Lawyerly

GR No. 200751

2015-08-17

LEONEN, J.

The DARAB is the quasi-judicial tribunal that has the primary jurisdiction to determine whether there is a tenancy relationship between adverse parties.[87] This court has held that "judicial determinations [of the a DARAB] have the same binding effect as judgments and orders of a regular judicial body."[88] Disputes under the jurisdiction of the DARAB include controversies relating to:tenurial arrangements, whether leasehold, tenancy, stewardship or otherwise, over lands devoted to agriculture, including disputes concerning farmworkers associations or representation of persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing or seeking to arrange terms or conditions of such tenurial arrangements.[89]

GR No. 167237

2010-04-23

ASSOCIATED ANGLO-AMERICAN TOBACCO CORPORATION v. CA

DEL CASTILLO, J.

Petitioners are questioning a final decision of the CA by resorting to Rule 65, when their remedy should be based on Rule 45. This case would normally have been dismissed outright for failure of the petitioners to adopt the proper remedy. While ordinarily, certiorari is unavailing where the appeal period has lapsed, there are exceptions. Among them are (a) when public welfare and the advancement of public policy dictates; (b) when the broader interest of justice so requires; (c) when the writs issued are null and void; or (d) when the questioned order amounts to an oppressive exercise of judicial authority.[8] In the present case, the CA's act of dismissing petitioners' petition for certiorari and in finding the RTC's Decision already final and executory in its entirety, despite the filing by the petitioners of a Notice of Appeal within 15 days from their receipt of the February 7, 2001 RTC Order amending the said RTC Decision is an oppressive exercise of judicial authority. Hence, in the interest of substantial justice, we deem it wise to overlook the procedural technicalities.

GR No. 127965

2009-01-20

FRANCISCO SALAZAR v. REYNALDO DE LEON

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.

In Vda. de Tangub v. Court of Appeals,[33] the Court held that the jurisdiction of the DAR concerns the (1) determination and adjudication of all matters involving implementation of agrarian reform; (2) resolution of agrarian conflicts and land-tenure related problems; and (3) approval or disapproval of the conversion, restructuring or readjustment of agricultural lands into residential, commercial, industrial, or other non-agricultural use. The DAR, in turn, exercises this jurisdiction through its adjudicating arm, the Department of Agrarian Reform and Adjudication Board (DARAB).[34]

GR No. 171961

2008-11-28

FERDINAND A. DELA CRUZ v. AMELIA G. QUIAZON

NACHURA, J.

However, contrary to petitioners' posture, the issuance of a CLT does not vest full ownership in the holder.[29] The issuance of the CLT does not sever the tenancy relationship between the landowner and the tenant-farmer. A certificate of land transfer merely evinces that the grantee thereof is qualified to avail himself of the statutory mechanism for the acquisition of ownership of the land tilled by him as provided under P.D. No. 27. It is not a muniment of title that vests in the farmer/grantee absolute ownership of his tillage. [30] It is only after compliance with the conditions which entitle a farmer/grantee to an emancipation patent that he acquires the vested right of absolute ownership in the landholding--a right which then would have become fixed and established, and no longer open to doubt or controversy.[31]

GR No. 140656 & 154482

2007-09-13

MAYOR FELIPE K. CONSTANTINO v. SANDIGANBAYAN

TINGA, J.

Although the instant case involves a criminal charge whereas Constantino involved an administrative charge, still the findings in the latter case are binding herein because the same set of facts are the subject of both cases. What is decisive is that the issues already litigated in a final and executory judgment preclude by the principle of bar by prior judgment, an aspect of the doctrine of res judicata, and even under the doctrine of "law of the case," the re-litigation of the same issue in another action.[47] It is well established that when a right or fact has been judicially tried and determined by a court of competent jurisdiction, so long as it remains unreversed, it should be conclusive upon the parties and those in privity with them.[48] The dictum therein laid down became the law of the case and what was once irrevocably established as the controlling legal rule or decision continues to be binding between the same parties as long as the facts on which the decision was predicated continue to be the facts of the case before the court. Hence, the binding effect and enforceability of that dictum can no longer be resurrected anew since such issue had already been resolved and finally laid to rest, if not by the principle of res judicata, at least by conclusiveness of judgment.[49]

GR NO. 153456

2007-03-02

ROBERTO PADUA v. CA

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.

