This case has been cited 7 times or more.
2014-06-09 |
DEL CASTILLO, J. |
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Truly, "direct evidence of the commission of a crime is not the only basis from which a court may draw its finding of guilt."[27] The rules of evidence allow a trial court to rely on circumstantial evidence to support its conclusion of guilt. Circumstantial evidence is that evidence "which indirectly proves a fact in issue through an inference which the fact-finder draws from the evidence established."[28] Under Section 4, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court, circumstantial evidence would be sufficient to convict the offender "if i) there is more than one circumstance; ii) the facts from which the inference is derived are proven; and iii) the combination of all circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt."[29] All the circumstances must be consistent with one another, consistent with the hypothesis that the accused is guilty and at the same time inconsistent with the hypothesis that he is innocent. Thus, conviction based on circumstantial evidence can be upheld provided that the circumstances proved constitute an unbroken chain which leads to one fair and reasonable conclusion that points to the accused, to the exclusion of all others as the guilty person.[30] | |||||
2013-09-18 |
DEL CASTILLO, J. |
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Indeed, no prosecution witness has actually seen the commission of the crime. But jurisprudence tells us that direct evidence of the crime is not the only matrix from which a trial court may draw its conclusion and finding of guilt. The rules on evidence allow a trial court to rely on circumstantial evidence to support its conclusion of guilt.[27] Circumstantial evidence is that evidence "which indirectly proves a fact in issue through an inference which the fact-finder draws from the evidence established."[28] | |||||
2010-08-03 |
VILLARAMA, JR., J. |
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When death occurs due to a crime, the following may be recovered: (1) civil indemnity ex delicto for the death of the victim; (2) actual or compensatory damages; (3) moral damages; (4) exemplary damages; (5) attorney's fees and expenses of litigation; and (6) interest, in proper cases.[28] In murder, the grant of civil indemnity, which has been fixed by jurisprudence at P50,000.00, requires no proof other than the fact of death as a result of the crime and proof of an accused's responsibility therefor.[29] Thus, the civil indemnity of P50,000.00 awarded to the heirs of the victim is in order. | |||||
2010-07-26 |
PEREZ, J. |
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The testimony of Medina, the tricycle driver, is negative testimony which proves nothing more than that he did not see any untoward incident occur inside Manoy's restaurant at the time and date of the buy-bust operation. Between the categorical statements of the prosecution witness, on one hand, and the bare denial of accused-appellant, the former must prevail. It is a well-settled rule that affirmative testimony is far stronger than negative testimony, especially so when it comes from the mouth of a credible witness.[18] Medina's negative testimony is in fact contradictory to the purported version of Desuyo who admits that an incident did occur that evening in the vicinity of Manoy's. Even the testimony of Dionela, another Tricycle driver who testified for the defense, does not negate that the incident inside Manny's was a buy-bust operation. | |||||
2009-11-25 |
NACHURA, J. |
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It is settled that for the defense of alibi to prosper, the accused must prove not only that he was at some other place at the time of the commission of the crime, but also that it was physically impossible for him to be at the locus delicti or within its immediate vicinity.[43] The RTC and the CA, therefore, rightly rejected appellant's alibi. | |||||
2009-11-25 |
CHICO-NAZARIO, J. |
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The twin defenses of denial and alibi raised by accused-appellant must fail in light of the positive identification made by one of his victims, Jay. Alibi and denial are inherently weak defenses and must be brushed aside when the prosecution has sufficiently and positively ascertained the identity of the accused.[20] It is only axiomatic that positive testimony prevails over negative testimony.[21] Accused-appellant and his two victims reside in the same barangay and are therefore familiar with one another. Thus, Jay could not have been mistaken on accused-appellant's identity. For alibi to prosper, it must be established by positive, clear and satisfactory proof that it was physically impossible for the accused to have been at the scene of the crime at the time of its commission, and not merely that accused was somewhere else.[22] Accused-appellant's alibi that he was at his sister's house at the time of the shooting, and that his cousin Pinoy later went to him and told him that he had shot the Valencias was disproved by Cristina, accused-appellant's sister and witness. Cristina testified that her brother, accused-appellant, did not visit her on the night of the incident. Moreover, where the defense of denial remains unsubstantiated by clear and convincing evidence, it becomes negative and self-serving, and must not be given more evidentiary value vis-à-vis the affirmative testimony of a credible witness.[23] | |||||
2009-08-19 |
NACHURA, J. |
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In murder, the grant of civil indemnity, which has been fixed by jurisprudence at P50,000.00, requires no proof other than the fact of death as a result of the crime and proof of an accused's responsibility therefor.[32] Thus, the heirs of Olomoddin Abbas should be awarded civil indemnity of P50,000.00. |