Lawyerly

GR No. 209835

2015-09-22

PERALTA, J.

RA No. 9225, which is known as the Citizenship Retention and Reacquisition Act of 2003, declares that natural-born citizens of the Philippines, who have lost their Philippine citizenship by reason of their naturalization as citizens of a foreign country, can re-acquire or retain his Philippine citizenship under the conditions of the law.[21] The law does not provide for residency requirement for the reacquisition or retention of Philippine citizenship; nor does it mention any effect of such reacquisition or retention of Philippine citizenship on the current residence of the concerned natural-born Filipino.[22]

GR No. 207264

2013-06-25

REGINA ONGSIAKO REYES v. COMELEC

PEREZ, J.

The COMELEC First Division found that, contrary to the declarations that she made in her COC, petitioner is not a citizen of the Philippines because of her failure to comply with the requirements of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9225 or the Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition Act of 2003, namely: (1) to take an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines; and (2) to make a personal and sworn renunciation of her American citizenship before any public officer authorized to administer an oath. In addition, the COMELEC First Division ruled that she did not have the one-year residency requirement under Section 6, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution.[13] Thus, she is ineligible to run for the position of Representative for the lone district of Marinduque.

GR No. 195649

2013-04-16

CASAN MACODE MAQUILING v. COMELEC

SERENO, C.J.

(2) Those seeking elective public in the Philippines shall meet the qualification for holding such public office as required by the Constitution and existing laws and, at the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy, make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before any public officer authorized to administer an oath. x x x[31]

GR No. 193261

2012-04-24

MEYNARDO SABILI v. COMELEC

SERENO, J.

effected a change of residence for election law purposes for the period required by law."[65]

GR No. 193261

2012-04-24

MEYNARDO SABILI v. COMELEC

SERENO, J.

Similarly, in Japzon v. Commission on Elections,[98] we concluded that "when the evidence of the alleged lack of residence qualification of a candidate for an elective position is weak or inconclusive and it clearly appears that the purpose of the law would not be thwarted by upholding the victor's right to the office, the will of the electorate should be respected. For the purpose of election laws is to give effect to, rather than frustrate, the will of the voters."

GR No. 193261

2012-04-24

MEYNARDO SABILI v. COMELEC

SERENO, J.

NSO Certificate of No Marriage of Bernadette Palomares[15]

GR No. 186359

2010-03-05

JESUS O. TYPOCO v. COMELEC

The Court does not find merit in petitioner's argument. As stated at the outset, the appreciation of election documents involves a question of fact best left to the determination of the COMELEC, a specialized agency tasked with the supervision of elections all over the country. The findings of fact of administrative bodies, when supported by substantial evidence, are final and nonreviewable by courts of justice.[32] This principle is applied with greater force when the case concerns the COMELEC, because the framers of the Constitution intended to place the poll body--created and explicitly made independent by the Constitution itself--on a level higher than statutory administrative organs.[33]

GR No. 187478

2009-12-21

REPRESENTATIVE DANILO RAMON S. FERNANDEZ v. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.

Recently, in Japzon v. COMELEC,[44] the Court, citing Papandayan, Jr. v. COMELEC,[45] said: In Papandayan, Jr. v. Commission on Elections, the Court provided a summation of the different principles and concepts in jurisprudence relating to the residency qualification for elective local officials. Pertinent portions of the ratio in Papandayan are reproduced below:

GR No. 170661

2009-12-04

RAMON B. FORMANTES v. DUNCAN PHARMACEUTICALS

PERALTA, J.

The findings of facts of quasi-judicial agencies, which have acquired expertise in the specific matters entrusted to their jurisdiction, are accorded by this Court not only respect but even finality if they are supported by substantial evidence. Only substantial, not preponderance, of evidence is necessary. Section 5, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court, provides that in cases filed before administrative or quasi-judicial bodies, a fact may be deemed established if it is supported by substantial evidence, or that amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion.[30]

GR No. 179313

2009-09-17

MAKIL U. PUNDAODAYA v. COMELEC

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.

In Japzon v. Commission on Elections,[15] it was held that the term "residence" is to be understood not in its common acceptation as referring to "dwelling" or "habitation," but rather to "domicile" or legal residence, that is, "the place where a party actually or constructively has his permanent home, where he, no matter where he may be found at any given time, eventually intends to return and remain (animus manendi)."

