This case has been cited 4 times or more.
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2004-11-17 |
YNARES-SATIAGO, J. |
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| Even with all of the compelling and persuasive scientific evidence presented by petitioner and his counsel, we are not convinced that Reynaldo de Villa is entitled to outright acquittal. As correctly pointed out by the Solicitor General, even if it is conclusively proven that Reynaldo de Villa is not the father of Leahlyn Mendoza, his conviction could, in theory, still stand, with Aileen Mendoza's testimony and positive identification as its bases.[57] The Solicitor General reiterates, and correctly so, that the pregnancy of the victim has never been an element of the crime of rape.[58] Therefore, the DNA evidence has failed to conclusively prove to this Court that Reynaldo de Villa should be discharged. Although petitioner claims that conviction was based solely on a finding of paternity of the child Leahlyn, this is not the case. Our conviction was based on the clear and convincing testimonial evidence of the victim, which, given credence by the trial court, was affirmed on appeal. | |||||
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2004-03-02 |
QUISUMBING, J. |
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| We are not convinced that the private complainant's conduct in meekly walking home in single-file with her mother and the appellant behind after she was raped, would negate her tale of ravishment. First, as appellant himself admits, there is no standard reaction of a victim in a rape incident. Second, there is nothing bizarre about the behavior of the private complainant or of her mother, as appellant would have us believe. As the Solicitor General correctly points out, both Mary Jane and Araceli were threatened with death by the appellant. Araceli, in fact, had no choice but to placate appellant with promises that she would not disclose the rape lest the latter make good his threats. Hence, they had to act as if they were calm and had accepted the fait accompli as a matter of course in order to throw appellant off his guard. Note, however, that once safely out of the appellant's clutches, Araceli did not waste time to report immediately the incident to the barangay authorities when she had the chance to do so. Note likewise that appellant ran off to the mountains when the authorities sought to bring him in for questioning. His flight strongly indicates his guilt.[38] A truly innocent person would seize every opportunity to defend himself and assert his innocence. | |||||
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2004-01-29 |
CARPIO MORALES, J. |
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| Under Art. 335 of the Revised Penal Code, which was in force at the dates of the commission of the felonies, the penalty for rape with the use of a deadly weapon was "reclusion perpetua to death." However, the penalty of death may not be imposed since the aggravating circumstance of Romela's relationship to appellant was not proven beyond reasonable doubt. While during the trial Romela testified that appellant is her father and appellant, in turn, repeatedly admitted that Romela is his daughter, this Court has held that, because of the serious and irrevocable nature of the death penalty, the bare testimony of the complainant and the admission of the accused are not sufficient for its imposition; the relationship between the victim and the accused must be sufficiently established by competent and independent evidence.[70] | |||||
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2004-01-14 |
YNARES-SATIAGO, J. |
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| We have recently held in People v. Mendoza[20] that the bare testimony of the complainant and the admission of the accused during pre-trial and trial as to their relationship do not suffice for an accused cannot be condemned to suffer the supreme penalty of death on the basis of stipulations or his own admissions. This strict rule is warranted by the seriousness of the penalty of death. The fact that appellant is the father of the complainant must be sufficiently established by competent and independent evidence. | |||||