This case has been cited 23 times or more.
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2014-06-04 |
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J. |
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| In this case, the OSG succinctly put things in perspective when it argued that "[AAA] could hardly be faulted for behaving as she did. Being in her early years, and [accused-appellant] exercising moral ascendancy over her, she could not be expected to go against his orders, especially when the history of violence between them is considered. Such history has instilled fear upon her which started since she was still a child x x x her passive submission to the sexual act will neither mitigate nor absolve [accused-appellant] from liability." In any case, with such shocking and horrifying experience, it would not be reasonable to impose upon AAA any standard form of reaction, especially at such tender age. Time and again, this Court has recognized that different people react differently to a given situation involving a startling occurrence.[37] The workings of the human mind placed under emotional stress are unpredictable, and people react differently - some may shout, others may faint, and still others may be shocked into insensibility even if there may be a few who may openly welcome the intrusion.[38] More to the point, physical resistance is not the sole test to determine whether a woman involuntarily succumbed to the lust of an accused.[39] | |||||
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2014-02-12 |
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J. |
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| In this case, appellant Jastiva insistently makes an issue out of AAA's failure to shout for help or struggle against him, which for him does nothing but erode her credibility. This Court, however, does not agree. It does not follow that because AAA failed to shout for help or struggle against her attacker means that she could not have been raped. The force, violence, or intimidation in rape is a relative term, depending not only on the age, size, and strength of the parties but also on their relationship with each other.[45] And physical resistance need not be established in rape when intimidation is exercised upon the victim and the latter submits herself against her will to the rapist's advances because of fear for her life and personal safety.[46] Record disclose that in this case, AAA was already 67 years of age when she was raped in the dark by appellant Jastiva who was armed with a knife. Justifiably, a woman of such advanced age could only recoil in fear and succumb into submission. In any case, with such shocking and horrifying experience, it would not be reasonable to impose upon AAA any standard form of reaction. Time and again, this Court has recognized that different people react differently to a given situation involving a startling occurrence.[47] The workings of the human mind placed under emotional stress are unpredictable, and people react differently - some may shout, others may faint, and still others may be shocked into insensibility even if there may be a few who may openly welcome the intrusion.[48] | |||||
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2011-10-19 |
BERSAMIN, J. |
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| That AAA's recollection on the rape was corroborated by the results of the medico-legal examination was sufficient proof of the consummation of rape. We have ruled that rape can be established by the sole testimony of the victim that is credible and untainted with serious uncertainty.[26] With more reason is this true when the medical findings supported the testimony of the victim,[27] like herein. | |||||
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2010-12-08 |
PEREZ, J. |
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| The records likewise revealed that AAA was in tears while positively identifying appellant and Danny Alcanices as her ravisher, as well as in recounting the circumstances surrounding her ordeal.[53] The crying of the victim during her testimony is evidence of the credibility of the rape charge with the verity born out of human nature and experience.[54] Moreover, the straightforward narration of AAA on how she was raped coupled by her categorical identification of appellant and Danny Alcanices as the malefactors sealed the case for the prosecution.[55] | |||||
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2010-07-28 |
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J. |
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| In reviewing rape cases, this Court is guided by three principles: (1) an accusation of rape can be made with facility, and while the accusation is difficult to prove, it is even more difficult for the person accused, although innocent, to disprove; (2) considering the intrinsic nature of the crime, only two persons being usually involved, the testimony of the complainant should be scrutinized with great caution; and (3) the evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall on its own merit, and cannot be allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the evidence for the defense.[37] | |||||
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2009-08-27 |
CHICO-NAZARIO, J. |
