This case has been cited 7 times or more.
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2009-09-30 |
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J. |
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| In People v. Buayaban,[20] the crime was committed and the Information was filed in 1990. Still, the Court gave the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure retroactive application since it benefited the accused and disregarded the generic aggravating circumstance of band because it was not alleged in the Information. The Court explained, viz: Section 8 simply provides that the information or complaint must state the designation of the offense given by the statute and specify its qualifying and generic aggravating circumstances. With regard to Section 9, we held in People vs. Nerio Suela that the use of the word "must" in said Section 9 indicates that the requirement is mandatory and therefore, the failure to comply with sec. 9, Rule 110, means that generic aggravating circumstances, although proven at the trial, cannot be appreciated against the accused if such circumstances are not stated in the information. | |||||
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2008-06-25 |
QUISUMBING, J. |
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| Moreover, the fact that the judge who penned the decision was not the judge who heard the testimonies of the witnesses was not enough reason to overturn the findings of fact of the trial court on the credibility of the witnesses. Though ideally a judge should hear all the testimonies personally, at times the reality is that a different judge might pen the decision because the predecessor judge has retired or died or has resigned. In this situation, it cannot be assumed that the findings of fact of the judge who took over the case are not reliable and do not deserve the respect of the appellate courts. The judge who did not hear the testimonies personally can always rely on the transcripts of stenographic notes taken during the trial. Such dependence does not violate substantive and procedural due process. [16] | |||||
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2007-08-17 |
CHICO-NAZARIO, J. |
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| Also affirmed is the ruling of the trial court and the Court of Appeals imposing upon the appellants the penalty of reclusion perpetua. However, the award of actual damages by the trial court in the amount of P60,000.00 cannot be sustained, considering that the prosecution merely presented a list of expenses. This Court has already held that actual damages cannot be awarded based on a list of expenses presented, as such claim must be adequately supported by receipts. In place of the actual damages, temperate damages in the amount of P25,000.00 should be awarded to the heirs of the victim in line with the prevailing jurisprudence.[25] Temperate damages are awarded to the heirs of the victim where no documentary evidence of actual damages were presented in the trial, because it is reasonable to presume that, when death occurs, the family of the victim incurred expenses for the wake and funeral.[26] Moreover, appellants are also ordered to pay the heirs of the victim the amount P50,000.00 as moral damages. However, in addition to these damages, exemplary damages should also be awarded to the heirs of the victim, since the qualifying circumstance of treachery was proven by the prosecution.[27] When a crime is committed with an aggravating circumstance, either qualifying or generic, an award of P25,000.00 as exemplary damages is justified under Article 2230 of the New Civil Code.[28] This kind of damage is intended to serve as a deterrent to serious wrongdoings, and as a vindication of undue sufferings and wanton invasion of the rights of an injured or a punishment for those guilty of outrageous conduct.[29] | |||||
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2007-07-10 |
CHICO-NAZARIO, J. |
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| It is not unusual for a judge who did not wholly try a case to decide it on the basis of the records on hand after the trial judge who had heard almost entirely the testimony of the witnesses died, resigned, retired, transferred, and so forth. Relative thereto, we have held in several cases that the fact that the judge who heard the evidence is not the one who rendered the judgment; and that for the same reason, the latter did not have the opportunity to observe the demeanor of the witnesses during the trial but merely relied on the records of the case does not render the judgment erroneous.[33] Even though the judge who penned the decision was not the judge who heard the testimonies of the witnesses, such is not enough reason to overturn the findings of fact of the trial court on the credibility of witnesses.[34] It may be true that the trial judge who conducted the hearing would be in a better position to ascertain the truth or falsity of the testimonies of the witnesses, but it does not necessarily follow that a judge who was not present during the trial cannot render a valid and just decision.[35] The efficacy of a decision is not necessarily impaired by the fact that its writer only took over from a colleague who had earlier presided at the trial.[36] That a judge did not hear a case does not necessarily render him less competent in assessing the credibility of witnesses. He can rely on the transcripts of stenographic notes of their testimony and calibrate them in accordance with their conformity to common experience, knowledge and observation of ordinary men. Such reliance does not violate substantive and procedural due process of law.[37] | |||||
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2007-04-13 |
CALLEJO, SR., J. |
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| This, too, is bereft of merit. The fact that the judge who penned the decision was not the judge who heard the testimonies of the witnesses is not enough reason to overturn the findings of fact of the trial court on their credibility. Though ideally a judge should hear all the testimonies personally, at times the reality is that a different judge might pen the decision because the predecessor judge has retired, died or has been reassigned. In this situation, it cannot be assumed that the findings of fact of the judge who took over the case are not reliable and do not deserve the respect of the appellate courts. Besides, the judge who did not hear the testimonies personally can always rely on the transcripts of stenographic notes taken during the trial. Such dependence does not violate substantive and procedural due process. Indeed, the correctness of the decision is not impaired by the fact alone that the writer only took over from a colleague who had earlier presided at trial, unless there is a showing of grave abuse of discretion in the appreciation of factual findings reached by him.[70] | |||||
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2004-03-25 |
QUISUMBING, J. |
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| The recommendations of the OSG are well taken. As a rule, claims for actual damages must be supported by evidence.[39] In this case, no receipts were offered to support the funeral expenses claimed by the victim's family. Hence, the award of P19,000.00 in actual damages must be stricken for lack of proof. However, considering that the victim's heirs did incur funeral and other expenses because of his death, the award of temperate damages in the amount of P25,000.00 would be justified.[40] Lastly, concerning the award of civil indemnity, the amount thereof should be reduced to P50,000.00, in line with prevailing case law.[41] | |||||
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2003-11-19 |
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J. |
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| Section 8 simply provides that the information or complaint must state the designation of the offense given by the statute and specify its qualifying and generic aggravating circumstances. With regard to Section 9, we held in People vs. Nerio Suela [48] that the use of the word `must' indicates that the requirement is mandatory and failure to comply with it means that generic aggravating circumstances, although proven at the trial, cannot be appreciated against the accused if such circumstances are not alleged in the information. Although the rule took effect on December 1, 2000, the same may be applied retroactively[49] because it is a cardinal rule that rules of criminal procedure are given retroactive application insofar as they benefit the accused.[50] | |||||