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PEOPLE v. WILSON SALVADOR Y GAGARIN

This case has been cited 2 times or more.

2010-02-04
PERALTA, J.
Moreover, the "sweetheart theory" proffered by the accused is effectively an admission of carnal knowledge of the victim, which consequently places on him the burden of proving the supposed relationship by substantial evidence.[22] The "sweetheart theory" hardly deserves any attention when an accused does not present any evidence, such as love letters, gifts, pictures, and the like to show that, indeed, he and the victim were sweethearts.[23] In the case at bar, Sajiron was unable to present any evidence to prove their relationship. Clearly, the "sweetheart theory" is a self-serving defense and mere fabrication of the accused to exculpate himself and his cohorts from the charges filed against them. It bears stressing that during her testimony before the trial court, AAA vehemently denied that she and Sajiron were sweethearts and firmly declared that the latter never lived in their house.[24]
2003-10-23
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.
In his Brief, appellant does not deny having sexual intercourse with complainant. He claims that she consented to the sexual act. As earlier found by us, the prosecution failed to adduce evidence to prove that complainant resisted the sexual advances of appellant when she was allegedly raped on November 16, 1996. The gravamen in the crime of rape is carnal knowledge of a woman against her will or without her consent.[14] We find nothing in the testimony of complainant to show that she offered any semblance of resistance when appellant allegedly raped her. While it may be said that tenacious resistance from the victim is not a requirement for the crime of rape, the lack of evidence signifying obstinate resistance to submit to the intercourse, naturally expected from an unwilling victim, could likewise indicate that no rape has occurred.[15] Nothing in private complainant's testimony indicates that she struggled against the sexual advances of appellant. There was no evidence of appellant's use of force or threat in having sex with her that evening of November 16, 1996.