This case has been cited 4 times or more.
|
2007-02-06 |
CHICO-NAZARIO, J. |
||||
| This complete absence of evidence on the part of the prosecution to show the conduct of the appellant and his co-accused, disclosing a common understanding among them relative to the commission of the offense, [83] is fatal to the prosecution. The prosecution's witness could not testify on the manner by which the deceased Piamonte was stabbed, precisely because by his own admission, he did not see the stabbing. No account of the stabbing which caused the death of the deceased Piamonte was ever given nor shown. Unfortunately, no account of how Piamonte died was ever given, except for the established fact that he died due to stabbing. The appellant's act of holding a lead pipe and hitting the deceased in the head was not shown to be in furtherance of the common design of killing the deceased. What transpired during the stabbing of the victim, which is material to proving the fact of conspiracy, is, regrettably, left merely to speculation. This Court must neither conjecture nor surmise that a conspiracy existed. The rule is clear that the guilt of the accused must be proved with moral certainty. [84] All doubts should be resolved in favor of the accused. Thus, the time honored principle in criminal law that if the inculpatory facts are capable of two or more explanations, one consistent with the innocence of the accused and the other with his guilt, the Court should adopt that which is more favorable to the accused for then the evidence does not fulfill the test of moral certainty. [85] | |||||
|
2006-11-27 |
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J. |
||||
| The Court agrees with both the defense and the prosecution that the present petition dwells basically on the issue of credibility of witnesses. Settled is the rule that in assessing the credibility of witnesses, this Court gives great respect to the evaluation of the trial court for it had the unique opportunity to observe the demeanor of witnesses and their deportment on the witness stand, an opportunity denied the appellate courts, which merely rely on the records of the case.[17] The assessment by the trial court is even conclusive and binding if not tainted with arbitrariness or oversight of some fact or circumstance of weight and influence, especially when such finding is affirmed by the CA.[18] After examining the records of the instant case, the Court finds no cogent reason to depart from the lower courts' assessment of the credibility of private complainant. The absence of evidence as to an improper motive actuating the sole witness of the prosecution strongly tends to indicate that his testimony is worthy of full faith and credence.[19] Moreover, the Court agrees with the OSG that truth is established not by the number of witnesses but by the quality of their testimonies, for in determining the value and credibility of evidence, the witnesses are to be weighed not numbered.[20] | |||||
|
2004-03-17 |
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J. |
||||
| to draw his bolo, is entitled to full faith and credit because he was not shown to have been impelled by any ill motive to testify falsely against appellant.[23] Moreover, even if it were true that the victim unsuccessfully tried to unsheathe his bolo immediately before he was hacked, this did not qualify as unlawful aggression that would justify a finding of self-defense. Indeed, the act of trying to draw a bolo is merely a | |||||
|
2003-11-27 |
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J. |
||||
| In Criminal Case No. 3595, for frustrated homicide, we sustain the finding of the court below that it was petitioner and not Nelson Importado, as claimed by the defense, who stabbed Isaias Ibardalosa, Jr. This is supported by the testimony of Froilan Sucro, whose declaration is entitled to full faith and credit inasmuch as he was not shown to have been impelled by ill motive to perjure himself.[36] It cannot be denied, however, that the unlawful aggression came from Isaias who, after intervening between Nestor and petitioner, wrestled with the latter. As previously stated, Isaias pinned petitioner to the ground face up while holding petitioner's shoulders. While in this position, petitioner was able to free himself by delivering a single stabbing blow at the back of Isaias. Under the circumstances, it is reasonable to conclude that petitioner did not use unnecessary means to repel an ongoing attack. It would not be proper and reasonable to require petitioner to flee or use a less deadly weapon or defense, because in the situation in which he was placed, it was natural for him to use the weapon he was holding to defend himself. In the natural order of things, following the instinct of self preservation, he was compelled to resort to the available defense.[37] In emergencies of this kind, human nature does not act upon processes of formal reason but in obedience to the instinct of self- preservation; and when it is apparent that a person has reasonably acted upon this instinct, it is the duty of the courts to sanction that act or to mitigate his liability.[38] | |||||