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PEOPLE v. RUEL EUGENIO Y ANGELES

This case has been cited 22 times or more.

2014-06-23
SERENO, C.J.
As stated in the Information, the accused were charged not only with the sale of cocaine but also with the delivery and distribution thereof, which is committed by the mere delivery of the prohibited drug. The consideration therefor is of no moment.[30] The law has defined "deliver" as "[a]ny act of knowingly passing a dangerous drug to another, personally or otherwise, and by any means, with or without consideration."[31] Upon a careful review of the records, we find that the elements of the crime as stated above were proven by the prosecution.
2011-11-23
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.
This Court has many times discussed the dispensability of prior surveillance in buy-bust operations, as it is not a pre-requisite for the validity of an entrapment or such buy-bust operation.  In People v. Eugenio,[37] we held that the conduct of surveillance prior to a buy-bust operation is not required especially when the police officers are accompanied to the scene by their civilian informant.  This is so because there is no rigid or textbook method in conducting buy-bust operations.  Flexibility is a trait of good police work, and the need for prior surveillance may be dispensed with when time is of the essence.[38]  In People v. Gonzales,[39] we said: The Court has left to the discretion of police authorities the selection of effective means to apprehend drug dealers.  Thus, we have refused to establish on a priori basis what detailed acts the police authorities might credibly undertake in their entrapment operations.[40]
2011-10-19
SERENO, J.
Second, the actual marked money was likewise not presented in evidence[28] since SPO1 Mora could no longer locate the marked money[29] after he probably turned it over to the Investigator who photocopied it.[30] While the Court has also had occasion to hold that presentation of the buy-bust money, as a lone defect, is not indispensable to the prosecution of a drug case,[31] again it raises doubts regarding the regularity of the buy-bust operation.
2011-10-12
SERENO, J.
In the present case, accused-appellant has not presented any evidence to support his defense of frame-up apart from his uncorroborated testimony. He could have at least presented another witness or some other evidence to corroborate his claim that the accusation against him was a mere fabrication. After all, "frame-up, like alibi, is generally viewed with caution by this Court, because it is easy to contrive and difficult to disprove. Moreover, it is a common and standard line of defense in prosecutions of violations of the Dangerous Drugs Act."[48]
2011-06-15
VELASCO JR., J.
Concomitantly, this Court has held in several cases that "denials unsubstantiated by convincing evidence are not enough to engender reasonable doubt particularly where the prosecution presents sufficiently telling proof of guilt," [77] as in the case at bar.
2011-06-01
PEREZ, J.
Moreover, there is no requirement that prior surveillance should be conducted before a buy-bust operation can be undertaken.  Prior surveillance is not a prerequisite for the validity of an entrapment or a buy-bust operation, there being no fixed or textbook method for conducting one.[56]  It is enough that the elements of the crime are proven by credible witnesses and other pieces of evidence.[57]
2011-01-26
VELASCO JR., J.
This Court has held consistently that "denials unsubstantiated by convincing evidence are not enough to engender reasonable doubt particularly where the prosecution presents sufficiently telling proof of guilt,"[43] as in the instant case.
2011-01-17
VELASCO JR., J.
Time and again, We have held that "denials unsubstantiated by convincing evidence are not enough to engender reasonable doubt particularly where the prosecution presents sufficiently telling proof of guilt."[43]
2010-06-29
MENDOZA, J.
For the claim of frame-up to prosper, the defense must be able to present clear and convincing evidence to overcome this presumption of regularity.[13] Frame-up, like alibi, is generally viewed with caution by this Court because it is easy to contrive and difficult to disprove.  Moreover, it is a common and standard line of defense in prosecution of violations of the Dangerous Drugs Act.[14]
2010-04-23
VELASCO JR., J.
In the face of SPO2 Jamila's positive testimony, accused-appellant's denial is self-serving and has little weight in law. A bare denial is an inherently weak defense[40] and has been invariably viewed by this Court with disfavor for it can be easily concocted but difficult to prove, and is a common standard line of defense in most prosecutions arising from violations of RA 9165.[41] Time and again, We have held that "denials unsubstantiated by convincing evidence are not enough to engender reasonable doubt, particularly where the prosecution presents sufficiently telling proof of guilt."[42]
2009-07-23
VELASCO JR., J.
Cortez's main defense of denial cannot prevail over the affirmative and credible testimony of SP02 Zipagan pointing Cortez as the seller of the prohibited substance. Denial, if not substantiated by clear and convincing proof, is negative and self-serving evidence and of little, if any, weight in law. As it can easily be fabricated, in fact a common standard line of defense in most prosecutions arising from violations of RA 9165,[31] denial is inherently weak.[32] And the Court is at loss to understand how Cortez can with a straight face set up the defense of denial after having been caught in possession of the prohibited substance for which he received PhP 200 from SPO2 Zipagan.
2009-06-22
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.
Settled is the rule that the absence of a prior surveillance or test buy does not affect the legality of the buy-bust operation. There is no textbook method of conducting buy-bust operations. The Court has left to the discretion of police authorities the selection of effective means to apprehend drug dealers.[27] A prior surveillance, much less a lengthy one, is not necessary, especially where the police operatives are accompanied by their informant during the entrapment.[28] Flexibility is a trait of good police work.[29] We have held that when time is of the essence, the police may dispense with the need for prior surveillance.[30] In the instant case, having been accompanied by the informant to the person who was peddling the dangerous drugs, the policemen need not have conducted any prior surveillance before they undertook the buy-bust operation.
