This case has been cited 9 times or more.
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2012-04-17 |
PER CURIAM |
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| In Chin v. Court of Appeals,[110] the Court warned against litigants' contumacious practice in successively asking for the inhibition of judges, in order to shop for one who is more friendly and sympathetic to their cause: We agree that judges have the duty of protecting the integrity of the judiciary as an institution worthy of public trust and confidence. But under the circumstances here, we also agree that unnecessary inhibition of judges in a case would open the floodgates to forum-shopping. More so, considering that Judge Magpale was not the first judge that TAN had asked to be inhibited on the same allegation of prejudgment. To allow successive inhibitions would justify petitioners' apprehension about the practice of certain litigants shopping for a judge more friendly and sympathetic to their cause than previous ones. | |||||
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2008-08-06 |
QUISUMBING, J. |
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| Fourth, the instant case does not fall under the instances covered by the rule on the mandatory disqualification of judges as enumerated in Section 1, paragraph 1[16] of Rule 137 of the Rules of Court; thus, the issue of voluntary inhibition is primarily a matter of conscience and sound discretion on the part of the judge.[17] | |||||
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2008-07-03 |
YNARES-SATIAGO, J. |
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| Petitioners' contention that the appellate court committed grave abuse of discretion in denying their motion for inhibition has likewise no merit. Mere suspicion that a judge or justice is partial to a party is not enough. Bare allegations of partiality and prejudgment will not suffice in the absence of clear and convincing evidence to overcome the presumption that the judge will undertake his noble role to dispense justice according to law and evidence and without fear or favor. There should be sufficient evidence to prove the allegations, and there must be showing that the judge had an interest, personal or otherwise, in the prosecution of the case. To be a disqualifying circumstance, the bias and prejudice must be shown to have stemmed from an extrajudicial source and result in an opinion on the merits on some basis other than what the judge learned from his participation in the case.[36] In the instant case, the fact that the Court of Appeals reconsidered its Order dated March 20, 2000 dismissing respondents' appeal and eventually reinstating the same, by itself, does not imply bias or partiality on the part of the justices. | |||||
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2006-08-31 |
QUISUMBING, J. |
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| The rule contemplates two kinds of inhibition: compulsory and voluntary. In the first paragraph, compulsory disqualification conclusively assumes that a judge cannot actively or impartially sit on a case for the reasons therein stated. The second paragraph, concerning voluntary inhibition, leaves to the judge's discretion whether he should desist from sitting in a case for other just and valid reasons with only his conscience to guide him.[13] | |||||
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2006-01-25 |
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J. |
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| Alim's request for inhibition holding that the mere filing of an administrative complaint does not preclude a judge from deciding a case submitted to him/her for resolution for there are judicial remedies available to the parties should there be an adverse decision.[20] It is clear from the Resolution that the Court was not persuaded by the reason put forth by Judge Molina-Alim in her request for inhibition. It should be clearly understood from the above-cited Resolution that the Court found no sufficient basis to allow Judge Molina-Alim to inhibit herself from hearing Civil Case No. 1099-BG. The Court ruled that the mere fact that an administrative case for alleged partiality was filed against her by herein petitioners does not justify her recusal. Indeed, a careful reading of the letter-request of Judge Molina-Alim shows that her request for inhibition stems solely from the fact that herein petitioners had filed an administrative case against her for partiality. There is no other statement in said letter-request, categorical or implied, which would show that her purported bias resulted from any other source. Notwithstanding Judge Molina-Alim's statements in her request for inhibition, we find that petitioners' allegations of bias and partiality remain unsubstantiated. Indeed, bare allegations of partiality and prejudgment will not suffice in the absence of clear and convincing evidence to overcome the presumption that the judge will undertake his noble role to dispense justice according to law and evidence and without fear or favor.[21] There should be adequate evidence to prove the allegations, and there must be showing that the judge had an interest, personal or otherwise, in the prosecution of the case.[22] | |||||
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2005-09-30 |
CALLEJO, SR., J. |
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| Significantly, Ombudsman Marcelo did not state in the said memorandum the reason for his inhibition. On this point, the rule on voluntary inhibition of judges finds application to the Ombudsman in the performance of his functions particularly in administrative proceedings like OMB-C-A-03-0379-J. Like judges, the decision on whether or not to inhibit is admittedly left to the Ombudsman's sound discretion and conscience.[23] However, again similar to judges, Ombudsman Marcelo has no unfettered discretion to inhibit himself. The inhibition must be for just and valid causes.[24] No such cause was proffered by Ombudsman Marcelo for his inhibition in OMB-C-A-03-0379-J. | |||||
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2004-09-08 |
PUNO, J. |
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| As to the denial of the request of complainant-spouses for an ocular inspection of the lots, respondent judge reasonably exercised his discretion in ordering instead the conduct of a relocation survey by a licensed inspector. It is the better means to determine who between the parties encroached on the boundary of the adjacent lands. Bias and partiality can never be presumed. Bare allegations of partiality will not suffice in the absence of clear and convincing proof that will overcome the presumption that the judge dispensed justice according to law and evidence, without fear or favor.[9] | |||||