Padua insists, however, that his status in relation to Lot No. 90 was no longer that of a mere potential agrarian reform farmer-beneficiary but a civil law vendor dealing directly with the LBP in the payment of amortizations on the property.[36] That view is incorrect. The statutory mechanism for the acquisition of land through agrarian reform requires full payment of amortization before a farmer-beneficiary may be issued a CLOA or EP, which, in turn, can become the basis for issuance in his name of an original or a transfer certificate of title.[37] As Padua himself admitted that he is still paying amortization on Lot No. 90 to LBP, his status in relation to said property remains that of a mere potential farmer-beneficiary whose eligibilities DAR may either confirm or reject. In fact, under Section 2 (d) of Administrative Order No. 06-00, DAR has authority to issue, recall, or cancel a CLT, CBC, EP, or CLOA issued to potential farmer-beneficiaries but not yet registered with the Register of Deeds.[38]

GR NO. 129165

2006-10-30

SPS. RODRIGO COLOSO AND ELISA COLOSO v. SECRETARY ERNESTO V. GARILAO

VELASCO, JR., J.

It is well established that "when a right or fact has been judicially tried and determined by a court of competent jurisdiction, so long as it remains unreversed, it should be conclusive upon the parties and those in privity with them."[22]

GR NO. 154490

2006-09-19

SPS. ROMULO AND GUILLERMA CUBA v. MANUEL V. CUENCO

SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.

SEC. 50. Quasi-Judicial Powers of the DAR. - The DAR is hereby vested with primary jurisdiction to determine and adjudicate agrarian reform matters and shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over all matters involving the implementation of agrarian reform, except those falling under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Department of Agriculture (DA) and the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR). (Underscoring supplied) In Vda. de Tangub v. Court of Appeals,[9] we held that the jurisdiction of the DAR concerns the (1) determination and adjudication of all matters involving implementation of agrarian reform; (2) resolution of agrarian conflicts and land-tenure related problems; and (3) approval or disapproval of the conversion, restructuring or readjustment of agricultural lands into residential, commercial, industrial, and other non-agricultural uses. The DAR, in turn, exercises this jurisdiction through its adjudicating arm, the DARAB.[10]

GR NO. 163655

2006-06-16

INOCENCIO ALIMBOBOYOG v. CA

TINGA, J.

It appears that Alimboboyog, as affirmed by the Provincial Adjudicator's Decision, pins his cause on the CLT issued to his father. However, a CLT merely evinces that the grantee thereof is qualified to avail of the statutory mechanisms for the acquisition of ownership of the land tilled by him as provided under Pres. Decree No. 27. It is not a muniment of title that vests upon the farmer/grantee absolute ownership of his tillage.[11] Moreover, the subsequent cancellation of the said CLT on the ground that Noblefranca's property is exempt from the coverage of Operation Land Transfer invalidates Alimboboyog's claim of full ownership of the property.

GR NO. 140319

2006-05-05

RODOLFO HERMOSO v. C.L. REALTY CORPORATION

GARCIA, J.

Vis-a-vis petitioners' jurisdictional challenge, it may be stated that the DAR, through its adjudication arm, i.e., the DARAB and its regional and provincial adjudication boards, exercises quasi-judicial functions and jurisdiction on all matters pertaining to agrarian dispute or controversy and the implementation of agrarian reform laws.[11] In Nuesa vs. Court of Appeals,[12] the Court, citing the Revised Rules of Procedure of the DARAB, stated that the DARAB has primary, original and appellate jurisdiction "to determine and adjudicate all agrarian disputes, cases, controversies, and matters or incidents involving the implementation of all the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program [CARP] under R.A. 6657, E.O. Nos. 228, 229 and 129-A, R.A. 3844, as amended by R.A. 6389, P.D. No. 27 and other agrarian laws and their implementing rules and regulations." The Court made a similar pronouncement on the jurisdiction of DARAB in Bautista vs. Mag-isa Vda. De Villa.[13] Under Section 1(f) of the DARAB Rules of Procedure, such jurisdiction of the DARAB includes cases involving "the issuance, correction and cancellation of ... (CLOAs) and Emancipation Patents (EPs) which are registered with the Land Registration Authority." Surely, such jurisdiction cannot be deemed to disappear the moment a certificate of title is issued. For, such certificates are not modes of transfer of property but merely evidence of such transfer. Needless to state, there can be no valid transfer of title should the CLOA on which it was grounded is void.

