Lawyerly

GR No. 210164

2015-08-18

DEL CASTILLO, J.

In a petition for certiorari under Rule 64 in relation to Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, the primordial issue to be resolved is whether the respondent tribunal committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing the assailed resolution. And as a matter of policy, this Court will not interfere with the resolutions of the Comelec unless it is shown that it had committed grave abuse of discretion.[21] Thus, in the absence of grave abuse of discretion, a Rule 64 petition will not prosper. Jurisprudence, on the other hand, defines grave abuse of discretion as the "capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction."[22] "Mere abuse of discretion is not enough; it must be grave."[23] Grave abuse of discretion has likewise been defined as an act done contrary to the Constitution, the law or jurisprudence.[24]

GR No. 209286

2014-09-23

LINA DELA PEÑA JALOVER v. JOHN HENRY R. OSMEÑA

BRION, J.

The COMELEC Second Division dismissed the petition on the ground that Osmeña did not commit any material misrepresentation in his COC.[40] Citing Velasco v. COMELEC,[41] the Second Division found that Osmeña was able to explain why he indicated in his COC that the period of his residence in Toledo City prior to the May 23, 2013 elections is 15 years.[42] This was his belief, as according to him, he has ties with Toledo City since childhood and that even as a Senator, he continued to bring projects to Toledo City.[43] The Second Division further found that Osmeña complied with the residency requirement.[44]

GR No. 206952

2013-10-22

PARTY-LIST v. COMELEC

REYES, J.

In Velasco v. Commission on Elections,[17] the Court further clarified that a false representation under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code, in order to be a ground to deny due course or cancel a certificate of candidacy, must consist of a deliberate attempt to mislead, misinform, or hide a fact which would otherwise render a candidate ineligible. Thus: The false representation that [Sections 74 and 78 of the Omnibus Election Code] mention must necessarily pertain to a material fact, not to a mere innocuous mistake. This is emphasized by the consequences of any material falsity: a candidate who falsifies a material fact cannot run; if he runs and is elected, cannot serve; in both cases, he or she can be prosecuted for violation of the election laws. Obviously, these facts are those that refer to a candidate's qualification for elective office, such as his or her citizenship and residence. The candidate's status as a registered voter similarly falls under this classification as it is a requirement that, by law (the Local Government Code), must be reflected in the COC. The reason for this is obvious: the candidate, if he or she wins, will work for and represent the local government under which he is running.

GR No. 195649

2013-04-16

CASAN MACODE MAQUILING v. COMELEC

SERENO, C.J.

This issue has also been jurisprudentially clarified in Velasco v. COMELEC[52] where the Court ruled that the ruling in Quizon and Saya-ang cannot be interpreted without qualifications lest "Election victory x x x becomes a magic formula to bypass election eligibility requirements."[53]

GR No. 193237

2012-10-09

DOMINADOR G. JALOSJOS v. COMELEC

CARPIO, J.

In closing, I consider to be appropriate and fitting the Court's following pronouncement in Velasco v. Commission on Elections:[49]

GR No. 193237

2012-10-09

DOMINADOR G. JALOSJOS v. COMELEC

CARPIO, J.

In closing, I consider to be appropriate and fitting the Court's following pronouncement in Velasco v. Commission on Elections:[49]

GR No. 193237

2012-10-09

DOMINADOR G. JALOSJOS v. COMELEC

CARPIO, J.

On the other hand, a candidate who was simply disqualified is merely prohibited from continuing as a candidate or from assuming or continuing to assume the functions of the office; substitution can thus take place under the terms of Section 77 of the OEC.[26]

GR No. 191938

2010-10-19

ABRAHAM KAHLIL B. MITRA v. COMELEC

BRION, J.

5. The private respondents submit that the Court erred in relying on jurisprudence (Torayno, Sr. v. COMELEC[19] and Asistio v. Hon. Trinidad Pe-Aguirre[20]) not applicable to the present case. They additionally argue that our ruling in Velasco v. COMELEC[21] should be applied strictly to the present case.

GR No. 191938

2010-07-02

ABRAHAM KAHLIL B. MITRA v. COMELEC

BRION, J.

(3) an intention to abandon the old domicile.[63]

GR No. 151800

2009-11-05

OFFICE OF OMBUDSMAN v. HEIRS OF MARGARITA VDA. DE VENTURA

PERALTA, J.

