This case has been cited 6 times or more.
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2015-03-09 |
PERALTA, J. |
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| The Court sustains the finding that the MeTC had no jurisdiction over the case. The ownership of the subject property passed to the Spouses Norberte by constructive delivery upon the execution of the March 28, 1988 contract of conditional sale between them and the Legaspis. Although denominated as conditional, a deed of sale is absolute in nature in the absence of any stipulation reserving title to the seller until full payment of the purchase price. In such case, ownership of the thing sold passes to the buyer upon actual or constructive delivery.[7] In a contract of sale, the title to the property passes to the buyer upon the delivery of the thing sold. In a contract to sell, on the other hand, the ownership is, by agreement, retained by the vendor and is not to pass to the vendee until full payment of the purchase price.[8] Here, there was already a perfected contract. The condition imposed was only on the performance of the obligations of the parties.[9] As admitted by the Spouses Norberte themselves, there is nothing in the Deed of Conditional Sale which expressly provides for the retention of title or ownership of the property by the sellers until full payment of the purchase price.[10] There is clearly no express reservation of title made by the Legaspis over the property, or any provision which would impose payment of the price as a condition for the contract's entering into force.[11] The absence of such stipulation indicates that what the parties have actually contemplated was a contract of absolute sale.[12] | |||||
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2008-07-21 |
TINGA, J, |
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| Petitioners argue that Titan's failure to pay the remainder of the purchase price constitutes a failure to perform its obligation under the deed and thus a ground for rescission. The demand for rescission is based on Article 1191[33] of the New Civil Code. This article refers to rescission applicable to reciprocal obligations. Reciprocal obligations are those which arise from the same cause, and in which each party is a debtor and a creditor of the other, such that the obligation of one is dependent upon the obligation of the other. They are to be performed simultaneously such that the performance of one is conditioned upon the simultaneous fulfillment of the other. While Article 1191 uses the term "rescission," the original term which was used in Article 1124 of the old Civil Code, from which the article was based, was "resolution." Resolution is a principal action which is based on breach of a party[34] or breach of faith by the other party who violates the reciprocity between them. The breach contemplated in the provision is the obligor's failure to comply with an existing obligation.[35] Thus, the power to rescind is given only to the injured party. The injured party is the party who has faithfully fulfilled his obligation or is ready and willing to perform his obligation.[36] | |||||
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2008-03-27 |
CORONA, J. |
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| The delivery of clean titles was not a condition imposed on the perfection of the contract of sale but a condition imposed on petitioner's obligation to pay the purchase price of these lots.[38] In Jardine Davies Inc. v. CA,[39] we distinguished between a condition imposed on the perfection of a contract and a condition imposed merely on the performance of an obligation. While failure to comply with the first condition results in the failure of a contract, non-compliance with the second merely gives the other party options and/or remedies to protect its interests.[40] | |||||
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2007-10-19 |
TINGA, J. |
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| It is basic in the interpretation and construction of contracts that the literal meaning of the stipulations shall control if the terms of the contract are clear and leave no doubt on the intention of the contracting parties.[18] It is only when the words appear to contravene the evident intention of the parties that the latter shall prevail over the former. The real nature of a contract may be determined from the express terms of the agreement and from the contemporaneous and subsequent acts of the parties thereto.[19] | |||||
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2003-12-11 |
QUISUMBING, J. |
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| WHETHER OR NOT, PETITIONER CECILIA YAMBAO IS NOT LIABLE FOR ANY DAMAGES AND THAT SHE EXERCISED THE PROPER DILIGENCE OF A GOOD FATHER OF THE FAMILY, BOTH IN THE SELECTION AND SUPERVISION OF HER DRIVER AND/OR EMPLOYEE.[12] At the outset, we must state that the first issue raised by the petitioner is a factual one. Whether a person is negligent or not is a question of fact,[13] which this Court cannot pass upon in a petition for review on certiorari, as our jurisdiction is limited to reviewing errors of law.[14] The resolution of factual issues is the function of the trial court and its findings on these matters are, as a general rule, binding on this Court,[15] more so where these have been affirmed by the Court of Appeals.[16] We have carefully examined and weighed the petitioner's arguments on the first issue submitted, as well as the evidence on record, and find no cogent reason to disregard the cited general rule, much less to reverse the factual findings of the trial court as upheld by the court a quo. Hence, we sustain the trial court's finding, as affirmed by the Court of Appeals, that it was Venturina's reckless and imprudent driving of petitioner's bus, which is the proximate cause of the victim's death. | |||||
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2003-09-23 |
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J. |
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| THE HONORABLE PUBLIC RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE AND REVERSIBLE ERROR AND/OR GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN DISMISSING THE PETITION ON MERE TECHNICALITY INSTEAD OF RESOLVING THE SAME ON THE MERITS DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE SEPTEMBER 19, 2001 DECISION AND FEBRUARY 1, 2002 ORDER OF THE OMBUDSMAN FINDING PETITIONERS GUILTY AS CHARGED WERE ALL CONCLUSIONS GROUNDED OR BASED ON SPECULATION, SURMISES OR CONJECTURES, SO MUCH SO, THAT PETITIONERS BEG AND APPEAL TO THE HONORABLE COURT TO RESOLVE THE CASE ON THE MERITS AND/OR TO REMAND THE SAME TO THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR RESOLUTION ON THE MERITS.[7] Suffice it to say that when technicality deserts its function of being an aid to justice, the courts are justified in exempting from its operations a particular case. Procedural rules are intended to insure the orderly conduct of litigation, because of the higher objective they seek, which is to protect the parties' substantive rights.[8] | |||||