This case has been cited 19 times or more.
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2013-04-11 |
SERENO, C.J. |
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| The CA was correct in ruling that the doctrine of res judicata applies only to judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings, and not to the exercise of administrative powers.[83] Administrative powers here refer to those purely administrative in nature,[84] as opposed to administrative proceedings that take on a quasi-judicial character.[85] | |||||
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2013-04-02 |
CARPIO, J. |
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| Similarly, the COMELEC cannot be precluded from reviewing pending registration and existing registration and/or accreditation of party-list groups, organizations and coalitions on the ground of res judicata. It has been repeatedly cited in a long line of jurisprudence that the doctrine of res judicata applies only to judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings, not to the exercise of administrative powers.[167] | |||||
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2012-09-04 |
PERLAS-BERNABE, J. |
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| In any case, assuming that the Ombudsman's Internal Affairs Board properly conducted a subsequent and parallel administrative action against petitioner, its earlier dismissal of the charge of graft and corruption against petitioner could not have the effect of preventing the Office of the President from proceeding against petitioner upon the same ground of graft and corruption. After all, the doctrine of res judicata applies only to judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings, not to the exercise of administrative powers.[42] In Montemayor v. Bundalian,[43] the Court sustained the President's dismissal from service of a Regional Director of the Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH) who was found liable for unexplained wealth upon investigation by the now defunct Philippine Commission Against Graft and Corruption (PCAGC). The Court categorically ruled therein that the prior dismissal by the Ombudsman of similar charges against said official did not operate as res judicata in the PCAGC case. | |||||
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2012-07-24 |
PERLAS-BERNABE, J. |
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| Also, contrary to petitioner's assertions, his right to due process was not violated when the IAD-ODESLA took cognizance of the administrative complaint against him since he was given sufficient opportunity to oppose the formal complaint filed by Secretary Purisima. In administrative proceedings, the filing of charges and giving reasonable opportunity for the person so charged to answer the accusations against him constitute the minimum requirements of due process,[35] which simply means having the opportunity to explain one's side.[36] Hence, as long as petitioner was given the opportunity to explain his side and present evidence, the requirements of due process are satisfactorily complied with because what the law abhors is an absolute lack of opportunity to be heard.[37] The records show that petitioner was issued an Order requiring him to submit his written explanation under oath with respect to the charge of grave misconduct filed against him. His own failure to submit his explanation despite notice defeats his subsequent claim of denial of due process. | |||||
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2012-04-10 |
PER CURIAM |
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| It is settled that "technical rules of procedure and evidence are not strictly applied to administrative proceedings. Thus, administrative due process cannot be fully equated with due process in its strict judicial sense."[12] It is enough that the party is given the chance to be heard before the case against him is decided.[13] Otherwise stated, in the application of the principle of due process, what is sought to be safeguarded is not lack of previous notice but the denial of the opportunity to be heard.[14] | |||||
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2011-06-08 |
VILLARAMA, JR., J. |
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| In the analogous case of Montemayor v. Bundalian,[8] this Court ruled: Lastly, we cannot sustain petitioner's stance that the dismissal of similar charges against him before the Ombudsman rendered the administrative case against him before the PCAGC moot and academic. To be sure, the decision of the Ombudsman does not operate as res judicata in the PCAGC case subject of this review. The doctrine of res judicata applies only to judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings, not to the exercise of administrative powers. Petitioner was investigated by the Ombudsman for his possible criminal liability for the acquisition of the Burbank property in violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act and the Revised Penal Code. For the same alleged misconduct, petitioner, as a presidential appointee, was investigated by the PCAGC by virtue of the administrative power and control of the President over him. As the PCAGC's investigation of petitioner was administrative in nature, the doctrine of res judicata finds no application in the case at bar. (Emphasis supplied.) | |||||
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2011-04-13 |
MENDOZA, J. |
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| Administrative proceedings are governed by the "substantial evidence rule." Otherwise stated, a finding of guilt in an administrative case would have to be sustained for as long as it is supported by substantial evidence that the respondent has committed acts stated in the complaint.[42] Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla of evidence. It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion, even if other minds equally reasonable might conceivably opine otherwise.[43] | |||||
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2011-04-13 |
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J. |
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| While it is true that this Court has declared that the doctrine of res judicata applies only to judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings, and not to the exercise of administrative powers,[62] we have also limited the latter to proceedings purely administrative in nature.[63] Therefore, when the administrative proceedings take on an adversary character, the doctrine of res judicata certainly applies.[64] As this Court held in Fortich v. Corona[65]: The rule of res judicata which forbids the reopening of a matter once judicially determined by competent authority applies as well to the judicial and quasi-judicial acts of public, executive or administrative officers and boards acting within their jurisdiction as to the judgments of courts having general judicial powers.[66] (Emphasis ours.) | |||||
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2011-02-16 |
MENDOZA, J. |
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| On the other hand, the Ombudsman, Tuason and LWUA raised the jurisprudential principle that the dismissal of a criminal case involving the same set of facts does not automatically result in the dismissal of the administrative charges due to the distinct and independent nature of one proceeding from the other. They further countered that the only issue resolved in De Jesus was the absence of mens rea, which was not a mandatory requirement for a finding of falsification of official documents as an administrative offense;[48] and although it was found that there was no absolutely false narration of facts in the two sets of appointment papers, the issue in this administrative case was not limited solely to falsification of official documents. It was further contended that the evidence and admissions in the administrative case were different from the evidence in the criminal case, thus, the findings in the criminal case could not bind the administrative case. Finally, they argued that the doctrine of res judicata would only apply to judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings and not to administrative matters.[49] | |||||
