Lawyerly

GR No. 181112

2010-06-29

INTERORIENT MARITIME ENTERPRISES v. LEONORA S. REMO

NACHURA, J.

For disability claims, the post-employment medical examination is meant to verify the medical condition of the seafarer when he signs off from the vessel.[25] On the other hand, in the cases involving death compensation, our rulings in Gau Sheng Phils., Inc. v. Joaquin[26] and Rivera v. Wallem Maritime Services, Inc.[27] stressed the importance of a post-employment medical examination or its equivalent, i.e., it is a basis for the award of death compensation. In these cited cases, however, death benefits were not awarded because the seafarers and/or their representatives failed to abide by the POEA-SEC wherein it was stated that the seafarer must report to his employer for a post-employment medical examination within three working days from the date of arrival, otherwise, benefits under the POEA-SEC would be nullified.[28]

GR No. 167345

2007-11-23

E PACIFIC GLOBAL CONTACT CENTER v. MA. LOURDES CABANSAY

NACHURA, J.

We have consistently ruled in a plethora of cases that, in petitions for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, only questions of law may be raised,[37] except if the factual findings of the appellate court are mistaken, absurd, speculative, conjectural, conflicting, tainted with grave abuse of discretion, or contrary to the findings culled by the court of origin.[38] As the findings and conclusions of the LA and the NLRC, in this case, starkly conflict with those of the CA, we are constrained to delve into the records and examine the questioned findings.

GR No. 156668

2007-11-23

KIMBERLY-CLARK v. SECRETARY OF LABOR

NACHURA, J.

As to Kimberly's assertions that some of the employees were already recalled, reassigned or replaced by the RANK Manpower Services, and that some did not return to work, the Court notes that these are questions of fact. Basic is the rule that, in petitions for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, only questions of law may be raised,[12] except, if the factual findings of the appellate court are mistaken, absurd, speculative, conjectural, conflicting, tainted with grave abuse of discretion, or contrary to the findings culled by the court of origin,[13] which is not so in the instant case. The DOLE and the appellate court herein are uniform in their findings.

GR NO. 167572

2007-07-27

GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM v. MELVIN I. PALMA

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.

This increased risk theory can be made applicable in compensation cases, when the claimant can adduce reasonable proof of the connection between his work and the cause of the disease, or that that the risk of contracting the disease was increased by the claimant's working conditions.[6] Strict rules of evidence are not applicable to claims for compensation.[7] The degree of proof required under Presidential Decree No. 626 is merely substantial evidence, which means "such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion."[8] What the law requires is a reasonable work-connection and not a direct causal relation.[9] Medical opinion to the contrary can be disregarded, especially where there is some basis in the facts for inferring a work connection.[10] It is sufficient that the hypothesis on which the workmen's claim is based is probable since probability, not certainty, is the touchstone.[11]

GR NO. 166580

2007-02-08

PRUDENTIAL SHIPPING v. EMERLINDA A. STA. RITA

CALLEJO, SR., J.

In petitions for review on certiorari, only questions of law may be raised, the only exceptions being when the factual findings of the appellate court are erroneous, absurd, speculative, conjectural, conflicting, or contrary to the findings culled by the court of origin.[44] Considering the conflicting findings of the NLRC, the CA and the Labor Arbiter, the Court is impelled to resolve the factual issues in this case along with the legal ones.

GR NO. 161104

2006-09-27

NYK-FIL SHIP MANAGEMENT INC. v. NLRC

CARPIO MORALES, J.

The pre-employment medical examination conducted on Roberto could not have divulged the disease for which he died, considering the fact that most, if not all, are not so exploratory. The disease of GFR, which is an indicator of chronic renal failure, is measured thru the renal function test. In pre-employment examination, the urine analysis (urinalysis), which is normally included measures only the creatinine, the presence of which cannot conclusively indicate chronic renal failure.[59] (Underscoring supplied) It having been satisfactorily shown that respondent was really not fit to work as a boatswain due to his pre-existing illness and, therefore, he is not entitled to disability compensation, necessarily, he is not entitled to attorney's fees.

GR NO. 149256

2006-07-21

ADELAIDA B. AQUINO v. SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM

CORONA, J.

