This case has been cited 17 times or more.
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2015-11-10 |
BERSAMIN, J. |
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| There are two remedies available under existing laws to prevent a candidate from running in an electoral race. One is by petition for disqualification, and the other by petition to deny due course to or to cancel his certificate of candidacy. In Fermin v. Commission on Elections,[29] the Court has differentiated the two remedies thuswise: [A] petition for disqualification, on the one hand, can be premised on Section 12 or 68 of the OEC, or Section 40 of the LGC. On the other hand, a petition to deny due course to or cancel a CoC can only be grounded on a statement of a material representation in the said certificate that is false. The petitions also have different effects. While a person who is disqualified under Section 68 is merely prohibited to continue as a candidate, the person whose certificate is cancelled or denied due course under Section 78 is not treated as a candidate at all, as if he/she never filed a CoC.[30] | |||||
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2014-04-22 |
PERALTA, J. |
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| The petitioner shall, before filing of the Petition, furnish a copy of the Petition, through personal service to the respondent. In cases where personal service is not feasible, or the respondent refuses to receive the Petition, or the respondents' whereabouts cannot be ascertained, the petitioner shall execute an affidavit stating the reason or circumstances therefor and resort to registered mail as a mode of service. The proof of service or the affidavit shall be attached to the Petition to be filed;[17] | |||||
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2014-04-22 |
PERALTA, J. |
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| Hayudini likewise protests that it was a grave error on the part of the COMELEC to have declared his proclamation null and void when no petition for annulment of his proclamation was ever filed. What petitioner seems to miss, however, is that the nullification of his proclamation as a winning candidate is also a legitimate outcome - a necessary legal consequence - of the cancellation of his CoC pursuant to Section 78. A CoC cancellation proceeding essentially partakes of the nature of a disqualification case.[35] The cancellation of a CoC essentially renders the votes cast for the candidate whose certificate of candidacy has been cancelled as stray votes.[36] If the disqualification or CoC cancellation or denial case is not resolved before the election day, the proceedings shall continue even after the election and the proclamation of the winner. Meanwhile, the candidate may be voted for and even be proclaimed as the winner, but the COMELEC's jurisdiction to deny due course and cancel his or her CoC continues. This rule likewise applies even if the candidate facing disqualification has already taken his oath of office.[37] The only exception to this rule is in the case of congressional and senatorial candidates where the COMELEC ipso jure loses jurisdiction in favor of either the Senate or the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal after the candidates have been proclaimed, taken the proper oath, and also assumed office.[38] | |||||
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2012-11-13 |
VILLARAMA, JR., J. |
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| In Fermin v. COMELEC,[23] this Court distinguished a petition for disqualification under Section 68 and a petition to cancel or deny due course to a certificate of candidacy (COC) under Section 78. Said proceedings are governed by different rules and have distinct outcomes. | |||||
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2012-10-09 |
CARPIO, J. |
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| Perpetual special disqualification is a ground for a petition under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code because this accessory penalty is an ineligibility, which means that the convict is not eligible to run for public office, contrary to the statement that Section 74 requires him to state under oath. As used in Section 74, the word "eligible" means having the right to run for elective public office, that is, having all the qualifications and none of the ineligibilities to run for public office. As this Court held in Fermin v. Commission on Elections,[17] the false material representation may refer to "qualifications or eligibility." One who suffers from perpetual special disqualification is ineligible to run for public office. If a person suffering from perpetual special disqualification files a certificate of candidacy stating under oath that "he is eligible to run for (public) office," as expressly required under Section 74, then he clearly makes a false material representation that is a ground for a petition under Section 78. As this Court explained in Fermin: Lest it be misunderstood, the denial of due course to or the cancellation of the CoC is not based on the lack of qualifications but on a finding that the candidate made a material representation that is false, which may relate to the qualifications required of the public office he/she is running for. It is noted that the candidate states in his/her CoC that he/she is eligible for the office he/she seeks. Section 78 of the OEC, therefore, is to be read in relation to the constitutional and statutory provisions on qualifications or eligibility for public office. If the candidate subsequently states a material representation in the CoC that is false, the COMELEC, following the law, is empowered to deny due course to or cancel such certificate. Indeed, the Court has already likened a proceeding under Section 78 to a quo warranto proceeding under Section 253 of the OEC since they both deal with the eligibility or qualification of a candidate, with the distinction mainly in the fact that a "Section 78" petition is filed before proclamation, while a petition for quo warranto is filed after proclamation of the winning candidate.[18] (Emphasis supplied) | |||||
