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LAND BANK OF PHILIPPINES v. HERNANDO T. CHICO

This case has been cited 7 times or more.

	GR No. 182431 2013-02-27	LAND BANK OF PHILIPPINES v. ESTHER ANSON RIVERA PEREZ, J.
Aggrieved, LBP filed this present Motion for Reconsideration and argued once again the erroneous imposition of 12% interest. The bank reiterated its previous argument that the imposition is justifiable only in case of undue delay in the payment of just compensation.[12] It argued[13] against the application of the A.O. No. 6, Series of 2008 (A.O. 06-08)[14] to the instant case because it claims that the 6% interest does not apply to agricultural lands valued under R.A. 6657, such as the subject properties, following the Court's ruling in Land Bank of the Philippines v. Chico.[15]
	GR No. 175055 2012-06-27	LAND BANK OF PHILIPPINES v. HEIRS OF MAXIMO PUYAT DEL CASTILLO, J.
The Court has already resolved the first question posed by Land Bank in several decisions.[27] It has been held that, when the government takes property pursuant to PD 27, but does not pay the landowner his just compensation until after RA 6657 has taken effect in 1988, it becomes more equitable to determine the just compensation using RA 6657. Land Bank of the Philippines v. Natividad[28] explained it thus: Land Bank's contention that the property was acquired for purposes of agrarian reform on October 21, 1972, the time of the effectivity of PD 27, ergo just compensation should be based on the value of the property as of that time and not at the time of possession in 1993, is likewise erroneous. In Office of the President, Malacañang, Manila v. Court of Appeals, we ruled that the seizure of the landholding did not take place on the date of effectivity of PD 27 but would take effect [upon] payment of just compensation.
	GR No. 171101 2012-04-24	HACIENDA LUISITA v. PRESIDENTIAL AGRARIAN REFORM COUNCIL VELASCO JR., J.
Moreover, I disagree that the desire to avoid delaying the distribution of the land can justify deciding now the time of taking. Haste on that basis may unduly sacrifice the constitutional right of HLI to the fair and prompt determination of its just compensation. We have to bear in mind that the taking of land for the CARP, albeit revolutionary, should not be done by sacrificing the constitutional right to the fair and prompt determination of just compensation for HLI as the landowner because it was as entitled as the FWBs to the protection of the Constitution and the agrarian reform laws.[28] On the other hand, having the RTC-SAC determine the time of taking, far from being a cause for delay, may actually expedite the proceedings, because the RTC-SAC can resort to the aid of extrajudicial and judicial mediation, as well as to other procedures heretofore effectively used by the trial courts to expedite, including pre-trial and discovery, with the end in view of quickening the all-important determination of just compensation. In this regard, all the possibilities of expediting the process should be encouraged, because just compensation that results from the agreement and consent of the stakeholders of land reform will be no less just and full.
	GR No. 171101 2011-11-22	HACIENDA LUISITA v. PRESIDENTIAL AGRARIAN REFORM COUNCIL VELASCO JR., J.
DAR, however, contends that the declaration of the area[32] to be awarded to each FWB is too restrictive. It stresses that in agricultural landholdings like Hacienda Luisita, there are roads, irrigation canals, and other portions of the land that are considered commonly-owned by farmworkers, and this may necessarily result in the decrease of the area size that may be awarded per FWB.[33] DAR also argues that the July 5, 2011 Decision of this Court does not give it any leeway in adjusting the area that may be awarded per FWB in case the number of actual qualified FWBs decreases.[34]
	GR No. 175251 2011-05-30	RODOLFO LUNA v. ALLADO CONSTRUCTION CO. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.
With regard to the second assignment of error which essentially involves the determination of factual issues, we are reminded that, in a petition under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, only questions of law, not of fact, may be raised before the Court.[27] However, where the findings of the NLRC contradict those of the Labor Arbiter, the Court, in the exercise of equity jurisdiction, may look into the records of the case and reexamine the questioned findings.[28]
	GR No. 168726 2010-03-05	PIO DELOS REYES v. WALDO Q. FLORES CARPIO, J.
As to the merits of the case, the question of whether petitioners owned landholdings used for residential, commercial, industrial, or other urban purposes from which they derived adequate income is a question of fact. In a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, only questions of law, not of fact, may be raised before this Court. Well-settled is the rule that this Court is not a trier of facts. It is not this Court's function to re-examine the respective sets of evidence submitted by the parties.[25] As this case involves the application of P.D. No. 27 and LOI No. 474, the DAR Secretary, owing to his agrarian expertise, is in a better position to make a final determination whether petitioners' landholdings may be subject of exclusion from operation land transfer or retention. This Court need not weigh anew the evidence submitted by the parties and supplant the findings of fact by the DAR Secretary, especially when such findings are fully supported by evidence consisting of certifications issued by the Office of the Provincial Assessor of Bataan and the various certificates of title on record.
	GR No. 180803 2009-10-23	LAND BANK OF PHILIPPINES v. J. L. JOCSON CARPIO MORALES, J.
Petitioner's interpretation is flawed. In the recent case of Land Bank of the Philippines v. Chico,[27] the Court declared in no uncertain terms that R.A. No. 6657 is the relevant law for determining just compensation after noting several decided cases[28] where the Court found it more equitable to determine just compensation based on the value of the property at the time of payment. This was a clear departure from the Court's earlier stance in Gabatin v. Land Bank of the Philippines[29] where it declared that the reckoning period for the determination of just compensation is the time when the land was taken applying P.D. No. 27 and E.O. No. 228.