This case has been cited 2 times or more.
|
2013-09-02 |
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J. |
||||
| Article VIII, Section 15(1) of the 1987 Constitution provides that lower courts have three months within which to decide cases or resolve matters submitted to them for resolution. Moreover, Canon 3, Rule 3.05 of the Code of Judicial Conduct enjoins judges to dispose of their business promptly and decide cases within the required period. In addition, this Court laid down guidelines in SC Administrative Circular No. 13 which provides, inter alia, that "[j]udges shall observe scrupulously the periods prescribed by Article VIII, Section 15, of the Constitution for the adjudication and resolution of all cases or matters submitted in their courts. Thus, all cases or matters must be decided or resolved within twelve months from date of submission by all lower collegiate courts while all other lower courts are given a period of three months to do so." The Court has reiterated this admonition in SC Administrative Circular No. 3-99 which requires all judges to scrupulously observe the periods prescribed in the Constitution for deciding cases and the failure to comply therewith is considered a serious violation of the constitutional right of the parties to speedy disposition of their cases.[6] | |||||
|
2010-01-18 |
DEL CASTILLO, J. |
||||
| Besides, granting that his illness hindered the efficient performance of his functions, all respondent judge had to do was to request for an extension of time within which to decide the case. Judge Cruz, however, made no such request. In a similar case,[4] we held that: Indeed, Judge Ubiadas' illness could have adversely affected the performance of his duties. Despite having just been subjected to a triple by-pass operation, he knew fully well that he still had to act as the judge of four (4) RTC branches for two (2) months. If his illness had indeed seriously hampered him in the discharge of his duties, Judge Ubiadas could have requested this Court for additional time to decide/resolve pending cases and incidents. His illness cannot be an excuse for his failure to render decisions or resolutions within the constitutionally prescribed period, considering that he could have requested an extension or other relief from this Court but he did not. It is incumbent upon him to dispose the cases assigned to him without undue delay. | |||||