This case has been cited 9 times or more.
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2015-09-08 |
PERALTA, J. |
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| Given that the petition for certiorari should have been filed with the CTA, the mistake committed by the BOC in filing such petition before the CA may be excused. In this regard, Court takes note that nothing in R.A. No. 1125, as amended by R.A. No. 9282, indicates that a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 may be filed with the CTA. Despite the enactment of R.A. No. 9282 on March 30, 2004, it was only about ten (10) years later in the case of City of Manila v. Hon. Grecia-Cuerdo[44] that the Court ruled that the authority of the CTA to take cognizance of such petitions is included in the powers granted by the Constitution, as well as inherent in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction. While the rule on perfection of appeals cannot be classified as a difficult question of law,[45] mistake in the construction or application of a doubtful question of law, as in this case, may be considered as a mistake of fact, excusing the BOC from the consequences of the erroneous filing of its petition with the CA. | |||||
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2008-12-23 |
REYES, R.T., J. |
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| The indispensability of an appeal bond in the perfection of an appeal cannot be gainsaid. A cash or surety bond is a requirement sine qua non for the perfection of an appeal from the Labor Arbiter's monetary award.[27] In Viron Garments Manufacturing Co., Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission,[28] the Court ruled:The intention of the lawmakers to make the bond an indispensable requisite for the perfection of an appeal by the employer is clearly limned in the provision that an appeal by the employer may be perfected "only upon the posting of a cash or surety bond." The word `only' makes it perfectly clear, that the lawmakers intended that the posting of a cash or surety bond by the employer to be the exclusive means by which an employer's appeal may be perfected.[29] | |||||
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2008-07-09 |
QUISUMBING, J. |
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| We rule against remanding the case to the labor arbiter since it will only cause further delay and may frustrate speedy justice and, in any event, would be a futile exercise, as in all probability the case would eventually end up with this Court.[16] Also, this Court has repeatedly ruled that delay in the settlement of labor cases cannot be countenanced. Not only does it involve the survival of an employee and his loved ones who are dependent on him for food, shelter, clothing, medicine and education, it also wears down the meager resources of the workers.[17] | |||||
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2006-09-13 |
PUNO, J. |
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| Section 7. No Extension of Period. - No motion or request for extension of the period within which to perfect an appeal shall be allowed. It is clear, therefore, that the appeal filed by petitioner was dismissible. Respondent did not even cite in its motion for reconsideration any justifiable excuse for the belated filing of the memorandum of appeal.[12] Well-settled is the principle that the perfection of an appeal within the statutory or reglementary period is not only mandatory, but jurisdictional, and failure to do so renders the questioned decision final and executory and deprives the appellate court of jurisdiction to alter the final judgment, much less to entertain the appeal. The underlying purpose of this principle is to prevent needless delay, a circumstance which would allow the employer to wear out the efforts and meager resources of the worker to the point that the latter is constrained to settle for less than what is due him.[13] This Court has declared that although the NLRC is not bound by the technical rules of procedure and is allowed to be liberal in the interpretation of the rules in deciding labor cases, such liberality should not be applied where it would render futile the very purpose for which the principle of liberality is adopted. The liberal interpretation stems from the mandate that the workingman's welfare should be the primordial and paramount consideration.[14] We see no reason in this case to waive the rules on the perfection of appeal. | |||||
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2005-09-16 |
PUNO, J. |
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| The Court of Appeals also ruled that it is not inclined to frustrate respondents' right to appeal merely because of such "inconsequential inadequacy." We cannot denominate the bond requirement as a mere "inconsequential inadequacy." This requirement is intended to discourage employers from using the appeal to delay, or even evade, their obligation to satisfy their employee's possibly just and lawful claims.[25] The right to appeal is a statutory right. A party who wants to avail of it must comply with the requirements set by the law. We have ruled that while it is true that the NLRC Rules must be liberally construed and that the NLRC is not bound by the technicalities of law and procedure, the NLRC itself (and the Court of Appeals in the instant case) must not be the first to arbitrarily disregard specific provisions of the Rules which are precisely intended to assist the parties in obtaining a just and expeditious settlement of labor disputes. In short, the rule on liberal construction is not a license to disregard the rules of procedure. Rules of Procedure exists for a purpose, and to disregard such rules in the guise of liberal construction would be to defeat such purpose.[26] | |||||
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2005-06-15 |
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J. |
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| Lastly, the foregoing interpretation of law and jurisprudence is more in keeping with the underlying principle for the grant of this benefit. It is primarily given to alleviate the plight of workers and to help them cope with the exorbitant increases in the cost of living. To allow the pro-ration of the 13th month pay in this case is to undermine the wisdom behind the law and the mandate that the workingman's welfare should be the primordial and paramount consideration.[26] What is more, the factual milieu of this case is such that to rule otherwise inevitably results to dissuasion, if not a deterrent, for workers from the free exercise of their constitutional rights to self-organization and to strike in accordance with law.[27] | |||||
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2005-06-15 |
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J. |
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| As the Labor Arbiter observed, faced with the overwhelming evidence presented by respondents on one hand and the mere general denial of petitioner on the other, the invocation of the protective mantle of the law in favor of labor cannot be upheld in this case. This principle cannot be adopted where there is clear and convincing evidence of the truth. While this court endeavors to live up to its mandate that the workingman's welfare should be the primordial and paramount consideration,[24] it cannot do so if it will be at the expense of justice and will result in the oppression or self-destruction of the employer.[25] The interests of both the employers and employees are intended to be protected and not one of them is given undue preference.[26] | |||||
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2005-02-16 |
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J. |
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| We agree with the Court of Appeals that the foregoing constitutes grave abuse of discretion on the part of the NLRC. By delaying the resolution of Times' motion for reconsideration, it has unnecessarily prolonged the period of appeal. We have held that to extend the period of appeal is to prolong the resolution of the case, a circumstance which would give the employer the opportunity to wear out the energy and meager resources of the workers to the point that they would be constrained to give up for less than what they deserve in law.[22] The NLRC is well to take notice of our pronouncement in Santos v. Velarde:[23] | |||||
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2003-12-11 |
PUNO, J. |
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| We have consistently ruled that payment of the appeal bond is a jurisdictional requisite for the perfection of an appeal to the NLRC.[9] It is only in rare instances that the court relaxes the rule upon a showing of substantial compliance with it and to prevent patent injustice. | |||||