This case has been cited 6 times or more.
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2010-11-24 |
MENDOZA, J. |
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| Accordingly, Milwaukee's right to due process was not transgressed. The Court has consistently reminded litigants that due process is simply an opportunity to be heard.[28] The requirement of due process is satisfactorily met as long as the parties are given the opportunity to present their side. In the case at bar, Milwaukee was precisely given the right and the opportunity to present its side. It was able to present its evidence-in-chief and had its opportunity to present rebuttal evidence. | |||||
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2005-11-22 |
QUISUMBING, J. |
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| This case is a clear example of how a counsel's inadvertence can defeat his client's cause. Basic is the rule that a client is bound by the mistake of his counsel.[14] Hence, members of the bar must take utmost care of the cases they handle for they owe fidelity to the cause of their clients.[15] | |||||
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2005-08-18 |
CARPIO, J. |
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| Nor were petitioners denied procedural due process. In essence, procedural due process is simply the opportunity to be heard.[24] Petitioners were afforded such opportunity. Thus, petitioners were served a copy of the complaint and the summonses and given 15 days to file their Answer. While there is no showing from the records when petitioners received their copy of the 18 May 2000 Order declaring them in default, there is no dispute that Urian was present at the hearing when the trial court issued that Order in open court. Petitioners were also served a copy of the trial court's Decision of 6 September 2000 from which they had 15 days to appeal, seek reconsideration, or new trial. Indeed, petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration or new trial albeit belatedly and without complying with proper formalities. Plainly, there was no denial of due process to petitioners. | |||||
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2004-10-25 |
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J. |
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| Petitioners, as plaintiffs a quo, were given ample opportunity to present their case despite the several postponements asked by their counsel. Records show that the trial court allowed petitioners a total of twenty-eight postponements, in a span of seven years, from the time the case was filed on March 22, 1984 until its dismissal on April 17, 1991. They cannot claim, therefore, that they were deprived of their day in court. As we have repeatedly stated, due process is simply an opportunity to be heard.[23] So long as a party is given the opportunity to advocate her cause or defend her interest in due course, it cannot be said that there was denial of due process.[24] | |||||
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2004-10-25 |
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J. |
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| As we held in Villaruel Jr. vs. Fernando:[27] | |||||
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2004-05-20 |
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J. |
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| The only exceptions to the general rule are the correction of clerical errors, the so-called nunc pro tunc entries which cause no prejudice to any party, void judgments,[41] and whenever circumstances transpire after the finality of the decision rendering its execution unjust and inequitable.[42] Since the present case does not fall under any of the recognized exceptions, it is clear that petitioners are bound by the finality of the CA decision in CA-G.R. SP. No. 14783 which they themselves instituted. | |||||