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| In reviewing rape cases, this Court is guided by three principles: (1) an accusation of rape can be made with facility, and while the accusation is difficult to prove, it is even more difficult for the person accused, although innocent, to disprove; (2) considering the intrinsic nature of the crime, only two persons being usually involved, the testimony of the complainant should be scrutinized with great caution; and (3) the evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall on its own merit, and cannot be allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the evidence for the defense.[12] | |||||
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2009-08-04 |
CHICO-NAZARIO, J. |
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| Accused-appellant relies on his averment that he was harvesting mangoes in Casantiagoan, Pangasinan when the incidents occurred. For alibi to succeed as a defense, the accused must establish by clear and convincing evidence (a) his presence at another place at the time of the perpetration of the offense and (b) the physical impossibility of his presence at the scene of the crime.[15] No other principle in criminal law jurisprudence is more settled than that alibi is the frailest of all defenses as it is prone to fabrication. | |||||
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2008-12-17 |
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J. |
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| For alibi to prosper, the accused must establish by clear and convincing evidence (a) his presence at another place at the time of the perpetration of the offense and (b) the physical impossibility of his presence at the scene of the crime at the time.[30] Where there is even the least chance for the accused to be present at the crime scene, the defense of alibi will not hold water.[31] Clearly in this case, the physical impossibility of accused-appellant's presence at the scene of the crime on the date and time of its commission, has not been sufficiently established. | |||||
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2008-12-04 |
CHICO-NAZARIO, J. |
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| A No, sir.[8] The fact that this testimony came from a young barrio girl who charged her own father with rape added more credibility to her testimony. We have held that no young girl would concoct a sordid tale of so serious a crime as rape at the hands of her own father, undergo medical examination, then subject herself to the stigma and embarrassment of a public trial, if her motive were other than a fervent desire to seek justice.[9] | |||||
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2008-11-28 |
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J. |
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| This Court has ruled that in the review of rape cases, the Court is guided by the following precepts: (a) an accusation of rape can be made with facility, but it is more difficult for the accused, though innocent, to disprove it; (b) the complainant's testimony must be scrutinized with extreme caution since, by the very nature of the crime, only two persons are normally involved; and (c) if the complainant's testimony is convincingly credible, the accused may be convicted of the crime.[24] | |||||
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2008-11-26 |
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J. |
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| This Court has ruled that in the review of rape cases, the Court is guided by the following precepts: (a) an accusation of rape can be made with facility, but it is more difficult for the accused, though innocent, to disprove it; (b) the complainant's testimony must be scrutinized with extreme caution since, by the very nature of the crime, only two persons are normally involved; and (c) if the complainant's testimony is convincingly credible, the accused may be convicted of the crime.[27] | |||||
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2008-10-24 |
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J. |
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| Accused-appellant relies on his alibi that he was in his boarding house located along USM Avenue, Kabacan, Cotabato the whole morning of September 15, 1995. For alibi to prosper, however, the accused must establish by clear and convincing evidence (a) his presence at another place at the time of the perpetration of the offense and (b) the physical impossibility of his presence at the scene of the crime.[18] Where there is even the least chance for the accused to be present at the crime scene, the defense of alibi will not hold water.[19] | |||||
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2008-06-30 |
VELASCO JR., J. |
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| The exact date of the sexual assault is not an essential element of the crime of rape. What is important is the fact of the commission of the rape[14] or that there is proof of the penetration of the female organ.[15] In this case, accused-appellant admitted that he had sexual relations with the victim during the times that the alleged rape took place. His only defense was that those sexual encounters happened with AAA's consent. Thus, the matter of the exact date of the commission of the crime is already immaterial. | |||||
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2007-12-27 |
VELASCO JR., J. |
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| This Court has ruled that in the review of rape cases, we are guided by the following precepts: (a) an accusation of rape can be made with facility, but more difficult for the accused, though innocent, to disprove it; (b) the complainant's testimony must be scrutinized with extreme caution since, by the very nature of the crime, only two (2) persons are normally involved; and (c) if the complainant's testimony is convincingly credible, the accused may be convicted of the crime.[6] | |||||