GR NO. 154286

2006-02-28

MAGDALENA CORUÑA v. SATURNINO CINAMIN

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.

In the case at bar, respondents submitted as evidence the accomplished forms of Land Valuation Summary & Farmer's Undertaking of the LBP[41] and the average gross production prepared by the BCLP's in Barangays Hinigaran and Payao, Binalbagan, Negros Occidental.[42] To our mind, however, these documentary evidence, pertaining merely to the valuation of the subject lands, do not meet the requirement of Pres. Decree No. 27 and Pres. Decree No. 266 with respect to the issuance of emancipation patents to respondents. Valuation of the land is only one aspect of the whole process of agrarian reform; full compensation for the value of land is another. As discussed above, the laws mandate the full compensation for the lands acquired under Pres. Decree No. 27 prior to the issuance of emancipation patents. This is understandable particularly since the emancipation patent presupposes that the grantee thereof has already complied with all the requirements prescribed by Pres. Decree No. 27.[43] The issuance of emancipation patent, therefore, conclusively vests upon the farmer/grantee the rights of absolute ownership over the land awarded to him.[44]

GR NO. 147081

2005-12-09

PLANTERS DEVELOPMENT BANK v. FRANCISCO GARCIA

CORONA, J.

But, as correctly argued by PDB, more current decisions of this Court (where the interpretation of the phrase "deemed owner" was directly tackled) have clarified these pronouncements by distinguishing the legal effects of a CLT and those of an emancipation patent. Martillano v. Court of Appeals [35] is instructive:Both instruments have varying legal effects and implications insofar as the grantee's entitlements to his landholdings. A certificate of land transfer merely evinces that the grantee thereof is qualified to, in the words of Pagtalunan, "avail of the statutory mechanisms for the acquisition of ownership of the land tilled by him as provided under Pres. Decree No. 27." It is not a muniment of title that vests upon the farmer/grantee absolute ownership of his tillage. On the other hand, an emancipation patent, while it presupposes that the grantee thereof shall have already complied with all the requirements prescribed under Presidential Decree No. 27, serves as a basis for the issuance of a transfer certificate of title. It is the issuance of this emancipation patent that conclusively entitles the farmer/grantee of the rights of absolute ownership. Pagtalunan distinctly recognizes this point when it said that:

GR NO. 122202

2005-05-26

HEIRS OF LATE FAUSTINA ADALID ALSO KNOWN AS CRISTINA ADALID NAMELY ELENA JAMITO v. CA

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.

The petitioners advance the theory that petitioner Francisca Jamito, a legal heir of Faustina Adalid, and the respondent Register of Deeds of Bais City were not parties to the earlier case, therefore, there was no identity of parties between the first case and the second case. We do not agree. The principle of res judicata may not be evaded by the mere expedient of including an additional party to the first and second action.[20] Only substantial identity is necessary to warrant the application of res judicata. The addition or elimination of some parties does not alter the situation.[21] There is substantial identity of parties when there is a community of interest between a party in the first case and a party in the second case albeit the latter was not impleaded in the first case.[22] As fittingly held by the Court of Appeals:The appellants' pleadings both here and in the lower court admit that they are the descendants, and hence, the representatives of their predecessors-in-interest who were the defendants in Civil Case No. 4049. As such, the decision in the earlier case is binding on them and they are substantially the same persons who were parties in the earlier case. The addition of the Register of Deeds as a party in this case is of no moment as he is a mere nominal party.[23]

GR NO. 163448

2005-03-08

NATIONAL FOOD AUTHORITY v. MASADA SECURITY AGENCY

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.

