This case has been cited 5 times or more.
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2011-05-30 |
VILLARAMA, JR., J. |
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| The CA also held that Pastor and Macario's tenancy relationship was not extinguished despite the reclassification of the subject land into non-agricultural land in 1981 citing our ruling in Alarcon v. Court of Appeals.[45] The CA concluded that since the subject landholding was sold to Chan who, in turn, failed to notify Macario as required by law, the latter had the right to redeem the said property in accordance with Section 12[46] of R.A. No. 3844, as amended, or the Code of Agrarian Reforms of the Philippines. | |||||
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2009-12-04 |
CARPIO MORALES, J. |
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| KAMAHARI, DAMBA-NFSW, and DAR, in addition, call attention to the definition of reclassification as the act of specifying how agricultural lands shall be utilized for non-agricultural uses such as residential, industrial, or commercial.[61] They contend that the lands involved in Natalia Realty, Inc. v. DAR and NHA v. Allarde were reserved for specific non-agricultural uses, unlike in Presidential Proclamation No. 1520 which merely declared the three Municipalities a tourist zone. | |||||
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2009-12-04 |
CARPIO MORALES, J. |
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| It is clear in Alarcon v. Court of Appeals[86] that agricultural tenants who are dispossessed because of the reclassification of the landholding is entitled to disturbance compensation. Also, in DAR Administrative Order No. 6, series of 1994, under which Roxas & Co. filed its application for CARP exemption, lists among the requirements "[p]roof of payment of disturbance compensation if the area is being occupied by farmers, x x x" Therefore, Roxas & Co. cannot escape payment of disturbance compensation to its agricultural tenants who shall be dispossessed by the reclassification of the three haciendas to non-agricultural uses; and it cannot claim that it is offering to pay said tenants disturbance compensation out of pure liberality. | |||||
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2005-09-30 |
CHICO-NAZARIO, J. |
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| Reclassification is very much different from conversion. The latter is the act of changing the current use of a piece of agricultural land into some other use as approved by the DAR.[27] Reclassification, in contrast, is the act of specifying how agricultural lands shall be utilized for non-agricultural uses such as residential, industrial or commercial, as embodied in the land use plan, subject to the requirements and procedure for land use conversion.[28] Accordingly, a mere reclassification of agricultural land does not automatically allow a landowner to change its use and thus cause the ejectment of the tenants. Parties can still continue with their tenurial relationship even after such reclassification. He has to undergo the process of conversion before he is permitted to use the agricultural land for other purposes.[29] | |||||
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2005-08-31 |
CHICO-NAZARIO, J. |
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| The requirement that agricultural lands must go through the process of conversion despite having undergone reclassification was underscored in the case of Alarcon v. Court of Appeals,[24] where it was held that reclassification of land does not suffice:In the case at bar, there is no final order of conversion. The subject landholding was merely reclassified. Conversion is different from reclassification. Conversion is the act of changing the current use of a piece of agricultural land into some other use as approved by the Department of Agrarian Reform. Reclassification, on the other hand, is the act of specifying how agricultural lands shall be utilized for non-agricultural uses such as residential, industrial, commercial, as embodied in the land use plan, subject to the requirements and procedure for land use conversion. Accordingly, a mere reclassification of agricultural land does not automatically allow a landowner to change its use and thus cause the ejectment of the tenants. He has to undergo the process of conversion before he is permitted to use the agricultural land for other purposes. | |||||