Under the Rules on Employees Compensation, particularly "Annex A" thereof which contains the list of occupational diseases, congestive heart failure is not included. Hence, petitioner should have shown proof that the working conditions in the commissary store where her husband worked aggravated the risk of contracting the ailment.[6] Petitioner should have adduced evidence of a reasonable connection between the work of her deceased husband and the cause of his death, or that the progression of the disease was brought about largely by the conditions in her husband's job as grocery man at the commissary store.[7] Failing in this aspect, we are constrained to rule that her husband's illness which eventually caused his demise was not compensable.

GR NO. 158268

2006-04-12

RHODA CASTOR-GARUPA v. EMPLOYEES' COMPENSATION COMMISSION

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.

For the increased risk theory to apply in compensation cases, the claimant must adduce reasonable proof between his work and the cause of the disease, or that the risk of contracting the disease was increased by the claimant's working conditions.[23] Strict rules of evidence are not applicable in claims for compensation.[24] The degree of proof required under Presidential Decree No. 626 is merely substantial evidence, which means "such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." What the law requires is a reasonable work-connection and not a direct causal relation.[25] It is sufficient that the hypothesis on which the workmen's claim is based is probable since probability, not certainty, is the touchstone.[26]

GR NO. 155359

2006-01-31

SPS. PONCIANO AYA-AY v. ARPAPHIL SHIPPING CORP.

CARPIO MORALES, J.

c. In all cases, the employer shall pay the beneficiaries of seamen the Philippine Currency equivalent to the amount of US$1,000 for burial expenses at exchange rate prevailing during the time of payment. (Underscoring supplied) In order to give effect to the aforequoted benefits, it must be shown that the employee died during the effectivity of the contract of employment.[34]

GR NO. 159606

2005-12-13

MARILYN BUNAO v. SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.

For the beneficiaries of an employee to be entitled to death benefits under the system, the cause of death of the employee must be a sickness listed as an occupational disease by ECC; or any other illness caused by employment, subject to proof that the risk of contracting the same is increased by the working conditions.[11]

