This case has been cited 7 times or more.
|
2012-09-11 |
PEREZ, J. |
||||
| In the same breath, appellant Ricardo's defense of denial and alibi cannot be given any evidentiary value as it was unsubstantiated. Appellant Ricardo never presented any witness to support his claim that he was simply inside their house attending to his wife and children during the time that the ambush incident happened. This Court reiterates that mere denial, if unsubstantiated by clear and convincing evidence, is a self-serving assertion that deserves no weight in law. Between the categorical and positive assertions of the prosecution witnesses and the negative averments of the accused which are uncorroborated by reliable and independent evidence, the former indisputably deserve more credence and are entitled to greater evidentiary weight.[72] | |||||
|
2007-07-04 |
CARPIO MORALES, J. |
||||
| In statutory rape, like in this case, what matters most is that the information alleges that the victim is a minor under twelve years of age and that the accused had carnal knowledge of her.[21] | |||||
|
2004-07-07 |
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J. |
||||
| In the present cases, the Informations failed to allege Genelita's minority. Nowhere in the Informations is it stated that Genelita was only 16 years old when she was raped. Moreover, the relationship of the victim as the step-daughter of appellant was not properly proved. The evidence adduced shows that appellant is merely the common-law spouse of Genelita's mother, Felicidad Asoy Tonyacao.[50] While Felicidad and her children affixed appellant's surname, appellant was never legally married to Felicidad; appellant merely allowed Felicidad and her children to use his surname.[51] Hence, appellant could not be considered Genelita's "stepfather." The relationship between a step-father and a step-daughter presupposes a legitimate relationship, that is, the former should be legally married to the latter's mother.[52] Thus, failure of the prosecution to conjointly allege and prove the special qualifying circumstances of minority and relationship bars appellant's conviction of rape in its qualified form. | |||||
|
2004-05-27 |
CARPIO, J. |
||||
| We have repeatedly held that the date of the commission of rape is not an essential element of the crime.[11] It is not necessary to state the precise time when the offense was committed except when time is a material ingredient of the offense. In statutory rape, time is not an essential element.[12] What is important is that the information alleges that the victim was a minor under twelve years of age and that the accused had carnal knowledge of her, even if the accused did not use force or intimidation on her or deprived her of reason. | |||||
|
2004-05-27 |
CARPIO, J. |
||||
| Although the prosecution proved that appellant was the common-law spouse of Jenelyn's mother, what appears in the informations is that the victim is the stepdaughter of appellant. A stepdaughter is the daughter of one's spouse by a previous marriage.[43] For appellant to be the stepfather of Jenelyn, he must be legally married to Jenelyn's mother. However, appellant and the victim's mother were not legally married but merely lived in common-law relation. The two informations failed to allege specifically that appellant was the common-law spouse of the victim's mother. Instead, the two informations erroneously alleged the qualifying circumstance that appellant was the stepfather of the victim. Hence, appellant is liable only for two counts of simple statutory rape punishable with reclusion perpetua for each count. | |||||
|
2003-11-27 |
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J. |
||||
| Besides, we have held time and again that a few discrepancies and inconsistencies in the testimonies of witnesses referring to minor details and not in actuality touching upon the central fact of the crime do not impair the credibility of the witnesses. Instead of weakening their testimonies, such inconsistencies tend to strengthen the witnesses' credibility because they discount the possibility of their being rehearsed.[12] | |||||
|
2003-09-23 |
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J. |
||||
| Likewise, the relationship between appellant and Michelle was not established with the same degree of proof. While the information alleged that the victim was appellant's stepdaughter, the prosecution failed to prove the said relationship. For appellant to be considered the stepfather of the victim, he must be legally married to her mother.[26] The testimony of Lutgarda and the admission of the appellant regarding their marriage do not meet the required standard of proof.[27] The best evidence of their marriage is the marriage certificate itself, absent any showing that the same was lost or destroyed.[28] | |||||