At the outset, it should be noted that the proper remedy of NFA from the adverse decision of the trial court is a petition for review under Rule 45 directly with this Court because the issue involved a question of law. However, in the interest of justice we deem it wise to overlook the procedural technicalities if only to demonstrate that despite the procedural infirmity, the instant petition is impressed with merit.[17]

	GR No. 200751 2015-08-17	MONICO LIGTAS v. PEOPLE LEONEN, J.
The DARAB is the quasi-judicial tribunal that has the primary jurisdiction to determine whether there is a tenancy relationship between adverse parties.[87] This court has held that "judicial determinations [of the a DARAB] have the same binding effect as judgments and orders of a regular judicial body."[88] Disputes under the jurisdiction of the DARAB include controversies relating to:tenurial arrangements, whether leasehold, tenancy, stewardship or otherwise, over lands devoted to agriculture, including disputes concerning farmworkers associations or representation of persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing or seeking to arrange terms or conditions of such tenurial arrangements.[89]
	GR No. 167237 2010-04-23	ASSOCIATED ANGLO-AMERICAN TOBACCO CORPORATION v. CA DEL CASTILLO, J.
Petitioners are questioning a final decision of the CA by resorting to Rule 65, when their remedy should be based on Rule 45. This case would normally have been dismissed outright for failure of the petitioners to adopt the proper remedy. While ordinarily, certiorari is unavailing where the appeal period has lapsed, there are exceptions. Among them are (a) when public welfare and the advancement of public policy dictates; (b) when the broader interest of justice so requires; (c) when the writs issued are null and void; or (d) when the questioned order amounts to an oppressive exercise of judicial authority.[8] In the present case, the CA's act of dismissing petitioners' petition for certiorari and in finding the RTC's Decision already final and executory in its entirety, despite the filing by the petitioners of a Notice of Appeal within 15 days from their receipt of the February 7, 2001 RTC Order amending the said RTC Decision is an oppressive exercise of judicial authority. Hence, in the interest of substantial justice, we deem it wise to overlook the procedural technicalities.
	GR No. 127965 2009-01-20	FRANCISCO SALAZAR v. REYNALDO DE LEON CHICO-NAZARIO, J.
In Vda. de Tangub v. Court of Appeals,[33] the Court held that the jurisdiction of the DAR concerns the (1) determination and adjudication of all matters involving implementation of agrarian reform; (2) resolution of agrarian conflicts and land-tenure related problems; and (3) approval or disapproval of the conversion, restructuring or readjustment of agricultural lands into residential, commercial, industrial, or other non-agricultural use. The DAR, in turn, exercises this jurisdiction through its adjudicating arm, the Department of Agrarian Reform and Adjudication Board (DARAB).[34]
	GR No. 171961 2008-11-28	FERDINAND A. DELA CRUZ v. AMELIA G. QUIAZON NACHURA, J.
However, contrary to petitioners' posture, the issuance of a CLT does not vest full ownership in the holder.[29] The issuance of the CLT does not sever the tenancy relationship between the landowner and the tenant-farmer. A certificate of land transfer merely evinces that the grantee thereof is qualified to avail himself of the statutory mechanism for the acquisition of ownership of the land tilled by him as provided under P.D. No. 27. It is not a muniment of title that vests in the farmer/grantee absolute ownership of his tillage. [30] It is only after compliance with the conditions which entitle a farmer/grantee to an emancipation patent that he acquires the vested right of absolute ownership in the landholding--a right which then would have become fixed and established, and no longer open to doubt or controversy.[31]
	GR No. 140656 & 154482 2007-09-13	MAYOR FELIPE K. CONSTANTINO v. SANDIGANBAYAN TINGA, J.
Although the instant case involves a criminal charge whereas Constantino involved an administrative charge, still the findings in the latter case are binding herein because the same set of facts are the subject of both cases. What is decisive is that the issues already litigated in a final and executory judgment preclude by the principle of bar by prior judgment, an aspect of the doctrine of res judicata, and even under the doctrine of "law of the case," the re-litigation of the same issue in another action.[47] It is well established that when a right or fact has been judicially tried and determined by a court of competent jurisdiction, so long as it remains unreversed, it should be conclusive upon the parties and those in privity with them.[48] The dictum therein laid down became the law of the case and what was once irrevocably established as the controlling legal rule or decision continues to be binding between the same parties as long as the facts on which the decision was predicated continue to be the facts of the case before the court. Hence, the binding effect and enforceability of that dictum can no longer be resurrected anew since such issue had already been resolved and finally laid to rest, if not by the principle of res judicata, at least by conclusiveness of judgment.[49]