GR No. 180048

2009-06-19

ROSELLER DE GUZMAN v. COMELEC

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.

Thus, in Japzon v. COMELEC,[15] the Court held that Section 5(2) of R.A. No. 9225 requires the twin requirements of swearing to an Oath of Allegiance and executing a Renunciation of Foreign Citizenship, viz:Breaking down the afore-quoted provision, for a natural born Filipino, who reacquired or retained his Philippine citizenship under Republic Act No. 9225, to run for public office, he must: (1) meet the qualifications for holding such public office as required by the Constitution and existing laws; and (2) make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenships before any public officer authorized to administer an oath. Further, in Jacot v. Dal and COMELEC,[16] the Court ruled that a candidate's oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and his Certificate of Candidacy do not substantially comply with the requirement of a personal and sworn renunciation of foreign citizenship. Thus:

GR No. 176947

2009-02-19

GAUDENCIO M. CORDORA v. COMELEC

CARPIO, J.

In Sections 2 and 3 of R.A. No. 9225, the framers were not concerned with dual citizenship per se, but with the status of naturalized citizens who maintain their allegiance to their countries of origin even after their naturalization.[12] Section 5(3) of R.A. No. 9225 states that naturalized citizens who reacquire Filipino citizenship and desire to run for elective public office in the Philippines shall "meet the qualifications for holding such public office as required by the Constitution and existing laws and, at the time of filing the certificate of candidacy, make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before any public officer authorized to administer an oath" aside from the oath of allegiance prescribed in Section 3 of R.A. No. 9225. The twin requirements of swearing to an Oath of Allegiance and executing a Renunciation of Foreign Citizenship served as the bases for our recent rulings in Jacot v. Dal and COMELEC,[13] Velasco v. COMELEC,[14] and Japzon v. COMELEC,[15] all of which involve natural-born Filipinos who later became naturalized citizens of another country and thereafter ran for elective office in the Philippines. In the present case, Tambunting, a natural-born Filipino, did not subsequently become a naturalized citizen of another country. Hence, the twin requirements in R.A. No. 9225 do not apply to him.