In Velasco v. Commission on Elections,[18] the Court defined "grave abuse of discretion" as follows: x x x grave abuse of discretion is such "capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction, or [an] exercise of power in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, or an exercise of judgment so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined, or to act in a manner not at all in contemplation of law."

GR No. 179430

2009-07-27

JAMELA SALIC MARUHOM v. COMELEC

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.

Under Section 78 of the OEC, a false representation of material fact in the COC is a ground for the denial or cancellation of the COC. The false representation must pertain to a material fact that affects the right of the candidate to run for the election for which he filed his COC. Such material fact refers to a candidate's eligibility or qualification for elective office like citizenship, residence or status as a registered voter.[19] Aside from the requirement of materiality, the false representation must consist of a deliberate attempt to mislead, misinform, or hide a fact that would otherwise render a candidate ineligible. In other words, it must be made with the intention to deceive the electorate as to the would-be candidate's qualifications for public office.[20]

GR No. 176947

2009-02-19

GAUDENCIO M. CORDORA v. COMELEC

CARPIO, J.

In Sections 2 and 3 of R.A. No. 9225, the framers were not concerned with dual citizenship per se, but with the status of naturalized citizens who maintain their allegiance to their countries of origin even after their naturalization.[12] Section 5(3) of R.A. No. 9225 states that naturalized citizens who reacquire Filipino citizenship and desire to run for elective public office in the Philippines shall "meet the qualifications for holding such public office as required by the Constitution and existing laws and, at the time of filing the certificate of candidacy, make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before any public officer authorized to administer an oath" aside from the oath of allegiance prescribed in Section 3 of R.A. No. 9225. The twin requirements of swearing to an Oath of Allegiance and executing a Renunciation of Foreign Citizenship served as the bases for our recent rulings in Jacot v. Dal and COMELEC,[13] Velasco v. COMELEC,[14] and Japzon v. COMELEC,[15] all of which involve natural-born Filipinos who later became naturalized citizens of another country and thereafter ran for elective office in the Philippines. In the present case, Tambunting, a natural-born Filipino, did not subsequently become a naturalized citizen of another country. Hence, the twin requirements in R.A. No. 9225 do not apply to him.