2008-07-28
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.
Having been caught in flagrante, appellant's identity as seller and possessor of the shabu can no longer be disputed.  Against the positive testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, appellant's plain denial of the offenses charged, unsubstantiated by any credible and convincing evidence, must simply fail.[62]   Frame-up, like alibi, is generally viewed with caution by this Court, because it is easy to contrive and difficult to disprove.  Moreover, it is a common and standard line of defense in prosecutions of violations of the Dangerous Drugs Act.[63]  For this claim to prosper, the defense must adduce clear and convincing evidence to overcome the presumption that government officials have performed their duties in a regular and proper manner.[64]
2008-06-27
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.
We are not swayed.  In the case at bar, the evidence clearly shows that appellants were involved in the buy-bust operation.  Having been caught in flagrante delicto, appellants Alfredo and Henry's participation cannot be doubted.  Against the positive testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, appellants' plain denial of the offenses charged, unsubstantiated by any credible and convincing evidence, must simply fail.[48] Frame-up, like alibi, is generally viewed with caution by this Court, because it is easy to contrive and difficult to disprove.  Moreover, it is a common and standard line of defense in prosecutions of violations of the Dangerous Drugs Act.[49] For this claim to prosper, the defense must adduce clear and convincing evidence to overcome the presumption that government officials have performed their duties in a regular and proper manner. [50]
2008-04-23
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.
In the case at bar, the evidence clearly shows that appellant was the subject of a buy-bust operation.  Having been caught in flagrante delicto, his identity as seller of the shabu can no longer be doubted.  Against the positive testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, appellant's plain denial of the offenses charged, unsubstantiated by any credible and convincing evidence, must simply fail.[28]   Frame-up, like alibi, is generally viewed with caution by this Court, because it is easy to contrive and difficult to disprove.  Moreover, it is a common and standard line of defense in prosecutions of violations of the Dangerous Drugs Act.[29]  For this claim to prosper, the defense must adduce clear and convincing evidence to overcome the presumption that government officials have performed their duties in a regular and proper manner.[30]  This, appellant failed to do.  The presumption remained unrebutted because the defense failed to present clear and convincing evidence that the police officers did not properly perform their duty or that they were inspired by an improper motive.
2007-02-08
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.
 [39] People v. Eugenio, 443 Phil. 411, 419 (2003).
2004-04-14
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.
Anent the buy-bust money, the prosecution merely presented photocopies of the marked money used in the buy-bust operation. The trial court is correct in not considering the non-presentation of the entire amount thereof as a mortal blow to the prosecution's case. We have held in People vs. Eugenio[55] presentation of buy-bust money is not indispensable to the prosecution of a drug case."[56]
2004-04-14
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.
Anent the buy-bust money, the prosecution merely presented photocopies of the marked money used in the buy-bust operation. The trial court is correct in not considering the non-presentation of the entire amount thereof as a mortal blow to the prosecution's case. We have held in People vs. Eugenio[55] presentation of buy-bust money is not indispensable to the prosecution of a drug case."[56]
2004-03-15
CARPIO MORALES, J.
daring and openly defiant of the law.[27] As for the non-presentation by the prosecution of the confidential informant, it is well-settled that except when the appellant vehemently denies selling prohibited drugs and there are material inconsistencies in the testimonies of the arresting officers, or there are reasons
2004-02-16
QUISUMBING, J.
Moreover, we are not persuaded that no illicit transaction took place. The offer to sell and then the sale itself arose when the poseur-buyer showed the money to appellant, which prompted the latter to show the contents of the carton, and hand it over to the poseur-buyer. Mere showing of the said regulated drug does not negate the existence of an offer to sell or an actual sale.[35] Before appellant and Mapoy met, the informant had already disclosed to appellant the intention of Mapoy to buy shabu. Thus, when appellant and Mapoy met, appellant's intention of selling "shabu" to Mapoy was undeniably manifest. The consummation of the crime charged herein may be sufficiently established even in the absence of an exchange of money.[36] After all, there is no fixed procedure for conducting a "buy-bust" operation. The crime of illegal sale is committed as soon as the sale transaction is consummated. The payment could precede or follow delivery of the drug sold.[37]
2004-01-14
CALLEJO, SR., J.
Even if the xerox copy of the P500.00 bill was erroneously admitted in evidence by the trial court, the absence of the original of the marked money is inconsequential.   The marked money used in the buy-bust operation is not indispensable in drug cases;[32] it is merely corroborative evidence.  Moreover, the appellant was charged not only for the sale of marijuana but also for the delivery thereof, which is committed by the mere delivery or transfer of the prohibited drug.  The consideration for the transaction is of no moment.[33]
2003-04-29
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.
Fifth, appellant contends that those engaged in the sale of illegal drugs would not readily turn over their merchandise without counting the money tendered as payment therefor. He points out that "drug fiends are smarter than that."[10] However, that statement is not always true. In any event, we respect the trial court's assessment of the credibility not only of the witnesses' testimony, but most importantly, of the witnesses themselves as manifested by their demeanor while testifying. Well-settled is the rule that appellate courts will not disturb on appeal the trial court's evaluation of the credibility of witnesses, absent any arbitrariness or oversight in the appreciation of facts or circumstances of weight and substance.[11]