This case has been cited 2 times or more.
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2009-03-25 |
TINGA, J. |
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| The Rules of Court does not state, enumerate, or give examples of "good reasons" to justify execution. The determination of what is a good reason must, necessarily, be addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court. In other words, the issuance of the writ of execution must necessarily be controlled by the judgment of the judge in accordance with his own conscience and by a sense of justice and equity, free from the control of another's judgment or conscience. It must be so for discretion implies the absence of a hard and fast rule.[32] | |||||
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2006-06-16 |
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J. |
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| Moreover, the length of time that the election protest has been pending, thus, leaving petitioner only 21 months as the remaining portion of the term to serve as mayor, does not constitute "good reason" to justify execution pending appeal. The case of Fermo v. Comelec,[13] which is closely analogous to the present case, is instructive. Therein, the Court stated thus: "Shortness of term," alone and by itself cannot justify premature execution. It must be manifest in the decision sought to be executed that the defeat of the protestee and the victory of the protestant has been clearly established.[14] (Emphasis supplied) The COMELEC also did not ignore the rule that, as between two presumptive winners, the proclamation made by the trial court prevails over that of the board of canvassers. However, after finding that the trial court's ruling regarding which candidate garnered the highest number of votes is unreliable, the COMELEC applied the ruling in Camlian v. Comelec,[15] where the Court agreed with the COMELEC that: x x x while it is true that when an election protest is filed the protestee is only considered a presumptive winner until the protest is resolved, in the same way, when a protestant is adjudged the winner by a court of law but the case is on appeal with the Commission, such appeal likewise makes the protestant a presumptive winner and, unless meritorious grounds exist to execute judgment pending appeal, it is illogical to replace a presumptive winner proclaimed by a board of canvassers, by another presumptive winner so declared by a court. It needs no explanation that when a protestant is installed as a winner pending appeal, that in itself is already disruptive of the government service. How much more if the protestee wins the appeal in which case he will have to be reinstalled again to the office which he was forced to vacate?[16] (Emphasis supplied) With regard to petitioner's asseveration that the COMELEC did not consider the circumstance that private respondent did not file a motion for reconsideration of the Special Order before filing the petition for certiorari, the Court finds the same unmeritorious. Note that the COMELEC 1st Division pointed out that "a decision suffering from grave infirmities cannot be a source of a valid execution."[17] Evidently, the COMELEC found the case to be one of those falling within the exceptions to the general rule that the filing of which is an indispensable condition to the filing of a special civil action for certiorari. Some of the exceptions to this general rule are: (1) when public interest is involved, (2) the matter is one of urgency, and (3) the order is a patent nullity.[18] Since the COMELEC found the Joint Decision of the trial court to be seriously impaired, it then concluded that the Special Order granting execution pending appeal is invalid or a patent nullity; and that the trial court was then acting with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction when it issued said Special Order. Again, the Court finds no grave abuse of discretion committed by the COMELEC in ruling so. | |||||