This case has been cited 4 times or more.
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2013-10-02 |
CARPIO, J. |
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| These clauses escape the taint of invalidity only in the narrow instance where the right of first refusal (or "right to top") is founded on the beneficiary's "interest on the object over which the right of first refusal is to be exercised"[24] (such as a "tenant with respect to the land occupied, a lessee vis-à-vis the property leased, a stockholder as regards shares of stock, and a mortgagor in relation to the subject of the mortgage"[25]) and the government stands to benefit from the stipulation. Thus, we upheld the validity of a "right to top" clause allowing a private stockholder in a corporation to top by 5% the highest bid for the shares disposed by the government in that corporation.[26] Under the joint venture agreement creating the corporation, a party had the right of first refusal in case the other party disposed its shares. The government, the disposing party in the joint venture agreement, benefitted from the 5% increase in price under the "right to top," on outcome better than the right of first refusal. | |||||
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2011-08-24 |
PEREZ, J. |
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| In all the foregoing cases, the party seeking to exercise the right has a vested interest in, if not a right to, the subject of the right of first refusal. Thus, on account of such interest, a tenant (with respect to the land occupied), a lessee (vis-à-vis the property leased), a stockholder (as regards shares of stock), and a mortgagor (in relation to the subject of the mortgage), are all granted first priority to buy the property over which they have an interest in the event of its sale. Even in the JG Summit Case,[81] which case was heavily relied upon by the lower court in its decision and by respondent in support of its arguments, the right of first refusal to the corporation's shares of stock - later exchanged for the right to top - granted to KAWASAKI was based on the fact that it was a shareholder in the joint venture for the construction, operation, and management of the Philippine Shipyard and Engineering Corporation (PHILSECO). | |||||
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2009-09-10 |
VELASCO JR., J. |
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| Petitioners' counsel, when queried, hedged on what specific constitutional proscriptions or concepts had been infringed by the award of the subject automation project to Smartmatic TIM Corporation, although he was heard to say that "our objection to the system is anchored on the Constitution itself a violation [sic] of secrecy of voting and the sanctity of the ballot."[41] Petitioners also depicted the covering automation contract as constituting an abdication by the Comelec of its election-related mandate under the Constitution, which is to enforce and administer all laws relative to the conduct of elections. Worse still, according to the petitioners, the abdication, with its anti-dummy dimension, is in favor of a foreign corporation that will be providing the hardware and software requirements.[42] And when pressed further, petitioners came out with the observation that, owing in part to the sheer length of the ballot, the PCOS would not comply with Art. V, Sec. 2 of the Constitution[43] prescribing secrecy of voting and sanctity of the ballot.[44] | |||||
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2009-01-19 |
NACHURA, J. |
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| In any event, the invitation to bid contains a reservation for PPMC to reject any bid. It has been held that where the right to reject is so reserved, the lowest bid, or any bid for that matter, may be rejected on a mere technicality.[19] The discretion to accept or reject bid and award contracts is vested in the government agencies entrusted with that function. This discretion is of such wide latitude that the Courts will not interfere therewith or direct the committee on bids to do a particular act or to enjoin such act within its prerogatives unless it is apparent that it is used as a shield to a fraudulent award;[20] or an unfairness or injustice is shown;[21] or when in the exercise of its authority, it gravely abuses or exceeds its jurisdiction. Thus, where PPMC as advertiser, availing itself of that right, opts to reject any or all bids, the losing bidder has no cause to complain or right to dispute that choice, unless fraudulent acts, injustice, unfairness or grave abuse of discretion is shown. | |||||