This case has been cited 9 times or more.
|
2015-11-23 |
LEONEN, J. |
||||
| In 1985, National Investment Development Corporation sold Pantranco to North Express Transport, Inc., which was owned by Gregorio Araneta III,[7] while Pantranco's assets were sold to Max B. Potenciano, Max Joseph A. Potenciano, and Dolores A. Potenciano. The Potencianos thereafter incorporated Pantranco as a private corporation.[8] | |||||
|
2015-02-23 |
SERENO, C.J. |
||||
| A real party in interest is one who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit.[85] One's interest must be personal and not one based on a desire to vindicate the constitutional right of some third and unrelated party.[86] The purposes of the rule are to prevent the prosecution of actions by persons without any right or title to or interest in the case; to require that the actual party entitled to legal relief be the one to prosecute the action; to avoid a multiplicity of suits; and to discourage litigation and keep it within certain bounds, pursuant to sound public policy.[87] | |||||
|
2014-10-01 |
LEONEN, J. |
||||
| Piercing the corporate veil is warranted when "[the separate personality of a corporation] is used as a means to perpetrate fraud or an illegal act, or as a vehicle for the evasion of an existing obligation, the circumvention of statutes, or to confuse legitimate issues."[85] It is also warranted in alter ego cases "where a corporation is merely a farce since it is a mere alter ego or business conduit of a person, or where the corporation is so organized and controlled and its affairs are so conducted as to make it merely an instrumentality, agency, conduit or adjunct of another corporation."[86] | |||||
|
2014-03-24 |
REYES, J. |
||||
| All the foregoing circumstances, with the exception of the admitted stock ownership, were however not properly pleaded and proved in accordance with the Rules of Court.[66] These were merely raised by the petitioners for the first time in their Motion for Issuance of an Alias Writ of Execution[67] and Reply,[68] which the Court cannot consider. "Whether the separate personality of the corporation should be pierced hinges on obtaining facts appropriately pleaded or proved."[69] | |||||
|
2012-06-13 |
MENDOZA, J. |
||||
| In two subsequent cases, the Court's ruling in Restaurante Las Conchas was invoked but the Court refused to consider it reasoning out that it was the exception rather than the rule. The two cases were Mandaue Dinghow Dimsum House, Co., Inc. and/or Henry Uytengsu v. National Labor Relations Commission[25] and Pantranco Employees Association (PEA-PTGWO) v. National Labor Relations Commission.[26] | |||||
|
2012-06-13 |
MENDOZA, J. |
||||
| Clearly, what can be inferred from the earlier cases is that the doctrine of piercing the corporate veil applies only in three (3) basic areas, namely: 1) defeat of public convenience as when the corporate fiction is used as a vehicle for the evasion of an existing obligation; 2) fraud cases or when the corporate entity is used to justify a wrong, protect fraud, or defend a crime; or 3) alter ego cases, where a corporation is merely a farce since it is a mere alter ego or business conduit of a person, or where the corporation is so organized and controlled and its affairs are so conducted as to make it merely an instrumentality, agency, conduit or adjunct of another corporation. In the absence of malice, bad faith, or a specific provision of law making a corporate officer liable, such corporate officer cannot be made personally liable for corporate liabilities.[29] [Emphasis supplied] | |||||
|
2011-01-12 |
PERALTA, J. |
||||
| On the contrary, the Court agrees with the CA that Lubas is a mere agent, conduit or adjunct of PTI. A settled formulation of the doctrine of piercing the corporate veil is that when two business enterprises are owned, conducted and controlled by the same parties, both law and equity will, when necessary to protect the rights of third parties, disregard the legal fiction that these two entities are distinct and treat them as identical or as one and the same.[26] In the present case, it may be true that Lubas is a single proprietorship and not a corporation. However, petitioners' attempt to isolate themselves from and hide behind the supposed separate and distinct personality of Lubas so as to evade their liabilities is precisely what the classical doctrine of piercing the veil of corporate entity seeks to prevent and remedy. | |||||
|
2010-09-29 |
VELASCO JR., J. |
||||
| In Pantranco Employees Association (PEA-PTGWO) v. National Labor Relations Commission,[32] the Court revisited the subject principle of piercing the veil of corporate fiction and wrote: Under the doctrine of "piercing the veil of corporate fiction," the court looks at the corporation as a mere collection of individuals or an aggregation of persons undertaking business as a group, disregarding the separate juridical personality of the corporation unifying the group. Another formulation of this doctrine is that when two business enterprises are owned, conducted and controlled by the same parties, both law and equity will, when necessary to protect the rights of third parties, disregard the legal fiction that two corporations are distinct entities and treat them as identical or as one and the same. | |||||
|
2010-08-25 |
VILLARAMA, JR., J. |
||||
| Also in Pantranco Employees Association (PEA-PTGWO) v. National Labor Relations Commission,[27] this Court ruled: Whether the separate personality of the corporation should be pierced hinges on obtaining facts appropriately pleaded or proved. However, any piercing of the corporate veil has to be done with caution, albeit the Court will not hesitate to disregard the corporate veil when it is misused or when necessary in the interest of justice. After all, the concept of corporate entity was not meant to promote unfair objectives. | |||||