	GR No. 181112 2010-06-29	INTERORIENT MARITIME ENTERPRISES v. LEONORA S. REMO NACHURA, J.
For disability claims, the post-employment medical examination is meant to verify the medical condition of the seafarer when he signs off from the vessel.[25] On the other hand, in the cases involving death compensation, our rulings in Gau Sheng Phils., Inc. v. Joaquin[26] and Rivera v. Wallem Maritime Services, Inc.[27] stressed the importance of a post-employment medical examination or its equivalent, i.e., it is a basis for the award of death compensation. In these cited cases, however, death benefits were not awarded because the seafarers and/or their representatives failed to abide by the POEA-SEC wherein it was stated that the seafarer must report to his employer for a post-employment medical examination within three working days from the date of arrival, otherwise, benefits under the POEA-SEC would be nullified.[28]
	GR No. 167345 2007-11-23	E PACIFIC GLOBAL CONTACT CENTER v. MA. LOURDES CABANSAY NACHURA, J.
We have consistently ruled in a plethora of cases that, in petitions for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, only questions of law may be raised,[37] except if the factual findings of the appellate court are mistaken, absurd, speculative, conjectural, conflicting, tainted with grave abuse of discretion, or contrary to the findings culled by the court of origin.[38] As the findings and conclusions of the LA and the NLRC, in this case, starkly conflict with those of the CA, we are constrained to delve into the records and examine the questioned findings.
	GR No. 156668 2007-11-23	KIMBERLY-CLARK v. SECRETARY OF LABOR NACHURA, J.
As to Kimberly's assertions that some of the employees were already recalled, reassigned or replaced by the RANK Manpower Services, and that some did not return to work, the Court notes that these are questions of fact. Basic is the rule that, in petitions for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, only questions of law may be raised,[12] except, if the factual findings of the appellate court are mistaken, absurd, speculative, conjectural, conflicting, tainted with grave abuse of discretion, or contrary to the findings culled by the court of origin,[13] which is not so in the instant case. The DOLE and the appellate court herein are uniform in their findings.
	GR NO. 167572 2007-07-27	GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM v. MELVIN I. PALMA CHICO-NAZARIO, J.
This increased risk theory can be made applicable in compensation cases, when the claimant can adduce reasonable proof of the connection between his work and the cause of the disease, or that that the risk of contracting the disease was increased by the claimant's working conditions.[6] Strict rules of evidence are not applicable to claims for compensation.[7] The degree of proof required under Presidential Decree No. 626 is merely substantial evidence, which means "such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion."[8] What the law requires is a reasonable work-connection and not a direct causal relation.[9] Medical opinion to the contrary can be disregarded, especially where there is some basis in the facts for inferring a work connection.[10] It is sufficient that the hypothesis on which the workmen's claim is based is probable since probability, not certainty, is the touchstone.[11]
	GR NO. 166580 2007-02-08	PRUDENTIAL SHIPPING v. EMERLINDA A. STA. RITA CALLEJO, SR., J.
In petitions for review on certiorari, only questions of law may be raised, the only exceptions being when the factual findings of the appellate court are erroneous, absurd, speculative, conjectural, conflicting, or contrary to the findings culled by the court of origin.[44] Considering the conflicting findings of the NLRC, the CA and the Labor Arbiter, the Court is impelled to resolve the factual issues in this case along with the legal ones.
	GR NO. 161104 2006-09-27	NYK-FIL SHIP MANAGEMENT INC. v. NLRC CARPIO MORALES, J.
The pre-employment medical examination conducted on Roberto could not have divulged the disease for which he died, considering the fact that most, if not all, are not so exploratory. The disease of GFR, which is an indicator of chronic renal failure, is measured thru the renal function test. In pre-employment examination, the urine analysis (urinalysis), which is normally included measures only the creatinine, the presence of which cannot conclusively indicate chronic renal failure.[59] (Underscoring supplied) It having been satisfactorily shown that respondent was really not fit to work as a boatswain due to his pre-existing illness and, therefore, he is not entitled to disability compensation, necessarily, he is not entitled to attorney's fees.
	GR NO. 149256 2006-07-21	ADELAIDA B. AQUINO v. SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM CORONA, J.
Under the Rules on Employees Compensation, particularly "Annex A" thereof which contains the list of occupational diseases, congestive heart failure is not included. Hence, petitioner should have shown proof that the working conditions in the commissary store where her husband worked aggravated the risk of contracting the ailment.[6] Petitioner should have adduced evidence of a reasonable connection between the work of her deceased husband and the cause of his death, or that the progression of the disease was brought about largely by the conditions in her husband's job as grocery man at the commissary store.[7] Failing in this aspect, we are constrained to rule that her husband's illness which eventually caused his demise was not compensable.
	GR NO. 158268 2006-04-12	RHODA CASTOR-GARUPA v. EMPLOYEES' COMPENSATION COMMISSION CHICO-NAZARIO, J.
For the increased risk theory to apply in compensation cases, the claimant must adduce reasonable proof between his work and the cause of the disease, or that the risk of contracting the disease was increased by the claimant's working conditions.[23] Strict rules of evidence are not applicable in claims for compensation.[24] The degree of proof required under Presidential Decree No. 626 is merely substantial evidence, which means "such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." What the law requires is a reasonable work-connection and not a direct causal relation.[25] It is sufficient that the hypothesis on which the workmen's claim is based is probable since probability, not certainty, is the touchstone.[26]
	GR NO. 155359 2006-01-31	SPS. PONCIANO AYA-AY v. ARPAPHIL SHIPPING CORP. CARPIO MORALES, J.
c. In all cases, the employer shall pay the beneficiaries of seamen the Philippine Currency equivalent to the amount of US$1,000 for burial expenses at exchange rate prevailing during the time of payment. (Underscoring supplied) In order to give effect to the aforequoted benefits, it must be shown that the employee died during the effectivity of the contract of employment.[34]
	GR NO. 159606 2005-12-13	MARILYN BUNAO v. SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM CHICO-NAZARIO, J.
For the beneficiaries of an employee to be entitled to death benefits under the system, the cause of death of the employee must be a sickness listed as an occupational disease by ECC; or any other illness caused by employment, subject to proof that the risk of contracting the same is increased by the working conditions.[11]

GAU SHENG PHILS. v. ESTELLA JOAQUIN