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POWTON CONGLOMERATE v. JOHNNY AGCOLICOL

This case has been cited 5 times or more.

	GR No. 172727 2010-09-08	QUEENSLAND-TOKYO COMMODITIES v. THOMAS GEORGE NACHURA, J.
Doctrine dictates that a corporation is invested by law with a personality separate and distinct from those of the persons composing it, such that, save for certain exceptions, corporate officers who entered into contracts in behalf of the corporation cannot be held personally liable for the liabilities of the latter. Personal liability of a corporate director, trustee, or officer, along (although not necessarily) with the corporation, may validly attach, as a rule, only when - (1) he assents to a patently unlawful act of the corporation, or when he is guilty of bad faith or gross negligence in directing its affairs, or when there is a conflict of interest resulting in damages to the corporation, its stockholders, or other persons; (2) he consents to the issuance of watered down stocks or who, having knowledge thereof, does not forthwith file with the corporate secretary his written objection thereto; (3) he agrees to hold himself personally and solidarily liable with the corporation; or (4) he is made by a specific provision of law personally answerable for his corporate action.[22]
	GR Nos. 147925-26 2010-07-07	ELPIDIO S. UY v. PUBLIC ESTATES AUTHORITY NACHURA, J.
We cannot sustain this claim that is premised mainly on the principle of unjust enrichment. We stress that the principle of unjust enrichment cannot be validly invoked by a party who, through his own act or omission, took the risk of being denied payment for additional costs by not giving the other party prior notice of such costs and/or by not securing their written consent thereto, as required by law and their contract.[7]
	GR NOS. 147925-26 2009-06-08	ELPIDIO S. UY v. PUBLIC ESTATES AUTHORITY NACHURA, J.
By this article, a written authorization from the owner is required before the contractor can validly recover his claim. The evident purpose of the provision is to avoid litigation for added costs incurred by reason of additions or changes in the original plan. Undoubtedly, it was adopted to serve as a safeguard or a substantive condition precedent to recovery.[28]
	GR NOS. 167829-30 2007-11-13	FILIPINAS SYSTEMS v. MRT DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION VELASCO, JR., J.
The authority to issue the field instructions cannot be divorced from the corresponding authority to cause the appropriate adjustment in price and time resulting from these instructions; otherwise, the filed instructions will never be followed by the contractor without the corresponding authority to adjust the price and time. While theoretically it is possible to divorce the two, it is not the norm specially in a project where the time for completion is tight as the separation would invariably lead to delay.[13] Relying on Art. 1724 and Powton Conglomerate, Inc. v. Agocolicol,[14] it is argued that a written consent of the owner of a project in order that increased costs shall be binding is required and the Project Manager in this case had no such written consent.
	GR No. 145908 2004-01-22	DEVELOPMENT BANK OF PHILIPPINES v. PINGOL LAND TRANSPORT SYSTEM COMPANY YNARES-SATIAGO, J.
Rule 17, Section 1 of the old Rules of Civil Procedure[39] which allows the dismissal of the complaint by the plaintiff as a matter of right at any time before service of the answer, is not applicable in the instant case because Jesusito Pingol who signed the motion to withdraw the complaint failed to present a Board Resolution authorizing him to withdraw the complaint filed by PLTSCI. Being a corporation, the latter has a personality separate and distinct from Jesusito Pingol and the other officers composing it,[40] such that in the absence of a Board Resolution, the motion filed by Jesusito cannot be considered as a motion of PLTSCI itself. Inasmuch as no service of a proper "Motion to Withdraw Complaint" was made to petitioner prior to its filing of an answer with counterclaim, the applicable provision is Section 2 of Rule 17 of the old Rules. Under the said provision, if a counterclaim has been pleaded by the defendant prior to the service upon him of the plaintiff's motion to dismiss, the action shall not be dismissed against the defendant's objection unless the counterclaim can remain pending for independent adjudication by the court. In the present case, petitioner's claim is dependent on the validity of the sale and foreclosure which PLTSCI branded as illegal. Moreover, petitioner's claim for damages, caused by PLTSCI's filing of a baseless suit, cannot be decided without going through the merits of the complaint filed by PLTSCI. Petitioner's counterclaim cannot therefore stand independently from PLTSCI's complaint, justifying the Makati court's denial of the motion to withdraw the complaint.