This case has been cited 4 times or more.
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2005-10-14 |
CARPIO, J. |
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| The trial court ordered the spouses Ramos to pay the spouses Heruela and the spouses Pallori the amount of P20,000 as attorney's fees and P10,000 as litigation expenses. Article 2208[28] of the Civil Code provides that subject to certain exceptions, attorney's fees and expenses of litigation, other than judicial costs, cannot be recovered in the absence of stipulation. None of the enumerated exceptions applies to this case. Further, the policy of the law is to put no premium on the right to litigate.[29] Hence, the award of attorney's fees and litigation expenses should be deleted. | |||||
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2005-03-10 |
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J. |
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| Moral damages are meant to compensate the claimant for any physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation and similar injuries unjustly caused. Although incapable of pecuniary estimation, the amount must somehow be proportional to and in approximation of the suffering inflicted. It should not be palpably and scandalously excessive; rather, it must be commensurate to the loss or injury suffered.[3] We have consistently ruled that moral damages are not punitive in nature and were never intended to enrich the claimant at the expense of the defendant.[4] Its award must not appear to be the result of passion or undue prejudice, and it must always reasonably approximate the extent of injury and be proportional to the wrong committed.[5] | |||||
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2004-02-05 |
CARPIO, J. |
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| In the case of Santiago Land Development Corporation vs. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 106194, 276 SCRA 674 [1997]), petitioner maintained that as a purchaser pendente lite of the land in litigation, it had a right to intervene under Rule 12, Section 2. We rejected this position and said that "since petitioner is not a stranger to the action between Quisumbing and the PNB, petitioner in fact having stepped into the shoes of PNB in a manner of speaking, it follows that it cannot claim any further right to intervene in the action." As in the instant Petition, it was argued that the denial of the Motion to Intervene would be a denial likewise of due process. But this, too, was struck down in Santiago Land where we held that "petitioner is not really denied protection. It is represented in the action by its predecessor in interest." Indeed, since petitioner is a transferee pendente lite with notice of the pending litigation between Reyes and private respondent Carreon, petitioner stands exactly in the shoes of Reyes and is bound by any judgment or decree which may be rendered for or against the latter. Indeed, one who buys property with full knowledge of the flaws and defects of the title of his vendor and of a pending litigation over the property gambles on the result of the litigation and is bound by the outcome of his indifference.[21] A purchaser cannot close his eyes to facts which should put a reasonable man on guard and then claim that he acted in good faith believing that there was no defect in the title of the vendor.[22] | |||||
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2003-08-28 |
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J. |
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| The trial court, however, erred in imposing 12% interest per annum on the amount due the respondents. In Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,[47] it was held that interest on obligations not constituting a loan or forbearance of money is six percent (6%) annually. If the purchase price could be established with certainty at the time of the filing of the complaint, the six percent (6%) interest should be computed from the date the complaint was filed until finality of the decision. In Lui v. Loy,[48] involving a suit for reconveyance and annulment of title filed by the first buyer against the seller and the second buyer, the Court, ruling in favor of the first buyer and annulling the second sale, ordered the seller to refund to the second buyer (who was not a purchaser in good faith) the purchase price of the lots. It was held therein that the 6% interest should be computed from the date of the filing of the complaint by the first buyer. After the judgment becomes final and executory until the obligation is satisfied, the amount due shall earn interest at 12% per year, the interim period being deemed equivalent to a forbearance of credit.[49] | |||||