF funds were directly released to the implementing agency concerned was explicitly stated in the 2000 PDAF Article. Moreover, realignment of funds to any expense category was expressly allowed, with the sole condition that no amount shall be used to fund personal services and other personnel benefits.[47] The succeeding PDAF provisions remained the same in view of the re-enactment[48] of the 2000 GAA for the year 2001.
	GR No. 180882 2013-02-27	BAGUIO REGREENING MOVEMENT v. ATTY. BRAIN MASWENG LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.
In the case at bar, petitioners and private respondents present the very same arguments and counter-arguments with respect to the writ of injunction against the fencing of the Busol Watershed Reservation. The same legal issues are thus being litigated in G.R. No. 180206 and in the case at bar, except that different writs of injunction are being assailed. In both cases, petitioners claim (1) that Atty. Masweng is prohibited from issuing temporary restraining orders and writs of preliminary injunction against government infrastructure projects; (2) that Baguio City is beyond the ambit of the IPRA; and (3) that private respondents have not shown a clear right to be protected. Private respondents, on the other hand, presented the same allegations in their Petition for Injunction, particularly the alleged recognition made under Proclamation No. 15 in favor of their ancestors. While res judicata does not apply on account of the different subject matters of the case at bar and G.R. No. 180206 (they assail different writs of injunction, albeit issued by the same hearing officer), we are constrained by the principle of stare decisis to grant the instant petition. The Court explained the principle of stare decisis[25] in Ting v. Velez-Ting[26]: The principle of stare decisis enjoins adherence by lower courts to doctrinal rules established by this Court in its final decisions. It is based on the principle that once a question of law has been examined and decided, it should be deemed settled and closed to further argument. Basically, it is a bar to any attempt to relitigate the same issues, necessary for two simple reasons: economy and stability. In our jurisdiction, the principle is entrenched in Article 8 of the Civil Code. (Citations omitted.)
	GR No. 157649 2012-11-12	ARABELLE J. MENDOZA v. REPUBLIC BERSAMIN, J.
Apparent from the aforecited pronouncements is that it was not the absence of the medical expert's testimony alone that was crucial but rather petitioners' failure to satisfactorily discharge the burden of showing the existence of psychological incapacity at the inception of the marriage. In other words, the totality of the evidence proving such incapacity at and prior to the time of the marriage was the crucial consideration, as the Court has reminded in Ting v. Velez-Ting:[21]
	GR No. 177190 2011-02-23	LAND BANK OF PHILIPPINES v. ERNESTO P. PAGAYATAN VELASCO JR., J.
We cannot apply the principle of stare decisis to the instant case, too. The Court explained the principle in Ting v. Velez-Ting:[17]
	GR No. 184063 2011-01-24	CYNTHIA E. YAMBAO v. REPUBLIC NACHURA, J.
While the Court has not abandoned the standard set in Molina,[44] the Court has reiterated the tenet that the factual milieu of each case must be treated as distinct and, as such, each case must be decided based on its own set of facts.
	GR No. 184063 2011-01-24	CYNTHIA E. YAMBAO v. REPUBLIC NACHURA, J.
The intendment of the law has been to confine the application of Article 36 to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage.[48] Thus, for a marriage to be annulled under Article 36 of the Family Code, the psychologically incapacitated spouse must be shown to suffer no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes him or her to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants.[49] It is a malady so grave and so permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is about to assume.[50]
	GR No. 173138 2010-12-01	NOEL B. BACCAY v. MARIBEL C. BACCAY VILLARAMA, JR., J.
Surprisingly enough, Ngo-Te backtracked on its criticism of Molina a month later by saying in the case of Ting v. Velez-Ting[31] that Ngo-Te did not abandon Molina. Far from abandoning Molina, Ting explains the Ngo-Te simply suggested a relaxation of the stringent requirements set forth in Molina.[32]
	GR No. 173138 2010-12-01	NOEL B. BACCAY v. MARIBEL C. BACCAY VILLARAMA, JR., J.
SO ORDERED.[11]
	GR No. 164493 2010-03-10	JOCELYN M. SUAZO v. ANGELITO SUAZO BRION, J.
As a final note though, Te expressly stated that it is not suggesting the abandonment of Molina, but that, following Antonio v. Reyes, it merely looked at other perspectives that should also govern the disposition of petitions for declaration of nullity under Article 36. The subsequent Ting v. Velez-Ting[20] follows Te's lead when it reiterated that Te did not abandon Molina; far from abandoning Molina, it simply suggested the relaxation of its stringent requirements, cognizant of the explanation given by the Committee on the Revision of the Rules on the rationale of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages:[21]
	GR No. 162336 2010-02-01	HILARIO P. SORIANO v. PEOPLE DEL CASTILLO, J.
To be sure, the BSP letters involved in Soriano v. Hon. Casanova[39] are not the same as the BSP letter involved in the instant case. However, the BSP letters in Soriano v. Hon. Casanova and the BSP letter subject of this case are similar in the sense that they are all signed by the OSI officers of the BSP, they were not sworn to by the said officers, they all contained summaries of their attached affidavits, and they all requested the conduct of a preliminary investigation and the filing of corresponding criminal charges against petitioner Soriano. Thus, the principle of stare decisis dictates that the ruling in Soriano v. Hon. Casanova be applied in the instant case - once a question of law has been examined and decided, it should be deemed settled and closed to further argument.[40]
	GR No. 166738 2009-08-14	ROWENA PADILLA-RUMBAUA v. EDWARD RUMBAUA BRION, J.
These Guidelines incorporate the basic requirements we established in Santos. To reiterate, psychological incapacity must be characterized by: (a) gravity; (b) juridical antecedence; and (c) incurability.[31] These requisites must be strictly complied with, as the grant of a petition for nullity of marriage based on psychological incapacity must be confined only to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. Furthermore, since the Family Code does not define "psychological incapacity," fleshing out its terms is left to us to do so on a case-to-case basis through jurisprudence.[32] We emphasized this approach in the recent case of Ting v. Velez-Ting[33] when we explained: It was for this reason that we found it necessary to emphasize in Ngo Te that each case involving the application of Article 36 must be treated distinctly and judged not on the basis of a priori assumptions, predilections or generalizations but according to its own attendant facts. Courts should interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis, guided by experience, the findings of experts and researchers in psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals.

BENJAMIN G. TING v. CARMEN M. VELEZ-TING