This case has been cited 4 times or more.
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2009-04-08 |
VELASCO JR., J. |
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| Moreover, accused-appellant belatedly raised his argument on appeal. In the similar case of People v. Mauro,[18] the accused gave a "not guilty" plea upon arraignment instead of questioning the so-called defect in the information against him. We observed in Mauro that if the accused really believed in the allegedly defective information and the prejudice to his rights, he should have filed a motion for bill of particulars before his arraignment.[19] We, thus, also rule in the instant case that it is too late for accused-appellant to protest the imprecise dates found in the informations against him. | |||||
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2004-11-10 |
QUISUMBING, J. |
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| The exact date when the alleged trespass occurred is not an essential element of the offense of trespass. It is sufficient that the Complaint or Information states that the crime has been committed at any time as near as possible to the date of its actual commission.[13] Rule 110, Section 11 of the Rules of Court provides that it is not necessary to state in the complaint or information the precise time the offense was committed except when time is a material ingredient of the offense, but the act may be alleged to have been committed at any time as near to the actual date at which the offense was committed as the information or complaint will permit. A variance between the time set out in the indictment and that established by the evidence during trial does not constitute an error so serious as to warrant reversal of a conviction solely on that score.[14] Thus, the error invoked by the petitioner in the date of the alleged trespass in the Information is of no grave import, for it is far from being the decisive issue in this case. | |||||
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2003-10-01 |
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J. |
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| Q How about on November 1, 1997 did he also place the bolo beside him when your father sleep? A Yes, he place the bolo beside him every night. [30] However, the complaints/informations in those two cases fail to allege Lyzel's minority or appellant's relationship to her. Section 9, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, requires that both qualifying and aggravating circumstances must be stated in the complaint or information. Existing jurisprudence instructs that the death penalty may be imposed only if the complaint or information has alleged and the evidence has proven both the minority of the victim and her relationship to the offender by the quantum of proof required for conviction.[31] In the present case, not only were the minority of the complainant and her relationship with appellant not alleged in the two complaints/informations filed against appellant, but, also, the aggravating/qualifying circumstance that the second rape was committed in full view of appellant's daughter. Consequently, appellant may be convicted only of simple rape; hence, the trial court erred in imposing death penalty in both cases. The appropriate penalty which could be imposed on the appellant is reclusion perpetua in each count. | |||||
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2003-06-18 |
QUISUMBING, J. |
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| Consequently, we are unable to agree with the trial court regarding the imposition of death penalty on appellant. He can only be convicted of two counts of simple rape, each of which merits the penalty of reclusion perpetua.[32] | |||||