	GR NO. 153456 2007-03-02	ROBERTO PADUA v. CA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.
Padua insists, however, that his status in relation to Lot No. 90 was no longer that of a mere potential agrarian reform farmer-beneficiary but a civil law vendor dealing directly with the LBP in the payment of amortizations on the property.[36] That view is incorrect. The statutory mechanism for the acquisition of land through agrarian reform requires full payment of amortization before a farmer-beneficiary may be issued a CLOA or EP, which, in turn, can become the basis for issuance in his name of an original or a transfer certificate of title.[37] As Padua himself admitted that he is still paying amortization on Lot No. 90 to LBP, his status in relation to said property remains that of a mere potential farmer-beneficiary whose eligibilities DAR may either confirm or reject. In fact, under Section 2 (d) of Administrative Order No. 06-00, DAR has authority to issue, recall, or cancel a CLT, CBC, EP, or CLOA issued to potential farmer-beneficiaries but not yet registered with the Register of Deeds.[38]
	GR NO. 129165 2006-10-30	SPS. RODRIGO COLOSO AND ELISA COLOSO v. SECRETARY ERNESTO V. GARILAO VELASCO, JR., J.
It is well established that "when a right or fact has been judicially tried and determined by a court of competent jurisdiction, so long as it remains unreversed, it should be conclusive upon the parties and those in privity with them."[22]
	GR NO. 154490 2006-09-19	SPS. ROMULO AND GUILLERMA CUBA v. MANUEL V. CUENCO SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.
SEC. 50. Quasi-Judicial Powers of the DAR. - The DAR is hereby vested with primary jurisdiction to determine and adjudicate agrarian reform matters and shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over all matters involving the implementation of agrarian reform, except those falling under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Department of Agriculture (DA) and the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR). (Underscoring supplied) In Vda. de Tangub v. Court of Appeals,[9] we held that the jurisdiction of the DAR concerns the (1) determination and adjudication of all matters involving implementation of agrarian reform; (2) resolution of agrarian conflicts and land-tenure related problems; and (3) approval or disapproval of the conversion, restructuring or readjustment of agricultural lands into residential, commercial, industrial, and other non-agricultural uses. The DAR, in turn, exercises this jurisdiction through its adjudicating arm, the DARAB.[10]
	GR NO. 163655 2006-06-16	INOCENCIO ALIMBOBOYOG v. CA TINGA, J.
It appears that Alimboboyog, as affirmed by the Provincial Adjudicator's Decision, pins his cause on the CLT issued to his father. However, a CLT merely evinces that the grantee thereof is qualified to avail of the statutory mechanisms for the acquisition of ownership of the land tilled by him as provided under Pres. Decree No. 27. It is not a muniment of title that vests upon the farmer/grantee absolute ownership of his tillage.[11] Moreover, the subsequent cancellation of the said CLT on the ground that Noblefranca's property is exempt from the coverage of Operation Land Transfer invalidates Alimboboyog's claim of full ownership of the property.
	GR NO. 140319 2006-05-05	RODOLFO HERMOSO v. C.L. REALTY CORPORATION GARCIA, J.
Vis-a-vis petitioners' jurisdictional challenge, it may be stated that the DAR, through its adjudication arm, i.e., the DARAB and its regional and provincial adjudication boards, exercises quasi-judicial functions and jurisdiction on all matters pertaining to agrarian dispute or controversy and the implementation of agrarian reform laws.[11] In Nuesa vs. Court of Appeals,[12] the Court, citing the Revised Rules of Procedure of the DARAB, stated that the DARAB has primary, original and appellate jurisdiction "to determine and adjudicate all agrarian disputes, cases, controversies, and matters or incidents involving the implementation of all the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program [CARP] under R.A. 6657, E.O. Nos. 228, 229 and 129-A, R.A. 3844, as amended by R.A. 6389, P.D. No. 27 and other agrarian laws and their implementing rules and regulations." The Court made a similar pronouncement on the jurisdiction of DARAB in Bautista vs. Mag-isa Vda. De Villa.[13] Under Section 1(f) of the DARAB Rules of Procedure, such jurisdiction of the DARAB includes cases involving "the issuance, correction and cancellation of ... (CLOAs) and Emancipation Patents (EPs) which are registered with the Land Registration Authority." Surely, such jurisdiction cannot be deemed to disappear the moment a certificate of title is issued. For, such certificates are not modes of transfer of property but merely evidence of such transfer. Needless to state, there can be no valid transfer of title should the CLOA on which it was grounded is void.