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2009-09-04 |
QUISUMBING, J. |
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| Deportation proceedings are administrative in character, summary in nature, and need not be conducted strictly in accordance with the rules of ordinary court proceedings.[81] The essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be heard, or as applied to administrative proceedings, an opportunity to explain one's side or an opportunity to seek reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of.[82] As long as the parties are given the opportunity to be heard before judgment is rendered, the demands of due process are sufficiently met.[83] Although Jimmy was not furnished with a copy of the subject Resolution and Charge Sheet as alleged by him, the trial court found that he was given ample opportunity to explain his side and present controverting evidence, thus: x x x It must be stressed that after receiving the Order dated September 11, 2001 signed by BSI Chief Ronaldo P. Ledesma on October 4, 2001, petitioner Jimmy T. Go admitted that when his representative went to the B.I.D. to inquire about the said Order, the latter chanced upon the Resolution dated February 14, 2001 and March 8, 2001 as well as the Charge Sheet dated July 3, 2001. Hence on October 5, 2001, he filed a "Motion for Extension of Time to File Memorandum" and as such, was allowed by Ronaldo P. Ledesma an extension of ten (10) days to submit his required memorandum. x x x[84] | |||||
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2009-08-14 |
BRION, J. |
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| An administrative decision, in order to be valid, should have, among others, "something to support itself."[32] It must supported by substantial evidence, or that amount of relevant evidence adequate and acceptable enough for a reasonable mind to justify a conclusion or support a decision,[33] even if other minds equally reasonable might conceivably opine otherwise.[34] | |||||
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2008-04-18 |
YNARES-SATIAGO, J. |
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| In Montemayor v. Bundalian,[44] the Court upheld the dismissal of a Regional Director of the Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH) for unexplained wealth, when he could not sufficiently explain why a piece of property which he claimed belonged to his sister was registered in his name. | |||||
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2008-02-04 |
TINGA, J, |
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| As correctly pointed out by the OSG, the denial of petitioner's request for a formal investigation is not tantamount to a denial of her right to due process. Petitioner was required to file a counter-affidavit and position paper and later on, was given a chance to file two motions for reconsideration of the decision of the deputy ombudsman. The essence of due process in administrative proceedings is the opportunity to explain one's side or seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. As long as the parties are given the opportunity to be heard before judgment is rendered, the demands of due process are sufficiently met.[28] | |||||
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2007-12-27 |
TINGA, J, |
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| Concerning the right to representation, it is sufficient that petitioner's counsel of choice was allowed to submit in writing his observations on the investigation. Petitioner's counsel even filed a memorandum before the CAB. What is frowned upon is the absolute deprivation of the right to counsel. The counsel's participation in a proceeding similar to that of a courtroom trial is not required. Administrative due process cannot be fully equated with due process in its strict judicial sense for it is enough that the party is given the chance to be heard before the case against him is decided.[19] | |||||
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2007-06-08 |
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J. |
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| It is well settled that only substantial evidence is required to sustain a finding of guilt in an administrative case,[18] and findings of fact of the Office of the Ombudsman are conclusive when supported by substantial evidence.[19] Substantial evidence means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion, even if other minds equally reasonable might conceivably opine otherwise.[20] | |||||
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2007-04-13 |
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J. |
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| Administrative proceedings are governed by the "substantial evidence rule." Otherwise stated, a finding of guilt in an administrative case would have to be sustained for as long as it is supported by substantial evidence that the respondent has committed acts stated in the complaint.[13] Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla of evidence. It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion, even if other minds equally reasonable might conceivably opine otherwise.[14] | |||||
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2006-07-21 |
CARPIO MORALES, J. |
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| It is well settled that the doctrine of res judicata applies only to judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings, and not to the exercise of administrative powers.[28] | |||||
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2005-06-30 |
PER CURIAM |
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| Indisputably, it was respondent's failure to submit his "direct testimony in affidavit form" that caused delay. Since the proceedings had been dragging on a lethargic course, the IBP Commissioner is correct in considering the case submitted for resolution. At this juncture, it must be stressed that the essence of due process in administrative proceedings is the opportunity to explain one's side or seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. As long as the parties are given the opportunity to be heard before judgment is rendered, the demands of due process are sufficiently met.[16] Here, respondent was given sufficient opportunity to explain his side and adduce his evidence. Despite his sudden "flight into oblivion," the IBP Commissioner notified him of the proceedings. Significantly, he was duly represented by a counsel who attended the hearings and submitted manifestations and motions on his behalf, the latest of which is the instant Motion to Vacate. In short, the active participation of his lawyer in every stage of the proceedings rules out any badge of procedural deficiency therein. Of course, we need not mention the fact that respondent was able to file with this Court a motion to dismiss the complaint, as well as to confront and cross-examine the complainant and his witness during the investigation in the OSG. | |||||
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2005-03-28 |
CARPIO, J. |
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| The essence of due process in administrative proceedings is the opportunity to explain one's side or seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. As long as the parties are given the opportunity to be heard before judgment is rendered, the demands of due process are sufficiently met.[21] Tel-Equen, Ramirez, and Antonio participated in all levels of the present proceedings, from the Ombudsman to this Court. In fact, during the preliminary conference held on 27 November 1992 before Graft Investigation Officer Lamberto T. Tagayuna, the parties agreed to submit the case for resolution on the basis of the evidence on record.[22] Due process in an administrative context does not require trial-type proceedings similar to those in the courts of justice.[23] Thus, Tel-Equen, Ramirez, and Antonio can no longer request for the cross-examination of the witnesses against them. | |||||