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LAND BANK OF PHILIPPINES v. ARLENE DE LEON

This case has been cited 9 times or more.

	GR No. 153998 2010-10-06	JORGE L. TIANGCO v. LAND BANK OF PHILIPPINES PERALTA, J.
However, in a Resolution[27] issued by the Court en banc, dated March 20, 2003, which ruled on the motion for reconsideration filed by the LBP, the Court clarified that its decision in De Leon shall apply only to cases appealed from the finality of the said Resolution. The Court held: x x x LBP pleads that the subject Decision should at least be given prospective application considering that more than 60 similar agrarian cases filed by LBP via ordinary appeal before the Court of Appeals are in danger of being dismissed outright on technical grounds on account of our ruling herein. This, according to LBP, will wreak financial havoc not only on LBP as the financial intermediary of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program but also on the national treasury and the already depressed economic condition of our country. Thus, in the interest of fair play, equity and justice, LBP stresses the need for the rules to be relaxed so as to give substantial consideration to the appealed cases.
	GR No. 148892 2010-05-06	LAND BANK OF PHILIPPINES v. LUZ L. RODRIGUEZ MENDOZA, J.
On March 20, 2003, the Court issued an En Banc Resolution[14] to address the status of pending cases which had been appealed through a notice of appeal:
	GR No. 173615 2009-10-16	PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK v. CAYETANO A. TEJANO PERALTA, J.
It is binding rule, conformably with Article 4 of the Civil Code, that, generally, laws shall have only a prospective effect and must not be applied retroactively in such a way as to apply to pending disputes and cases. This is expressed in the familiar legal maxim lex prospicit, non respicit (the law looks forward and not backward.)[26] The rationale against retroactivity is easy to perceive: the retroactive application of a law usually divests rights that have already become vested or impairs the obligations of contract and, hence, is unconstitutional.[27] Although the rule admits of certain well-defined exceptions[28] such as, for instance, where the law itself expressly provides for retroactivity,[29] we find that not one of such exceptions that would otherwise lend credence to petitioner's argument obtains in this case. Hence, in other words, the fact that Section 6 of E.O. No. 80 states that PNB would be removed from the coverage of the CSC must be taken to govern acts committed by the bank's employees after privatization.
	GR No. 176951 2008-11-18	LEAGUE OF CITIES OF PHILIPPINES v. COMELEC CARPIO, J.
Thus, the interpellations by Senator Drilon of Senator Pimentel are consistent with the rule that laws should be applied prospectively in the spirit of justice and fair play. Be that as it may, the Civil Code is explicit that laws shall have no retroactive effect unless the contrary is provided.[110] This is expressed in the familiar legal maxim, lex prospicit, non respicit. The law looks forward, never backward. Ang batas ay tumitingin sa hinaharap, hindi sa nakaraan. The reason behind the rule is not difficult to perceive. The retroactive application of the law usually divests rights that have already become vested or impairs the obligations of contracts, thus, is unconstitutional.[111]
	GR No. 160352 2008-07-23	REPUBLIC v. KAWASHIMA TEXTILE MFG. AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.
However, R.A. No. 9481 took effect only on June 14, 2007;[26] hence, it applies only to labor representation cases filed on or after said date.[27] As the petition for certification election subject matter of the present petition was filed by KFWU on January 24, 2000,[28] R.A. No. 9481 cannot apply to it. There may have been curative labor legislations[29] that were given retrospective effect,[30] but not the aforecited provisions of R.A. No. 9481, for otherwise, substantive rights and interests already vested would be impaired in the process.[31]
	GR No. 158270 2008-07-21	LAND BANK OF PHILIPPINES v. HERMIN ARCEO REYES, R.T., J.
A petition for review, not an ordinary appeal, is the proper procedure in effecting an appeal from decisions of the Regional Trial Courts acting as Special Agrarian Courts in cases involving the determination of just compensation to the landowners concerned. Section 60 of RA 6657 clearly and categorically states that the said mode of appeal should be adopted. There is no reason for a contrary interpretation. Where the law is clear and categorical, there is no room for construction, but only application.[11] In a motion for reconsideration, this Court clarified the Land Bank of the Philippines v. De Leon[12] ruling to apply prospectively from March 20, 2003, thus:On account of the absence of jurisprudence interpreting Section 60 and 61 of RA 6657 regarding the proper way to appeal decisions of Special Agrarian Courts, as well as the conflicting decisions of the Court of Appeals thereon, LBP cannot be blamed for availing of the wrong mode. Based on its own interpretation and reliance on the Buenaventura ruling, LBP acted on the mistaken belief that an ordinary appeal is the appropriate manner to question decisions of Special Agrarian Courts.
	GR NO. 164195 2007-02-06	APO FRUITS CORPORATION v. CA CHICO-NAZARIO, J.
WHEREFORE, the motion for reconsideration dated October 16, 2002 and the supplement to the motion for reconsideration dated November 11, 2002 are PARTIALLY GRANTED. While we clarify that the Decision of this Court dated September 10, 2002 stands, our ruling therein that a petition for review is the correct mode of appeal from decisions of Special Agrarian Courts shall apply only to cases appealed after the finality of this Resolution.[50] (Emphasis supplied.) Essentially therefore, the rule is that a decision of the RTC acting as a Special Agrarian Court should be brought to the Court of Appeals via a Petition for Review. The Court of Appeals will no longer entertain ordinary appeals thereon. However, this rule applies only after the finality of the Resolution of this Court in Land Bank of the Philippines v. De Leon dated 20 March 2003.
	GR No. 148223 2004-11-25	FERNANDO GABATIN v. LAND BANK OF PHILIPPINES CHICO-NAZARIO, J.
In the case of Land Bank v. De Leon[19] (hereinafter referred to as Decision), we made the definitive pronouncement that a petition for review under Rule 42, and not an ordinary appeal under Rule 41, is the appropriate mode of appeal on the decisions of the RTCs acting as SACs. In the said case, Land Bank filed a motion for reconsideration. In a resolution[20] dated 20 March 2003 (hereinafter referred to as Resolution), we resolved the Motion for Reconsideration in this wise:
	GR No. 156278 2004-03-29	PLANTERS PRODUCTS v. FERTIPHIL CORPORATION PUNO, J.
As a general rule, rules of procedure apply to actions pending and undetermined at the time of their passage, hence, retrospective in nature. However, the general rule is not without an exception. Retrospective application is allowed if no vested rights are impaired.[6] Thus, in Land Bank of the Philippines v. de Leon[7] our ruling that the appropriate mode of review from decisions of Special Agrarian Courts is a petition for review under Sec. 60 of R.A. No. 6657 and not an ordinary appeal as Sec. 61 thereof seems to imply, was not given retroactive application. We held that to give our ruling a retrospective application would prejudice petitioner's pending appeals brought under said Sec. 61 before the Court of Appeals at a time when there was yet no clear pronouncement as to the proper interpretation of the seemingly conflicting Secs. 60 and 61. In fine, to apply the Court's ruling retroactively would prejudice LBP's right to appeal because its pending appeals would then be dismissed outright on a mere technicality thereby sacrificing the substantial merits of the cases.