	GR NO. 154286 2006-02-28	MAGDALENA CORUÑA v. SATURNINO CINAMIN CHICO-NAZARIO, J.
In the case at bar, respondents submitted as evidence the accomplished forms of Land Valuation Summary & Farmer's Undertaking of the LBP[41] and the average gross production prepared by the BCLP's in Barangays Hinigaran and Payao, Binalbagan, Negros Occidental.[42] To our mind, however, these documentary evidence, pertaining merely to the valuation of the subject lands, do not meet the requirement of Pres. Decree No. 27 and Pres. Decree No. 266 with respect to the issuance of emancipation patents to respondents. Valuation of the land is only one aspect of the whole process of agrarian reform; full compensation for the value of land is another. As discussed above, the laws mandate the full compensation for the lands acquired under Pres. Decree No. 27 prior to the issuance of emancipation patents. This is understandable particularly since the emancipation patent presupposes that the grantee thereof has already complied with all the requirements prescribed by Pres. Decree No. 27.[43] The issuance of emancipation patent, therefore, conclusively vests upon the farmer/grantee the rights of absolute ownership over the land awarded to him.[44]
	GR NO. 147081 2005-12-09	PLANTERS DEVELOPMENT BANK v. FRANCISCO GARCIA CORONA, J.
But, as correctly argued by PDB, more current decisions of this Court (where the interpretation of the phrase "deemed owner" was directly tackled) have clarified these pronouncements by distinguishing the legal effects of a CLT and those of an emancipation patent. Martillano v. Court of Appeals [35] is instructive:Both instruments have varying legal effects and implications insofar as the grantee's entitlements to his landholdings. A certificate of land transfer merely evinces that the grantee thereof is qualified to, in the words of Pagtalunan, "avail of the statutory mechanisms for the acquisition of ownership of the land tilled by him as provided under Pres. Decree No. 27." It is not a muniment of title that vests upon the farmer/grantee absolute ownership of his tillage. On the other hand, an emancipation patent, while it presupposes that the grantee thereof shall have already complied with all the requirements prescribed under Presidential Decree No. 27, serves as a basis for the issuance of a transfer certificate of title. It is the issuance of this emancipation patent that conclusively entitles the farmer/grantee of the rights of absolute ownership. Pagtalunan distinctly recognizes this point when it said that:
	GR NO. 122202 2005-05-26	HEIRS OF LATE FAUSTINA ADALID ALSO KNOWN AS CRISTINA ADALID NAMELY ELENA JAMITO v. CA CHICO-NAZARIO, J.
The petitioners advance the theory that petitioner Francisca Jamito, a legal heir of Faustina Adalid, and the respondent Register of Deeds of Bais City were not parties to the earlier case, therefore, there was no identity of parties between the first case and the second case. We do not agree. The principle of res judicata may not be evaded by the mere expedient of including an additional party to the first and second action.[20] Only substantial identity is necessary to warrant the application of res judicata. The addition or elimination of some parties does not alter the situation.[21] There is substantial identity of parties when there is a community of interest between a party in the first case and a party in the second case albeit the latter was not impleaded in the first case.[22] As fittingly held by the Court of Appeals:The appellants' pleadings both here and in the lower court admit that they are the descendants, and hence, the representatives of their predecessors-in-interest who were the defendants in Civil Case No. 4049. As such, the decision in the earlier case is binding on them and they are substantially the same persons who were parties in the earlier case. The addition of the Register of Deeds as a party in this case is of no moment as he is a mere nominal party.[23]
	GR NO. 163448 2005-03-08	NATIONAL FOOD AUTHORITY v. MASADA SECURITY AGENCY YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.
At the outset, it should be noted that the proper remedy of NFA from the adverse decision of the trial court is a petition for review under Rule 45 directly with this Court because the issue involved a question of law. However, in the interest of justice we deem it wise to overlook the procedural technicalities if only to demonstrate that despite the procedural infirmity, the instant petition is impressed with merit.[17]

NICANOR MARTILLANO v. CA