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2012-10-09 |
CARPIO, J. |
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| The penalty of prisión mayor automatically carries with it, by operation of law,[15] the accessory penalties of temporary absolute disqualification and perpetual special disqualification. Under Article 30 of the Revised Penal Code, temporary absolute disqualification produces the effect of "deprivation of the right to vote in any election for any popular elective office or to be elected to such office." The duration of the temporary absolute disqualification is the same as that of the principal penalty. On the other hand, under Article 32 of the Revised Penal Code perpetual special disqualification means that "the offender shall not be permitted to hold any public office during the period of his disqualification," which is perpetually. Both temporary absolute disqualification and perpetual special disqualification constitute ineligibilities to hold elective public office. A person suffering from these ineligibilities is ineligible to run for elective public office, and commits a false material representation if he states in his certificate of candidacy that he is eligible to so run. | |||||
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2012-10-09 |
CARPIO, J. |
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| Jalosjos then filed a Manifestation on 1 June 2012 which stated that "he has resigned from the position of Mayor of the City of Dapitan effective 30 April 2012, which resignation was accepted by the Provincial Governor of Zamboanga del Norte, Atty. Rolando E. Yebes."[12] Jalosjos' resignation was made "[i]n deference with the provision of the Omnibus Election Code in relation to [his] candidacy as Provincial Governor of Zamboanga del Sur in May 2013."[13] | |||||
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2012-10-09 |
CARPIO, J. |
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| Jalosjos then filed a Manifestation on 1 June 2012 which stated that "he has resigned from the position of Mayor of the City of Dapitan effective 30 April 2012, which resignation was accepted by the Provincial Governor of Zamboanga del Norte, Atty. Rolando E. Yebes."[12] Jalosjos' resignation was made "[i]n deference with the provision of the Omnibus Election Code in relation to [his] candidacy as Provincial Governor of Zamboanga del Sur in May 2013."[13] | |||||
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2012-10-09 |
CARPIO, J. |
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| There is absolutely nothing in the language of Section 68 that will justify including the crime of robbery as one of the offenses enumerated in this Section. All the offenses enumerated in Section 68 refer to offenses under the Omnibus Election Code. The dissenting opinion of Justice Reyes gravely errs when it holds that Jalosjos' conviction for the crime of robbery under the Revised Penal Code is a ground for "a petition for disqualification under Section 68 of the OEC and not for cancellation of COC under Section 78 thereof." This Court has already ruled that offenses punished in laws other than in the Omnibus Election Code cannot be a ground for a petition under Section 68. In Codilla, Sr. v. de Venecia,[19] the Court declared: [T]he jurisdiction of the COMELEC to disqualify candidates is limited to those enumerated in Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code. All other election offenses are beyond the ambit of COMELEC jurisdiction. They are criminal and not administrative in nature. (Emphasis supplied) | |||||
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2012-10-09 |
BERSAMIN, J. |
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| There are two remedies available to prevent a candidate from running in an electoral race. One is through a petition for disqualification and the other through a petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy. The Court differentiated the two remedies in Fermin v. Commission on Elections,[30] thuswise: x x x [A] petition for disqualification, on the one hand, can be premised on Section 12 or 68 of the [Omnibus Election Code], or Section 40 of the [Local Government Code]. On the other hand, a petition to deny due course to or cancel a CoC can only be grounded on a statement of a material representation in the said certificate that is false. The petitions also have different effects. While a person who is disqualified under Section 68 is merely prohibited to continue as a candidate, the person whose certificate is cancelled or denied due course under Section 78 is not treated as a candidate at all, as if he/she never filed a CoC.[31] | |||||
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2012-10-09 |
BERSAMIN, J. |
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| Considering that a cancelled CoC does not give rise to a valid candidacy,[33] there can be no valid substitution of the candidate under Section 77 of the Omnibus Election Code. It should be clear, too, that a candidate who does not file a valid CoC may not be validly substituted, because a person without a valid CoC is not considered a candidate in much the same way as any person who has not filed a CoC is not at all a candidate.[34] | |||||
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2012-10-09 |
BERSAMIN, J. |
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| WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that the Certificate of Candidacy filed by the respondent be denied due course to or cancel the same and that he be declared as a disqualified candidate under the existing Election Laws and by the provisions of the New Local Government Code.[6] (Emphasis supplied.) | |||||
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2012-10-09 |