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2007-09-21 |
CHICO-NAZARIO, J. |
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| Moreover, not all rape victims can be expected to conform to a set pattern of behavior. Each victim must necessarily deal with such aberrant episode in life in a way that is dictated by his or her own coping mechanism. It is settled that different people react differently to a given situation or type of situation, and there is no standard form of human behavioral response when one is confronted with a strange, startling or frightful experience.[25] | |||||
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2007-09-11 |
TINGA, J, |
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| Moreover, it is well-settled that a categorical and positive identification of an accused, without any showing of ill-motive on the part of the eyewitness testifying on the matter, prevails over alibi and denial, which are negative and self-serving evidence undeserving of bona fide weight in law unless substantiated by clear and convincing evidence.[25] The denial and alibi of appellants in this case are weak and cannot prevail over AAA's positive identification of them. For alibi to prosper, they must establish by clear and convincing evidence (a) their presence at another place at the time of the perpetration of the offense and (b) the physical impossibility of their presence at the scene of the crime.[26] Appellants' claim that they were in Guillermo's house two (2) kilometers away from the place of the crime does not convince us. It was not physically impossible for them to return to Upper Buli Creek and perpetrate the crime, for Guillermo's house in Carmina Compound is but a short distance away. In fact, Gingos initially testified that the distance between the two places was only 150 meters, which he curiously changed to two (2) kilometers subsequently in the course of his testimony.[27] | |||||
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2007-09-05 |
CHICO-NAZARIO, J. |
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| Case law has it that the failure of the victim to shout or offer tenacious resistance does not make voluntary the victim's submission to the criminal acts of the accused.[33] Not all rape victims can be expected to act conformably to the usual expectations of everyone. Different and varying degrees of behavioral responses are expected in the proximity of, or in confronting, an aberrant episode. It is well-settled that different people react differently to a given situation or type of situation.[34] There is no standard form of reaction for a woman, much more a minor, when facing a shocking and horrifying experience such as a sexual assault. The workings of the human mind placed under emotional stress are unpredictable, and people react differently - some may shout, some may faint, and some may be shocked into insensibility while others may openly welcome the intrusion.[35] In the present case, it is noteworthy that at the time the complainant was raped, she was only 14 years old,[36] while the appellant was already 23 years old, thus, her failure to shout could be attributed to the shock and horror which she felt as a result of appellant's sexual assault. | |||||
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2007-07-17 |
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J. |
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| For alibi to prosper, the accused must establish by clear and convincing evidence (a) his presence at another place at the time of the perpetration of the offense and (b) the physical impossibility of his presence at the scene of the crime.[24] Petitioner alleged he was watching television at Aurelio Pira's house, which is about 20 meters away from the barn at the time of the incident. However, it will only take one minute for him to reach the barn from the house.[25] Thus, it was not physically impossible for him to be at the scene of the crime at the time of its commission. | |||||
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2007-07-12 |
GARCIA, J. |
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| Interjected as a defense is alibi, appellant claiming that he went to Palao, Baddek, Bangued, Abra to visit his friends in the morning of April 22, 1988 and returned home only at around 5:30 p.m. For alibi to prosper, however, the hornbook rule requires a showing that the accused was at another place at the time of the perpetration of the offense and that it was physically impossible for him to be at the scene of the crime at the time of its commission.[16] Where there is even the least chance for the accused to be present at the crime scene, the defense of alibi will not hold water.[17] | |||||
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2007-05-25 |
GARCIA, J. |
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| It is a hornbook rule that for alibi to prosper, there must be a showing that the accused was at another place at the time of the perpetration of the offense and that it was physically impossible for him to be at the locus of the crime at the time of its commission.[19] The accused must not only prove that he was somewhere else when the crime was committed; he must also convincingly demonstrate that it was physically impossible for him to be at the locus criminis at the time of the incident. | |||||
