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GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM v. LEO L. CADIZ

This case has been cited 7 times or more.

	GR No. 182013 2009-12-04	QUASHA ANCHETA PEÑA v. SPECIAL SIXTH DIVISION OF CA CHICO-NAZARIO, J.
In the case at bar, this Court holds that there was no grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction committed by the Special Sixth Division of the Court of Appeals in not giving due deference to the decision of its co-division. As correctly pointed out by the Special Sixth Division of the Court of Appeals, the decision of its co-division is not binding on its other division. Further, it must be stressed that judicial decisions that form part of our legal system are only the decisions of the Supreme Court.[12] Moreover, at the time petitioners made the aforesaid Manifestation, the Decision dated 14 December 2007 in CA-G.R. SP No. 96717 of the Special Tenth Division was still on appeal before this Court.
	GR No. 173158 2009-12-04	ALEJANDRO B. TY v. QUEEN'S ROW SUBDIVISION CHICO-NAZARIO, J.
Secondly, it must be stressed that the Decisions of this Court are the only judicial decisions that form part of our legal system. While rulings of the Court of Appeals may serve as precedents for lower courts, they only apply to points of law not covered by any Supreme Court decision.[9]
	GR No. 183142 2009-09-17	ROSITA A. MONTANEZ v. PROVINCIAL AGRARIAN REFORM ADJUDICATOR OF LA CASTELLANA VELASCO JR., J.
Petitioner's invocation of the foregoing CA pronouncement to justify her elevation of the PARAD decision to the appellate court instead of to the DARAB is misplaced. For one, the aforequoted holding is without any binding effect, having effectively been superseded by the issuance of the Amended Decision. And for another, only decisions of the Court have the force of precedents and form part of the legal system.[37]
	GR No. 179802 2008-11-14	MAGSAYSAY MARITIME CORP. v. JAIME M. VELASQUEZ LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.
The Court has applied the Labor Code concept of permanent total disability to the case of seafarers. In a catena of cases,[10] the Court declared that disability should not be understood more on its medical significance but on the loss of earning capacity. Permanent total disability means disablement of an employee to earn wages in the same kind of work, or work of similar nature that he was trained for or accustomed to perform, or any kind of work which a person of his mentality and attainment could do. In addition, the Court in GSIS v. Cadiz[11] and Ijares v. CA[12] held that permanent disability is the inability of a worker to perform his job for more than 120 days, regardless of whether or not he loses the use of any part of his body.
	GR No. 172933 2008-10-06	JESUS E. VERGARA v. HAMMONIA MARITIME SERVICES BRION, J.
The respondents then point out that Section 30 provides a schedule of disability for injuries, disease or illness contracted. Any item in the schedule classified under Grade I constitutes total and permanent disability entitled to a disability allowance equivalent to US$60,000 (US$50,000 x 120%). They consider reliance on this Court's ruling in Crystal Shipping v. Natividad;[30] Government Service Insurance System v. Cadiz;[31] and Ijares v. Court of Appeals,[32] to be misplaced with respect to the advocated conversion of the petitioner's medical condition from temporary to permanent disability.
	GR No. 168753 2008-07-09	PHILIMARE v. BENEDICTO F. SUGANOB QUISUMBING, J.
Permanent disability is the inability of a worker to perform his job for more than 120 days, regardless of whether or not he loses the use of any part of his body.[21] Clearly, Suganob's disability is permanent since he was unable to work from the time he was medically repatriated on September 17, 2001 up to the time the complaint was filed on April 25, 2002, or more than 7 months. Moreover, if in fact Suganob is clear and fit to work on October 29, 2001, he would have been taken back by petitioners to continue his work as a Chief Cook, but he was not. His disability is undoubtedly permanent.
	GR NO. 154798 2005-10-20	CRYSTAL SHIPPING v. DEO P. NATIVIDAD QUISUMBING, J.
Permanent disability is the inability of a worker to perform his job for more than 120 days, regardless of whether or not he loses the use of any part of his body.[22] As gleaned from the records, respondent was unable to work from August 18, 1998 to February 22, 1999, at the least, or more than 120 days, due to his medical treatment. This clearly shows that his disability was permanent.