This case has been cited 8 times or more.
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2013-12-10 |
BERSAMIN, J. |
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| Considering that the assailed conduct under both complaints referred to the performance of their judicial functions by the respondent Justices, we feel compelled to dismiss the complaints for being improper remedies. We have consistently held that an administrative or disciplinary complaint is not the proper remedy to assail the judicial acts of magistrates of the law, particularly those related to their adjudicative functions. Indeed, any errors should be corrected through appropriate judicial remedies, like appeal in due course or, in the proper cases, the extraordinary writs of certiorari and prohibition if the errors were jurisdictional. Having the administrative or disciplinary complaint be an alternative to available appropriate judicial remedies would be entirely unprocedural. [47] In Pitney v. Abrogar,[48] the Court has forthrightly expressed the view that extending the immunity from disciplinary action is a matter of policy, for "[t]o hold otherwise would be to render judicial office untenable, for no one called upon to try the facts or interpret the law in the process of administering justice can be infallible in his judgment." | |||||
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2011-02-08 |
PER CURIAM |
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| Only errors that are tainted with fraud, corruption or malice may be the subject of disciplinary action. For administrative liability to attach, respondent must be shown to have been moved by bad faith, dishonesty, hatred or some other motive. Indeed, judges may not be held administratively liable for any of their official acts, no matter how erroneous, as long as they acted in good faith.[27] | |||||
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2008-04-18 |
NACHURA, J. |
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| After a careful scrutiny of the records, we sustain the OCA's finding that the charge respecting the erroneous issuance of the writ of replevin in Civil Case No. 4971 is clearly judicial in nature. The instant administrative complaint is not the proper remedy to assail the legality of respondent judge's order. In this regard, we have previously held that where sufficient judicial remedies exist, the filing of an administrative complaint is not the proper recourse to correct a judge's allegedly erroneous act.[10] | |||||
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2007-10-09 |
NACHURA, J. |
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| After a careful scrutiny of the records, we sustain the OCA's finding that the charge respecting the erroneous issuance of the writ of replevin in Civil Case No. 4971 is clearly judicial in nature. The instant administrative complaint is not the proper remedy to assail the legality of respondent judge's order. In this regard, we have previously held that where sufficient judicial remedies exist, the filing of an administrative complaint is not the proper recourse to correct a judge's allegedly erroneous act.[10] | |||||
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2005-11-11 |
CALLEJO, SR., J. |
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| Indeed, as a matter of policy, in the absence of fraud, dishonesty and corruption, the acts of a judge in his judicial capacity are not subject to disciplinary action.[4] He cannot be subjected to liability civil, criminal or administrative for any of his official acts, no matter how erroneous, as long as he acts in good faith.[5] Only judicial errors tainted with fraud, dishonesty, gross ignorance, bad faith or deliberate intent to do an injustice will be administratively sanctioned.[6] There is no showing that the respondent Judge acted in bad faith in the proceedings in the instant case. The Court also notes that the complainant did not even heed the OCA's directive[7] to comply with Section 1, Rule 140[8] of the Rules of Court to signify her interest in pursuing the case, and instead merely submitted a Letter[9] dated June 10, 2004 stating that she stood by her Letter-Complaint dated January 26, 2004 and April 13, 2004. | |||||
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2005-06-29 |
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J. |
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| As a matter of public policy, not every error or mistake committed by judges in the performance of their official duties renders them administratively liable. In the absence of fraud, dishonesty or deliberate intent to do an unjustice, acts done in their official capacity, even though erroneous, do not always constitute misconduct.[34] | |||||
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2005-06-29 |
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J. |
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| Moreover, the Court is guided by its ruling in Cruz vs. Iturralde,[37] to wit:It is settled that mere suspicion of partiality is not enough. There should be hard evidence to prove it, as well as a manifest showing of bias and partiality stemming from an extrajudicial source or some other basis. To be sure, a judge's conduct must be clearly indicative of arbitrariness and prejudice before it can be stigmatized as biased and partial. | |||||
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2003-11-11 |
CALLEJO, SR., J. |
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| As a matter of policy, the acts of a judge in his judicial capacity are not subject to disciplinary action. He cannot be subjected to liability - civil, criminal or administrative - for any of his official acts, no matter how erroneous, as long as he acts in good faith.[8] Only judicial errors tainted with fraud, dishonesty, gross ignorance, bad faith or deliberate intent to do an injustice will be administratively sanctioned.[9] To hold otherwise would be to render judicial office untenable, for no one called upon to try the facts or interpret the law in the process of administering justice can be infallible in his judgment.[10] | |||||