	GR No. 210164 2015-08-18	ROMMEL C. ARNADO v. COMELEC DEL CASTILLO, J.
In a petition for certiorari under Rule 64 in relation to Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, the primordial issue to be resolved is whether the respondent tribunal committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing the assailed resolution. And as a matter of policy, this Court will not interfere with the resolutions of the Comelec unless it is shown that it had committed grave abuse of discretion.[21] Thus, in the absence of grave abuse of discretion, a Rule 64 petition will not prosper. Jurisprudence, on the other hand, defines grave abuse of discretion as the "capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction."[22] "Mere abuse of discretion is not enough; it must be grave."[23] Grave abuse of discretion has likewise been defined as an act done contrary to the Constitution, the law or jurisprudence.[24]
	GR No. 209286 2014-09-23	LINA DELA PEÑA JALOVER v. JOHN HENRY R. OSMEÑA BRION, J.
The COMELEC Second Division dismissed the petition on the ground that Osmeña did not commit any material misrepresentation in his COC.[40] Citing Velasco v. COMELEC,[41] the Second Division found that Osmeña was able to explain why he indicated in his COC that the period of his residence in Toledo City prior to the May 23, 2013 elections is 15 years.[42] This was his belief, as according to him, he has ties with Toledo City since childhood and that even as a Senator, he continued to bring projects to Toledo City.[43] The Second Division further found that Osmeña complied with the residency requirement.[44]
	GR No. 206952 2013-10-22	PARTY-LIST v. COMELEC REYES, J.
In Velasco v. Commission on Elections,[17] the Court further clarified that a false representation under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code, in order to be a ground to deny due course or cancel a certificate of candidacy, must consist of a deliberate attempt to mislead, misinform, or hide a fact which would otherwise render a candidate ineligible. Thus: The false representation that [Sections 74 and 78 of the Omnibus Election Code] mention must necessarily pertain to a material fact, not to a mere innocuous mistake. This is emphasized by the consequences of any material falsity: a candidate who falsifies a material fact cannot run; if he runs and is elected, cannot serve; in both cases, he or she can be prosecuted for violation of the election laws. Obviously, these facts are those that refer to a candidate's qualification for elective office, such as his or her citizenship and residence. The candidate's status as a registered voter similarly falls under this classification as it is a requirement that, by law (the Local Government Code), must be reflected in the COC. The reason for this is obvious: the candidate, if he or she wins, will work for and represent the local government under which he is running.
	GR No. 195649 2013-04-16	CASAN MACODE MAQUILING v. COMELEC SERENO, C.J.
This issue has also been jurisprudentially clarified in Velasco v. COMELEC[52] where the Court ruled that the ruling in Quizon and Saya-ang cannot be interpreted without qualifications lest "Election victory x x x becomes a magic formula to bypass election eligibility requirements."[53]
	GR No. 193237 2012-10-09	DOMINADOR G. JALOSJOS v. COMELEC CARPIO, J.
In closing, I consider to be appropriate and fitting the Court's following pronouncement in Velasco v. Commission on Elections:[49]
	GR No. 193237 2012-10-09	DOMINADOR G. JALOSJOS v. COMELEC CARPIO, J.
In closing, I consider to be appropriate and fitting the Court's following pronouncement in Velasco v. Commission on Elections:[49]
	GR No. 193237 2012-10-09	DOMINADOR G. JALOSJOS v. COMELEC CARPIO, J.
On the other hand, a candidate who was simply disqualified is merely prohibited from continuing as a candidate or from assuming or continuing to assume the functions of the office; substitution can thus take place under the terms of Section 77 of the OEC.[26]
	GR No. 191938 2010-10-19	ABRAHAM KAHLIL B. MITRA v. COMELEC BRION, J.
5. The private respondents submit that the Court erred in relying on jurisprudence (Torayno, Sr. v. COMELEC[19] and Asistio v. Hon. Trinidad Pe-Aguirre[20]) not applicable to the present case. They additionally argue that our ruling in Velasco v. COMELEC[21] should be applied strictly to the present case.
	GR No. 191938 2010-07-02	ABRAHAM KAHLIL B. MITRA v. COMELEC BRION, J.
(3) an intention to abandon the old domicile.[63]
	GR No. 151800 2009-11-05	OFFICE OF OMBUDSMAN v. HEIRS OF MARGARITA VDA. DE VENTURA PERALTA, J.
In Velasco v. Commission on Elections,[18] the Court defined "grave abuse of discretion" as follows: x x x grave abuse of discretion is such "capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction, or [an] exercise of power in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, or an exercise of judgment so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined, or to act in a manner not at all in contemplation of law."
	GR No. 179430 2009-07-27	JAMELA SALIC MARUHOM v. COMELEC CHICO-NAZARIO, J.
Under Section 78 of the OEC, a false representation of material fact in the COC is a ground for the denial or cancellation of the COC. The false representation must pertain to a material fact that affects the right of the candidate to run for the election for which he filed his COC. Such material fact refers to a candidate's eligibility or qualification for elective office like citizenship, residence or status as a registered voter.[19] Aside from the requirement of materiality, the false representation must consist of a deliberate attempt to mislead, misinform, or hide a fact that would otherwise render a candidate ineligible. In other words, it must be made with the intention to deceive the electorate as to the would-be candidate's qualifications for public office.[20]
	GR No. 176947 2009-02-19	GAUDENCIO M. CORDORA v. COMELEC CARPIO, J.
In Sections 2 and 3 of R.A. No. 9225, the framers were not concerned with dual citizenship per se, but with the status of naturalized citizens who maintain their allegiance to their countries of origin even after their naturalization.[12] Section 5(3) of R.A. No. 9225 states that naturalized citizens who reacquire Filipino citizenship and desire to run for elective public office in the Philippines shall "meet the qualifications for holding such public office as required by the Constitution and existing laws and, at the time of filing the certificate of candidacy, make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before any public officer authorized to administer an oath" aside from the oath of allegiance prescribed in Section 3 of R.A. No. 9225. The twin requirements of swearing to an Oath of Allegiance and executing a Renunciation of Foreign Citizenship served as the bases for our recent rulings in Jacot v. Dal and COMELEC,[13] Velasco v. COMELEC,[14] and Japzon v. COMELEC,[15] all of which involve natural-born Filipinos who later became naturalized citizens of another country and thereafter ran for elective office in the Philippines. In the present case, Tambunting, a natural-born Filipino, did not subsequently become a naturalized citizen of another country. Hence, the twin requirements in R.A. No. 9225 do not apply to him.

NARDO M. VELASCO v. COMELEC