This case has been cited 7 times or more.
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2010-05-04 |
VILLARAMA, JR., J. |
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| We have applied the totality of circumstances test in the instant case and find AAA's identification of appellant via a show-up as the one (1) who raped her to be credible. Appellant's out-of-court identification is valid. AAA positively identified appellant as her abuser because the latter removed the mask he was wearing and revealed his face to her. AAA even recalled the tattoos on appellant's body and hand. The out-of-court identification made by AAA was done a few days after the incident and confirmed during the trial. There is likewise no evidence that SPO4 Bajar had supplied or even suggested to AAA the identity of appellant as her attacker. Even assuming arguendo that the out-of-court identification was defective, the defect was cured by the subsequent positive identification in court for the inadmissibility of a police line-up identification should not necessarily foreclose the admissibility of an independent in-court identification.[34] | |||||
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2009-07-03 |
BRION, J. |
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| We had the opportunity to explain the procedure for out-of-court identification and the test to determine their its in People v. Rivera[30] where we said:Out-of-court identification is conducted by the police in various ways. It is done thru show-ups where the suspect alone is brought face to face with the witness for identification. It is done thru mug shots where photographs are shown to the witness to identify the suspect. It is also done thru line-ups where a witness identifies the suspect from a group of persons lined up for the purpose x x x In resolving the admissibility of and relying on out-of-court identification of suspects, courts have adopted the totality of circumstances test where they consider the following factors, viz: (1) the witness' opportunity to view the criminal at the time of the crime; (2) the witness' degree of attention at that time; (3) the accuracy of any prior description given by the witness; (4) the level of certainty demonstrated by the witness at the identification; (5) the length of time between the crime and the identification; and, (6) the suggestiveness of the identification procedure. The totality test has been formulated precisely to assure fairness as well as compliance with constitutional due process requirements in out-of-court identification. Applying this test, we find Nancy's out-of-court identification to be reliable and, hence, admissible. First, Nancy testified that she was seated on the first seat of the jeepney's left rear side. From this vantage point, she had a good view of the faces of the four persons clinging to the jeepney as well as the two who were seated inside. Second, no competing event took place to draw her attention from the hold-up. Nothing in the records shows the presence of any distraction that could have disrupted her attention at the time of the robbery or that could have prevented her from having a clear view of the faces and appearances of the robbers. Third, the identification took place within five days after the robbery; she sufficiently explained why it took her five days to go to the police station. Fourth, she described the suspects to a police inspector prior to identifying them in the police station on June 16, 2001. Finally, nothing persuasive supports the appellants' contention that their identification at the police station was the result of an unduly suggestive procedure. When Nancy went to the Marikina Police Station, the police merely informed her of the date when the appellants were arrested. Afterwards, she went to the cell where the appellants were detained; she identified them as the persons who were her co-passengers and who participated in the robbery. The records are silent on whether other inmates were detained together with the appellants. Nonetheless, there was no evidence that the police either prodded Nancy to point to the appellants as the robbers, or suggested to her that the appellants were the suspects in the June 11, 2001 robbery. That she readily recognized them was not surprising as they were her fellow passengers before the hold-up took place. | |||||
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2004-05-28 |
AZCUNA, J. |
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| Time and again, this Court has held that the testimony of a sole eyewitness, which is clear, straightforward and worthy of credence by the trial court, is sufficient to support a conviction.[34] | |||||
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2004-03-04 |
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J. |
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| The fact that Marcita and Helen are related to the victim also does not lessen their credibility. The weight of the testimony of witnesses is not impaired nor in anyway affected by their relationship to the victim when there is no showing of improper motives on their part.[57] The relationship of a witness to the victim, far from rendering his testimony biased, would even render it more credible as it would be unnatural for a relative who is interested in vindicating the crime to accuse somebody other than the real culprit.[58] Moreover, as relatives of the victim, they would naturally have a knack for remembering the face of the assailants for they, more than anybody else would be concerned with seeking justice for the victim and bringing the malefactors to face the law.[59] | |||||
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2004-03-04 |
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J. |
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| The Court finds appellant Linanga's claim that the trial court erroneously held that conspiracy existed in this case to be without merit. Conspiracy exists among perpetrators of a crime when there is unity in purpose and intention in the commission of a crime. To establish conspiracy, direct evidence of a previous plan or agreement to commit assault is not required, as it is sufficient that at the time of the aggression, all the accused manifested by their acts a common intent or desire to attack.[71] Indeed, conspiracy may be inferred when by their acts, two or more persons proceed towards the accomplishment of the same felonious objective, with each doing his act, so that their acts though seemingly independent were in fact connected, showing a closeness of former association and concurrence of sentiment.[72] | |||||
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2004-03-04 |
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J. |
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| Evident premeditation also cannot be appreciated in this case. The elements of evident premeditation are as follows: (1) the time when the accused decided to commit the crime; (2) an overt act manifestly indicating that he has clung to his determination; and (3) sufficient lapse of time between decision and execution to allow the accused to reflect upon the consequences of his act. The essence of this circumstance is that the execution of the criminal act was preceded by cool thought and reflection upon the resolution to carry out the criminal intent during a space of time sufficient to arrive at a calm judgment. To be appreciated, it is indispensable to show how and when the plan to kill was hatched or how much time had elapsed before it was carried out.[82] It must be based on external facts which are evident and not merely suspected which indicate deliberate planning.[83] Considering the paucity of evidence to this effect, evident premeditation cannot be appreciated in the present case. | |||||
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2002-09-17 |
QUISUMBING, J. |
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| municipality of Lingayen.[8] A detailed disquisition could throw but little additional light on the issue of jurisdiction. Petitioner was charged with five counts of falsification. The first three, concerning Cash Receipts Nos. 39185, 39414, and 41775, were allegedly committed in Dagupan. The other two | |||||