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2007-02-23 |
GARCIA, J. |
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| At bottom, all that appellants could proffer by way of defense are denial and alibi, which, unfortunately for them, are inherently weak and cannot prevail over the positive and credible testimonies of the prosecution witnesses. A denial, unsubstantiated by clear and convincing evidence, is negative, self-serving and merits no weight in law.[24] On the other hand, for alibi to prosper, the hornbook rule requires a showing that the accused was at another place at the time of the perpetration of the offense and that it was physically impossible for him to be at the scene of the crime at the time of its commission.[25] The accused must not only prove that he was somewhere else when the crime was committed; he must also convincingly demonstrate that it was physically impossible for him to be at the locus criminis at the time of the incident. | |||||
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2006-08-31 |
AZCUNA, J. |
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| The Court finds nothing incredible in Sally's behavior. She woke up with appellant poking a knife at the base of her neck. The act of holding a knife, by itself, is strongly suggestive of force or at least intimidation, and threatening the victim with a knife is sufficient to bring her to submission. The victim's failure to shout for help or resist the sexual advances of the rapist does not negate the commission of rape.[18] As noted by the trial court: The fact that the accused did not shout or resist when her shorts and panty were removed because of fear (TSN, Oct. 21, 1999, p. 12) does not lessen complainant's credibility. To an innocent girl who was then barely thirteen (13) years old, the threat engendered in her a well-grounded fear that if she dared resist or frustrate the bestial desires of the accused, she and her family would be killed. Intimidation is addressed to the mind of the victim and is, therefore, subjective. It must be viewed in the light of the victim's perception and judgment at the time of the commission of the crime and not by any hard and fast rule. The workings of the human mind when placed under emotional stress are unpredictable and people react differently. In such a given situation, some may shout; some may faint; and some may be shocked into sensibility; while others may openly welcome the intrusion. (People v. Cabradilla, 133 SCRA 413 (1984)). The test for its sufficiency under Article 335 of the revised Penal Code is whether it produces a reasonable fear in the victim that if she resists or does not yield to the bestial demands of the accused, that which the latter threatened to do would happen to her, or those dear to her, in this case, her family. Where such degree of intimidation exists, and the victim is cowed into submission as a result thereof, thereby rendering resistance futile, it would be extremely unreasonable to expect the victim to resist with all her might and strength. And even if some degree of resistance would nevertheless be futile, offering none at all cannot amount to consent to the sexual assault. For rape to exist, it is not necessary that the force or intimidation employed in accomplishing it be so great or of such character as could not be resisted; it is only necessary that the force or intimidation be sufficient to consummate the purpose which the accused had in mind. (People v. Savellano, 57 SCRA 320 (1974)). Likewise, Sally's delay in reporting the incident to the authorities is understandable. It is not uncommon for young girls to conceal for some time the assault against their virtue because of the threats on their lives.[19] Failure, therefore, by the victim to file a complaint promptly to the proper authorities would not necessarily destroy the truth per se of the complaint nor would it impair the credibility of the complainant, particularly if such delay was satisfactorily explained.[20] As a matter of fact, delay in reporting a rape case due to threats is justified.[21] As the Court held in People v. Ballester:[22] Neither can appellant find refuge in complainant's failure to promptly report the sexual assault to her relatives. Long silence and delay in reporting the crime of rape has not always been construed as an indication of a false accusation. In fact this principle applies with greater force in this case where the offended party was barely twelve years old, and was therefore susceptible to intimidation and threats of physical harm. Not all rape victims can be expected to act conformably to the usual expectations of everyone. Different and varying degrees of behavioral responses is expected in the proximity of, or in confronting, an aberrant episode. It is settled that different people react differently to a given situation or type of situation and there is no standard form of human behavioral response when one is confronted with a strange, startling or frightful experience.[23] | |||||
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2005-09-14 |
PER CURIAM |
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| Anent the awards of damages, the Court of Appeals correctly modified the awards of civil indemnity and exemplary damages, which the trial court lumped together for all the crimes committed, by separately awarding the sums of P50,000.00[40] and P75,000.00[41] as civil indemnity in Criminal Case Nos. 96-125 and 96-150, respectively, and P25,000.00[42] as exemplary damages, for each count of rape, in line with the prevailing jurisprudence. | |||||