This case has been cited 9 times or more.
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2010-11-22 |
PERALTA, J. |
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| We, likewise, affirm appellant's conviction for illegal possession of marijuana. In the prosecution of such crime, the following facts must be proven with moral certainty: (1) that the accused is in possession of the object identified as prohibited or regulated drug; (2) that such possession is not authorized by law; and (3) that the accused freely and consciously possessed the said drug.[23] | |||||
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2007-02-20 |
QUISUMBING, J. |
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| Generally, after the parties have produced their respective direct proofs, they are allowed to offer rebutting evidence only. However, the court, for good reasons, in the furtherance of justice, may allow new evidence upon their original case, and its ruling will not be disturbed in the appellate court where no abuse of discretion appears.[25] A motion to reopen may thus properly be presented only after either or both parties had formally offered and closed their evidence, but before judgment is rendered,[26] and even after promulgation but before finality of judgment[27] and the only controlling guideline governing a motion to reopen is the paramount interest of justice.[28] This remedy of reopening a case was meant to prevent a miscarriage of justice.[29] | |||||
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2005-10-17 |
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J. |
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| Appellant's claim that the trial court's concession to "reopen" the case unduly prejudiced him is not well taken. We note that appellant had every opportunity to present his evidence to support his case or to refute the prosecution's evidence point-by-point, after the prosecution had rested its case. In short, appellant was never deprived of his day in court. A day in court is the touchstone of the right to due process in criminal justice. Thus, we are unable to hold that a grave abuse of discretion was committed by the trial court when it ordered the so-called "reopening" in order to complete the testimony of a prosecution witness.[27] | |||||
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2004-02-23 |
PUNO, J. |
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| The trial court did not err in giving credence to Erlinda's testimony in court as it is consistent with her sworn statement on all other matters and is corroborated on material points by the testimony of Cherry Francisco. Repeatedly, this Court has ruled that the testimony of a witness may be believed in part and disbelieved in other parts, depending on the corroborative evidence and the probabilities and improbabilities of the case.[13] Moreover, the matter of assigning values to declarations on the witness stand is best and most competently performed by the trial judge who, unlike appellate magistrates, can weigh such testimony in light of the declarant's demeanor, conduct and attitude at the trial and is thereby placed in a more competent position to discriminate between truth and falsehood.[14] | |||||
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2003-10-23 |
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J. |
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| Under Republic Act No. 6425, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death and a fine ranging from P500,000.00 to P10,000,000.00 shall be imposed if the quantity of marijuana or Indian hemp shall be 750 grams or more.[22] Section 63 of the Revised Penal Code provides that when the law prescribes a penalty composed of two indivisible penalties, the lesser penalty shall be applied in the absence of any aggravating or mitigating circumstance. [23] | |||||
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2003-09-26 |
TINGA, J. |
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| Suddenly, a man who identified himself as a police officer approached him, pointing a .38 caliber revolver.[38] The man told him not to run.[39] Tudtud raised his arms and asked, "Sir, what is this about?"[40] The man answered that he would like to inspect the plastic bag Tudtud was carrying, and instructed Tudtud to open the bag, which revealed several pairs of Levi's pants.[41] | |||||
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2003-06-25 |
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J. |
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| Anent the third element, we have held that possession of illegal drugs must be with knowledge of the accused or that animus possidendi existed together with the possession or control of said articles.[8] Knowledge refers to a mental state of awareness of a fact. Since courts cannot penetrate the mind of an accused and thereafter state its perceptions with certainty, resort to other evidence is necessary. Animus possidendi, as a state of mind, may be determined on a case-to-case basis by taking into consideration the prior or contemporaneous acts of the accused, as well as the surrounding circumstances. Its existence may and usually must be inferred from the attendant events in each particular case. [9] | |||||