	GR No. 209835 2015-09-22	ROGELIO BATIN CABALLERO v. COMELEC PERALTA, J.
RA No. 9225, which is known as the Citizenship Retention and Reacquisition Act of 2003, declares that natural-born citizens of the Philippines, who have lost their Philippine citizenship by reason of their naturalization as citizens of a foreign country, can re-acquire or retain his Philippine citizenship under the conditions of the law.[21] The law does not provide for residency requirement for the reacquisition or retention of Philippine citizenship; nor does it mention any effect of such reacquisition or retention of Philippine citizenship on the current residence of the concerned natural-born Filipino.[22]
	GR No. 207264 2013-06-25	REGINA ONGSIAKO REYES v. COMELEC PEREZ, J.
The COMELEC First Division found that, contrary to the declarations that she made in her COC, petitioner is not a citizen of the Philippines because of her failure to comply with the requirements of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9225 or the Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition Act of 2003, namely: (1) to take an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines; and (2) to make a personal and sworn renunciation of her American citizenship before any public officer authorized to administer an oath. In addition, the COMELEC First Division ruled that she did not have the one-year residency requirement under Section 6, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution.[13] Thus, she is ineligible to run for the position of Representative for the lone district of Marinduque.
	GR No. 195649 2013-04-16	CASAN MACODE MAQUILING v. COMELEC SERENO, C.J.
(2) Those seeking elective public in the Philippines shall meet the qualification for holding such public office as required by the Constitution and existing laws and, at the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy, make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before any public officer authorized to administer an oath. x x x[31]
	GR No. 193261 2012-04-24	MEYNARDO SABILI v. COMELEC SERENO, J.
effected a change of residence for election law purposes for the period required by law."[65]
	GR No. 193261 2012-04-24	MEYNARDO SABILI v. COMELEC SERENO, J.
Similarly, in Japzon v. Commission on Elections,[98] we concluded that "when the evidence of the alleged lack of residence qualification of a candidate for an elective position is weak or inconclusive and it clearly appears that the purpose of the law would not be thwarted by upholding the victor's right to the office, the will of the electorate should be respected. For the purpose of election laws is to give effect to, rather than frustrate, the will of the voters."
	GR No. 193261 2012-04-24	MEYNARDO SABILI v. COMELEC SERENO, J.
NSO Certificate of No Marriage of Bernadette Palomares[15]
	GR No. 186359 2010-03-05	JESUS O. TYPOCO v. COMELEC
The Court does not find merit in petitioner's argument. As stated at the outset, the appreciation of election documents involves a question of fact best left to the determination of the COMELEC, a specialized agency tasked with the supervision of elections all over the country. The findings of fact of administrative bodies, when supported by substantial evidence, are final and nonreviewable by courts of justice.[32] This principle is applied with greater force when the case concerns the COMELEC, because the framers of the Constitution intended to place the poll body--created and explicitly made independent by the Constitution itself--on a level higher than statutory administrative organs.[33]
	GR No. 187478 2009-12-21	REPRESENTATIVE DANILO RAMON S. FERNANDEZ v. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.
Recently, in Japzon v. COMELEC,[44] the Court, citing Papandayan, Jr. v. COMELEC,[45] said: In Papandayan, Jr. v. Commission on Elections, the Court provided a summation of the different principles and concepts in jurisprudence relating to the residency qualification for elective local officials. Pertinent portions of the ratio in Papandayan are reproduced below:
	GR No. 170661 2009-12-04	RAMON B. FORMANTES v. DUNCAN PHARMACEUTICALS PERALTA, J.
The findings of facts of quasi-judicial agencies, which have acquired expertise in the specific matters entrusted to their jurisdiction, are accorded by this Court not only respect but even finality if they are supported by substantial evidence. Only substantial, not preponderance, of evidence is necessary. Section 5, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court, provides that in cases filed before administrative or quasi-judicial bodies, a fact may be deemed established if it is supported by substantial evidence, or that amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion.[30]
	GR No. 179313 2009-09-17	MAKIL U. PUNDAODAYA v. COMELEC YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.
In Japzon v. Commission on Elections,[15] it was held that the term "residence" is to be understood not in its common acceptation as referring to "dwelling" or "habitation," but rather to "domicile" or legal residence, that is, "the place where a party actually or constructively has his permanent home, where he, no matter where he may be found at any given time, eventually intends to return and remain (animus manendi)."
	GR No. 180048 2009-06-19	ROSELLER DE GUZMAN v. COMELEC YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.
Thus, in Japzon v. COMELEC,[15] the Court held that Section 5(2) of R.A. No. 9225 requires the twin requirements of swearing to an Oath of Allegiance and executing a Renunciation of Foreign Citizenship, viz:Breaking down the afore-quoted provision, for a natural born Filipino, who reacquired or retained his Philippine citizenship under Republic Act No. 9225, to run for public office, he must: (1) meet the qualifications for holding such public office as required by the Constitution and existing laws; and (2) make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenships before any public officer authorized to administer an oath. Further, in Jacot v. Dal and COMELEC,[16] the Court ruled that a candidate's oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and his Certificate of Candidacy do not substantially comply with the requirement of a personal and sworn renunciation of foreign citizenship. Thus:
	GR No. 176947 2009-02-19	GAUDENCIO M. CORDORA v. COMELEC CARPIO, J.
In Sections 2 and 3 of R.A. No. 9225, the framers were not concerned with dual citizenship per se, but with the status of naturalized citizens who maintain their allegiance to their countries of origin even after their naturalization.[12] Section 5(3) of R.A. No. 9225 states that naturalized citizens who reacquire Filipino citizenship and desire to run for elective public office in the Philippines shall "meet the qualifications for holding such public office as required by the Constitution and existing laws and, at the time of filing the certificate of candidacy, make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before any public officer authorized to administer an oath" aside from the oath of allegiance prescribed in Section 3 of R.A. No. 9225. The twin requirements of swearing to an Oath of Allegiance and executing a Renunciation of Foreign Citizenship served as the bases for our recent rulings in Jacot v. Dal and COMELEC,[13] Velasco v. COMELEC,[14] and Japzon v. COMELEC,[15] all of which involve natural-born Filipinos who later became naturalized citizens of another country and thereafter ran for elective office in the Philippines. In the present case, Tambunting, a natural-born Filipino, did not subsequently become a naturalized citizen of another country. Hence, the twin requirements in R.A. No. 9225 do not apply to him.

MANUEL B. JAPZON v. COMELEC