CARPIO, J. |
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| A petition for disqualification tinder Section 68 clearly refers to "the commission of prohibited acts and possession of a permanent resident status in a foreign country."[20] All the offenses mentioned in Section 68 refer to election offenses under the Omnibus Election Code, not to violations of other penal laws. There is absolutely nothing in the language of Section 68 that would justify including violation of the three-term limit rule, or conviction by final judgment of the crime of falsification under the Revised Penal Code, as one of the grounds or offenses covered under Section 68. In Codilla, Sr. v. de Venecia,[21] this Court ruled: [T|he jurisdiction of the COMELEC to disqualify candidates is limited to those enumerated in Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code. All other election offenses are beyond the ambit of COMELEC jurisdiction. They are criminal and not: administrative in nature, x x x | |||||
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2012-10-09 |
CARPIO, J. |
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| A petition for disqualification tinder Section 68 clearly refers to "the commission of prohibited acts and possession of a permanent resident status in a foreign country."[20] All the offenses mentioned in Section 68 refer to election offenses under the Omnibus Election Code, not to violations of other penal laws. There is absolutely nothing in the language of Section 68 that would justify including violation of the three-term limit rule, or conviction by final judgment of the crime of falsification under the Revised Penal Code, as one of the grounds or offenses covered under Section 68. In Codilla, Sr. v. de Venecia,[21] this Court ruled: [T|he jurisdiction of the COMELEC to disqualify candidates is limited to those enumerated in Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code. All other election offenses are beyond the ambit of COMELEC jurisdiction. They are criminal and not: administrative in nature, x x x | |||||
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2012-10-09 |
CARPIO, J. |
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| Romeo D. Lonzanida (Lonzanida) and Estela D. Antipolo (Antipolo) were candidates for Mayor of San Antonio, Zambales in the May 2010 National and Local Elections. Lonzanida Hied his certificate of candidacy on 1 December 2009.[4] On 8 December 2009, Dra. Sigrid S. Rodolfo (Rodolfo) filed a petition under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code to disqualify Lonzanida and to deny due course or to cancel Lonzanida's certificate of candidacy on the ground that Lonzanida was elected, and had served, as mayor of San Antonio, Zambales for four (4) consecutive terms immediately prior to the term for the May 2010 elections. Rodolfo asserted that Lonzanida made a false material representation in his certificate of candidacy when Lonzanida certified under oath that he was eligible for the office he sought election. Section 8, Article X of the 1987 Constitution[5] and Section 43(b) of the Local Government Code[6] both prohibit a local elective official from being elected and serving for more than three consecutive terms for the same position. | |||||
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2011-10-19 |
SERENO, J. |
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| In the earlier case of Fermin v. Comelec[19], the Court clarified the two remedies that may be availed of by a candidate to prevent another from running in an electoral race. The Court held: The ground raised in the Dilangalen petition is that Fermin allegedly lacked one of the qualifications to be elected as mayor of Northern Kabuntalan, i.e., he had not established residence in the said locality for at least one year immediately preceding the election. Failure to meet the one-year residency requirement for the public office is not a ground for the "disqualification" of a candidate under Section 68. The provision only refers to the commission of prohibited acts and the possession of a permanent resident status in a foreign country as grounds for disqualification.... | |||||
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2011-03-08 |
VILLARAMA, JR., J. |
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| In the more recent case of Fermin v. Commission on Elections,[35] we stressed that a petition filed under Section 78 must not be interchanged or confused with one filed under Section 68. A petition which is properly a "Section 78 petition" must therefore be filed within the period prescribed therein, and a procedural rule subsequently issued by COMELEC cannot supplant this statutory period under Section 78. We further distinguished the two petitions as to their nature, grounds and effects, to wit: Lest it be misunderstood, the denial of due course to or the cancellation of the CoC is not based on the lack of qualifications but on a finding that the candidate made a material representation that is false, which may relate to the qualifications required of the public office he/she is running for. It is noted that the candidate states in his/her CoC that he/she is eligible for the office he/she seeks. Section 78 of the OEC, therefore, is to be read in relation to the constitutional and statutory provisions on qualifications or eligibility for public office. If the candidate subsequently states a material representation in the CoC that is false, the COMELEC, following the law, is empowered to deny due course to or cancel such certificate. Indeed, the Court has already likened a proceeding under Section 78 to a quo warranto proceeding under Section 253 of the OEC since they both deal with the eligibility or qualification of a candidate, with the distinction mainly in the fact that a "Section 78" petition is filed before proclamation, while a petition for quo warranto is filed after proclamation of the winning candidate. | |||||