This case has been cited 9 times or more.
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2012-11-27 |
PER CURIAM |
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| The Court is mindful of the dictum that the power to disbar must be exercised with great caution, and only in a clear case of misconduct that seriously affects the standing and character of the lawyer as an officer of the Court and as a member of the bar. Thus, where a lesser penalty, such as temporary suspension, could accomplish the end desired, disbarment should never be decreed.[26] However, in the present case, the seriousness of the offense compels the Court to wield its power to disbar as it appears to be the most appropriate penalty.[27] | |||||
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2012-03-20 |
VELASCO JR., J. |
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| The desired disbarment of Casuga, however, is too severe a sanction to impose under the premises; it cannot be granted. The penalty of disbarment shall be meted out only when the lawyer's misconduct borders on the criminal and/or is committed under scandalous circumstance.[17] | |||||
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2009-02-23 |
PER CURIAM |
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| While the power to disbar is exercised with great caution and is withheld whenever a lesser penalty could accomplish the end desired,[36] the seriousness of respondent's offense compels the Court to wield its supreme power of disbarment. Indeed, the Court will not hestitate to remove an erring attorney from the esteemed brotherhood of lawyers where the evidence calls for it.[37] This is because in the exercise of its disciplinary powers, the Court merely calls upon a member of the Bar to account for his actuations as an officer of the Court, with the end in view of preserving the purity of the legal profession and the proper and honest administration of justice by purging the profession of members who by their misconduct have proved themselves no longer worthy to be entrusted with the duties and responsibilities pertaining to the office of an attorney.[38] | |||||
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2009-01-30 |
PER CURIAM |
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| The Court is mindful that disbarment is the most severe form of disciplinary sanction and, as such, the power to disbar must always be exercised with great caution, and only for the most imperative reasons and in clear cases of misconduct affecting the standing and moral character of the lawyer as an officer of the court and a member of the bar.[43] If the practice of law, however, is to remain an honorable profession and attain its basic ideals, those enrolled in its ranks should not only master its tenets and principles but should also, in their lives, accord continuing fidelity to them.[44] The requirement of good moral character is, in fact, of much greater import, as far as the general public is concerned, than the possession of legal learning.[45] | |||||
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2007-03-07 |
CHICO-NAZARIO, J. |
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| It should be noted that the requirement of good moral character has four ostensible purposes, namely: (1) to protect the public; (2) to protect the public image of lawyers; (3) to protect prospective clients; and (4) to protect errant lawyers from themselves.[12] | |||||
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2006-11-30 |
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| In Dantes v. Dantes,[46] the Court ordered the disbarment of a lawyer, describing as grossly immoral his conduct of engaging in illicit relationships and abandoning his family. The Court exhorted lawyers to refrain from scandalous behavior, thus:In Barrientos vs. Daarol, we ruled that as officers of the court, lawyers must not only in fact be of good moral character but must also be seen to be of good moral character and leading lives in accordance with the highest moral standards of the community. More specifically, a member of the Bar and officer of the court is not only required to refrain from adulterous relationships or keeping mistresses but must also so behave himself as to avoid scandalizing the public by creating the belief that he is flouting those moral standards. If the practice of law is to remain an honorable profession and attain its basic ideals, those enrolled in its ranks should not only master its tenets and principles but should also, in their lives, accord continuing fidelity to them. The requirement of good moral character is of much greater import, as far as the general public is concerned, than the possession of legal learning. | |||||
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2006-09-19 |
TINGA, J. |
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| A lawyer shall not do any falsehood nor consent to the doing of any in court; nor shall he mislead, or allow the court to be misled by any artifice. Nonetheless, the power to disbar must be exercised with great caution.[15] In disbarment proceedings, the case against the respondent must be established by clear, convincing, and satisfactory proof, the burden of which rests upon the complainant.[16] Only a clear case of misconduct that seriously affects the standing and character of the lawyer as an officer of the Court and as a member of the bar will warrant disbarment.[17] | |||||
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2006-09-07 |
TINGA, J. |
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| Respondent's misconduct is of considerable gravity. There is a string of cases where the Court meted out the extreme penalty of disbarment on the ground of gross immorality where the respondent contracted a bigamous marriage,[40] abandoned his family to cohabit with his paramour,[41] cohabited with a married woman,[42] lured an innocent woman into marriage,[43] or was found to be a womanizer.[44] The instant case can be easily differentiated from the foregoing cases. We, therefore, heed the stern injunction on decreeing disbarment where any lesser penalty, such as temporary suspension, would accomplish the end desired.[45] In Zaguirre v. Castillo,[46] respondent was found to have sired a child with another woman who knew he was married. He therein sought understanding from the Court pointing out the polygamous nature of men and that the illicit relationship was a product of mutual lust and desire. Appalled at his reprehensible and amoral attitude, the Court suspended him indefinitely. However, in Fr. Sinnott v. Judge Barte,[47] where respondent judge consorted with a woman not his wife, but there was no conclusive evidence that he sired a child with her, he was fined P10,000.00 for his conduct unbecoming a magistrate despite his retirement during the pendency of the case. | |||||
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2006-03-31 |
GARCIA, J. |
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| [23] Dante vs. Dante, A.C. No. 6486, September 22, 2004, 438 SCRA 582. | |||||